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Taking a realist view that law is one form of politics, this dissertation studies the 
roles of citizens and organizations in mobilizing the law to request government 
agencies to disclose environmental information in China, and during this process, 
how the socio-legal field interacts with the political-legal sphere, and what changes 
have been brought about during their interactions.  
 
This work takes a socio-legal approach and applies methodologies of social science 
and legal analysis.  It aims to understand the paradox of why and how citizens and 
entities have been invoking the law to access environmental information despite the 
fact that various obstacles exist and the effectiveness of the new mechanism of 
environmental information disclosure still remains low.  
 
The study is largely based on the 28 cases and eight surveys of environmental 
information disclosure requests collected by the author.  The cases and surveys 
analysed in this dissertation all occurred between May 2008, when the OGI 
Regulations and the OEI Measures came into effect, and August 2012 when the case 
collection was completed. 
 
The findings of this study have shown that by invoking the rules of law made by the 
authorities to demand government agencies disclosing environmental information, 
the public, including citizens, organizations, law firms, and the media, have 
strategically created a repercussive pressure upon the authorities to act according to 
the law.  While it is a top-down process that has established the mechanism of open 
government information in China, it is indeed the bottom-up activism of the public 
that makes it work.  Citizens and organizations’ use of legal tactics to push 
government agencies to disclose environmental information have formed not only an 
end of accessing the information but more a means of making government agencies 
accountable to their legal obligations.  Law has thus played a pivotal role in enabling 
citizen participation in the political process.  
 
Against the current situation in China that political campaigns, or politicization, 
from general election to collective actions, especially contentious actions, are still 
restrained or even repressed by the government, legal mobilization, or judicialization, 
that citizens and organizations use legal tactics to demand their rights and push 
government agencies to enforce the law, become de facto an alternative of political 
participation.  During this process, legal actions have helped to strengthen the civil 
society, make government agencies act according to law, push back the political 






In the field of environmental information disclosure, citizens and organizations have 
formed a bottom-up social activism, though limited in scope, using the language of 
law, creating progressive social, legal and political changes.  This study emphasizes 
that it is partial and incomplete to understand China’s transition only from the 
top-down policy-making and government administration; it is also important to 
observe it from the bottom-up perspective that in a realistic view law can be part of 
politics and legal mobilization, even when utterly apolitical, can help to achieve 
political aims as well.  This study of legal mobilization in the field of environmental 
information disclosure also helps us to better understand the function of law: law is 
not only a tool for the authorities to regulate and control, but inevitably also a 
weapon for the public to demand government agencies to work towards their 
obligations stipulated by the laws issued by themselves.  
 
Keywords: China, open government information, environmental information 



























Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee kansalaisten ja järjestöjen rooleja ympäristön tilaa 
koskevan tiedon vaatimisessa valtion laitoksilta hyödyntämällä sitä varten tehtyjä 
lakeja Kiinan kansantasavallassa. Tarkastelun kohteena ovat myös 
tietopyyntöprosessin yhteiskunnallis-laillisen puolen ja poliittis-laillisen puolen 
vuorovaikutuksen mukanaan tuomat muutokset. 
 
Väitöskirjan lähestymistapa on oikeussosiologinen sen hyödyntäessä 
yhteiskuntatieteen ja laintulkinnan metodeja. Sen keskiössä on kansalaisten ja 
muiden toimijoiden toiminnan ristiriita niiden hyödyntäessä lakia saadakseen 
käsiinsä ympäristön tilaa koskevaa informaatiota. Ristiriita kumpuaa tiedon saannin 
epävarmuudesta ja uuden mekanismin toimintavarmuuden kyseenalaisuudesta. 
Väitöskirjassa laki nähdään realistisen koulukunnan mukaan yhtenä politiikan 
osa-alueena. 
 
Tutkimuksen pohjana on 28 tapausta ja kahdeksan selvitystä ympäristötietoa 
koskevista tietopyynnöistä. Tapaukset ja selvitykset ajoittuvat vuoden 2008 
toukokuun jälkeiselle ajalle, jolloin Kiina otti käyttöön tiedon avoimuutta 
käsittelevät säädökset. Materiaalien keräys päättyi vuoden 2012 elokuussa. 
 
Tutkimuksen johtopäätös on, että hyödyntämällä valtion omia lainvoimaisia 
tietopyyntöjä mahdollistavia mekanismeja, kansalaiset, järjestöt, asianajotoimistot ja 
media ovat aikaansaaneet valtioon kohdistuvan paineen, joka pakottaa sen 
toimimaan lain kirjaimen mukaan. Näin ylhäältä käsin luodun mekanismin 
toimivuuden on todistanut ruohonjuuritason aktivismi. Kansalaiset ja järjestöt ovat 
siis luoneet niin pääsyn tiedon lähteille kuin keinon saattaa valtion toimijat 
vastuuseen lain edellyttämistä velvoitteistaan. Lain rooli kansalaisten 
osallistamisessa poliittiseen prosessiin on täten ilmeinen. 
 
Avainsanat: Kiinan kansantasavalta, hallinnon avoimuus, kansalaisaktivismi, 
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OEI:   open environmental information 
SC:   State Council 
EPD:   Environmental Protection Department 
EPB:   Environmental Protection Bureau 
MEP:   Ministry of Environmental Protection 
CTO:   China Transparency Organization 
NGO:  non-governmental organization 
ENGO:  environmental non-governmental organization 
CCP:   Chinese Communist Party 
NPC:   National People’s Congress 
UN:   United Nations 
EIA:   environmental impact assessment 
SEPA:  State Environmental Protection Administration 
CASS:  China Academy of Social Sciences 
NAPSS:  National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets 
SPC:   Supreme People’s Court 
IPE:   Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs 
MoA:   Ministry of Agriculture 
CLAPV:  Centre of Legal Aid for Pollution Victims 
NRDC:  Natural Resources Defense Council 
PITI:   Pollution Information Transparency Index 
FWB:  Forest & Water Bureau 
POPs:  persistent organic pollutants 
PCBs:  polychlorinated biphenyls 
ACEF:  All China Environmental Federation 





































What if I stab your shield with your spear? 
 






Effective public participation in environmental matters requires, first and foremost, 
that the public have access to environmental information.
1
  In China, special 
legislation with regard to access to environmental information includes the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information 
( 政府信息公开条例 hereafter as OGI Regulations)2 and the Interim Measures on 
Open Environmental Information (环境信息公开暂行办法 hereafter as OEI 
Measures).
3
  Both pieces of legislation were adopted in 2007,
4
 since then, in Chinese 
law scholar Jamie Horsley’s words, “China officially started its own process of 
developing an effective, enforceable nationwide information access regime.”
5
  
Stanley Lubman, the Chinese Law expert, states that “[l]egal reform shapes and 
disseminates concepts about relations between state and society that affect 
individuals’ relationships with each other as well as with the state.”6  Since the 
coming into effect of the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures, has the new 
mechanism of open government information affected the relations between state and 
society?  If so, how?  Noticeably, citizens and organizations have already started to 
invoke the new law to push forward government information disclosure.  This has 
been gradually creating changes within and between the public and the authorities.  
While the public is empowered by the new legislation, the authorities react with 
changing attitudes.  This dissertation explores these changes with a particular focus 
on environmental information disclosure.  
                                               
1 Ryall 2011, 45.  
2 The English translation of the OGI Regulations, please see Appendix 8.1. 
3 The English translation of the OEI Measures, please see Appendix 8.2. 
4 It shall be noted that the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures are not the only two pieces of legal 
documents about government information disclosure, but just the two most relevant ones with regard to this 
study. There are other rules about government information disclosure issued by other ministries as well, for 
instance, the Interim Measures of Government Information Disclosure issued by the Ministry of Finance, and 
the Open Government Information Interim Measures for Education Government Agencies issued by the 
Ministry of Education.  
5 Horsley 2007a.  





Focusing on the role of citizens, and entities, mainly environmental organizations 
and law firms in this dissertation, in mobilizing the law to request government 
agencies to disclose environmental information, this dissertation argues that it is the 
changes with regard to social, political and legal factors pertinent to legal 
mobilization that make the mechanism of open government information more 
meaningful.  By invoking the law promulgated by the authorities to request 
government agencies to disclose environmental information, citizens and entities 
have been strategically created a repercussive pressure upon government agencies to 
react according to the law.  While it is the central government that lays down the 
structure of open government information, it is indeed the public who has been 
mobilizing the law to push forward its implementations.  While other means of 
social movements, such as demonstrations and protests are still highly controlled 
and repressed, legal mobilization constitutes a critical and comparatively safe 
strategy for citizens and entities to form a community and strengthen the civil 
society,
7
 push back political boundaries, and induce changes in the relationship 
between the state and the public,
8
 thus helping to realize citizen participation in 
China’s political process. This explains the paradox that, on the one hand, 
difficulties, obstacles and failures of obtaining government information through 
disclosure requests and suing government agencies for non-disclosure do exist; on 
the other hand, citizens and entities are active in using legal tactics for information 
disclosure and what is more, they have achieved in creating political responses that 
are far beyond the end result of information disclosure itself.  
The legal actions taken by citizens and entities analysed in this dissertation also 
echo with the argument of SULNAM established by political scientist Kate Zhou 
that they are “spontaneous, unorganized, leaderless, non-ideological, and apolitical, 
yet cumulatively have revolutionized Chinese society”.
9
  Differing from the 
                                               
7 Civil society in this dissertation refers to the growing citizen power, vis-à-vis the state, consisting of both 
individuals and organizations, which is outside of the state authorities. It does not refer to the concept in a 
strict sense that civil society is defined as independent organizations completely out of the control of the 
government in a liberal democratic society where a strong opposition party exists and freedom of expression 
is guaranteed. Although China remains an authoritarian state and the civil organizations are rather more 
embedded than independent, they have been acting towards the aims that independent organizations in the 
western liberal states have been fighting for. Therefore, in this dissertation, the concept of civil society is 
taken by its function within the arena between state and society but not the presence of certain conditional 
requirements. (Thibaut 2011, 138.) A detailed discussion of the concept of civil society, please see, Diamond 
1994.  
8 Yang 2003. 





traditional repertoire of political participation such as protest and demonstration that 
are collectively taken and well-organized, legal actions are mostly individualized, 
sporadic, localized, and non-political; however while more and more citizens act in 
similar measures, in accumulation, together they can form a powerful individualized 
collective activism.
10
   
This dissertation also reflects that when actions of politicization (政治化), for 
instance, forming political parties,
11
 signing Charter 08,
12
 or demanding government 
officials to disclose their assets,
13
 are repressed to a large extent by the Chinese 
government, judicialization (司法化), even appearing as utterly apolitical, becomes 
an alternative of seeking changes as well. Neverthelss, although seemingly non-
political and bearing no political purposes, these actions can result in political 
responses and political changes anyway.  Moreover,  it shall be noted that legal 
mobilization of requesting government agencies to disclose environmental 
information is nevertheless not a single and lone phenomenon of using law to 
interact with the authorities for social and political changes, the emerging 
rights-defense movement
14
 and using legal procedures to seek social justice, for 
instance through public interest litigation,
15
have all shared many similarities: 
citizens have been forming a bottom-up social activism in pushing forward rule of 
law in China and thus creating political responses and political changes.  This 
dissertation emphasizes that it is clearly partial and incomplete to understand 
China’s transition and transform only from the top-down political process of policy 
making and government administration, it is equally, if not more, important to 
                                               
10 van Deth & Maloney 2013. 
11 In China, to forming a political opposition party that advocates for democracy is not allowed. Moreover, 
organizers can be sentenced to long-term imprisonment for trying to do it.   
12 Charter 08 is a manifesto demanding Chinese government to launch democratic political reforms. It was 
published on 10 December 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One of 
the main drafters of the Charter 08, Liu Xiaobo was charged with “subverting state power” and sentenced to 
11 years imprisonment for his activism in the Charter 08 campaign and other writings calling for democratic 
reform in China. The Charter 08 was originally launched by Chinese elite intellectuals and it is signed by 
more than 10,000 Chinese intellectuals, and citizens in various professions. See, e.g., Béja et al., 2012. 
13 Between the end of 2012 and August 2013, in China, dozens of people, including veteran activist lawyer 
Xu Zhiyong, were detained for their involvement in the New Citizens’ Movement (新公民运动) and publicly 
demanding government officials to disclose their assets. Clearly, although the OGI Regulations provide the 
channel for citizens to request government information disclosure, they do not safeguard the political right of 
citizens to go to street holding posters written with “demanding government officials to disclose assets”.  
14 See, e.g., Teng 2012. 





observe it from the bottom-up perspective and scrutinize how Chinese people have 
been creating changes during this process as well.    
1.1 Open Environmental Information Upon Disclosure Request 
Government environmental information in this dissertation refers to 
environment-related information made or obtained by government agencies. This 
definition differs from the one in the OEI Measures that “government environmental 
information refers to information that is compiled or obtained during environmental 
protection agencies exercising their environmental protection responsibilities and 
recorded and stored in a given form”.
16
  The definition in this dissertation is broader 
than the OEI Measures mainly due to two reasons.  First, de facto, environmental 
information can also be held by non-environmental protection government agencies.  
Second, a broader definition of environmental information conforms with the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by China, that the public 
shall have access to information held by all government authorities.
17
  Thus, in this 
dissertation, environmental information disclosure requests relate to not only 
environmental protection agencies but other government agencies as well. 
According to the OEI Measures, public access to environmental information 
includes mainly two categories: access to information held by enterprises,
18
 and 
access to information held by government agencies.  Within each category there are 
two sub-categories of public access to environmental information.  The first is 
mandatory information disclosure, or active access to environmental information: 
                                               
16 OEI Measures, Article 2. Translation is made by the author in this dissertation unless it is otherwise noted. 
With regard to the translations made by the author, the responsibility for any inaccuracy lies with the author 
as well.   
17 See Rio Declaration, Principle 10.  
18 The aim of this dissertation is to study the interactions between the public and the authorities, particularly 
the roles of citizens in this process; therefore, access to enterprise information is not discussed. Information 
disclosure by enterprises is stipulated explicitly by the OEI Measures that government agencies shall 
encourage enterprises to disclose environment-related information. It nevertheless mostly imposes obligations 
upon government agencies with regard to environmental information disclosure. Punitive measures about 
enterprise compulsory disclosure are only stipulated in the last article of the OEI Measures. And it is a rule 
that is directly based on the Law of Promotion on Cleaner Production Law of the P.R.C. (the PCP Law) that 
enterprises with serious pollution must disclose their pollutants emission information, otherwise they can be 





that is, a government agency
19
 or enterprise takes active measures to make 
information available to the public on its own initiative, for example to publish 
environmental impact assessment approvals or statistics of an enterprise’s pollutants 
discharge on the Internet or in local newspapers.  The second is information 
disclosure upon request, or passive access to environmental information, which 
requires government agencies and enterprises to disclose environmental information 
upon disclosure request submitted by information requesters.
20
  
This dissertation mainly focuses on the second type, environmental information 
disclosure upon request, particularly government information disclosure upon 
request.
21
  Compared to mandatory information disclosure, government information 
disclosure upon request directly reflects the interactions between the public and 
state.  It requires the government to take positive measures to disclose information 
and guarantee the public’s access to this information.
22
 It diverges from the Chinese 
tradition that government affairs are mostly not interfered with by the public.
23
  
Instead, it directly reflects how citizen actions can affect government administration 
and, more broadly, the political process.  
The choice of focusing on environmental information disclosure in this 
dissertation is based on the reason that, compared to public participation in other 
fields, for instance a citizen demanding political reform, environmental protection 
and environmental activism has been more tolerated by the Chinese government.  
Moreover, using the law to access government information helps citizens to interact 
directly with the government administration and can possibly help to curb social 
conflicts caused partly by black-box decision making where information disclosure 
                                               
19 Government agency in this dissertation has a broad meaning. It refers to both the governments at different 
levels, e.g., a city government, as well as different government departments of the local and central 
governments, e.g., an EPB under a city government, or the MEP under the SC at the central government. 
Government/administrative agency (政府/行政机构), government/administrative department (政府/行政机
关), and administrative/government organ (行政/政府部门), are all used, mostly interchangeably, in this 
dissertation, either by the author depending on the context and situation, or in the original translation of 
Chinese laws.  
20 See Aarhus Convention-An Implementation Guide, ECE/CEP/72, UN Economic Commission for Europe, 
2000, 49. 
21  A study on both information disclosure by government agencies and enterprises with regard to risk 
management in China, please see, Mol, He and Zhang 2011. 






is inadequate, such as the 2007 Xiamen demonstration
24
 and the 2012 protest in 
Ningbo against PX plants.
25
  It is actually not only
 
officially permitted but can be 
encouraged by the state.  According to the veteran environmental journalist Liu 
Jianqiang,
 26
 journalists find it easier to report about the environment, since “the 
environment in China is not politics; politics is very sensitive.”
27
  In fact, there is 
generally a favourable political environment towards citizens and organizations 
promoting environmental rights in China.
28
  It is thus suggested here that access to 
environmental information, compared to many other types of government 
information, such as government officials’ assets, government budget spending, 
should be enforceable with less difficulty.  Therefore, it is not difficult to predict that 
there can be a potential power for it in making progressive social and political 
changes, advancing citizens’ rights and participation in the political process.  This 
clearly deserves our careful examination. 
1.2 Approaching Open Environmental Information Upon Disclosure 
Request Through Legal Mobilization 
This study takes an integrated approach of studying the workings of law in the field 
of environmental information disclosure, why and how legal tactics are adopted, and 
how they affect the social and political fields through the perspective of legal 
mobilization.  In the early 1980s, American legal jurist Frances Zemans stated that 
“the law is . .. mobilized when a desire or want is translated into a demand as an 
                                               
24 See, e.g., Zhu Qian 2008; He Yu 2007; Bai Liping 2009. Most Chinese articles concerning the Xiamen PX 
Incident can only be found from non-core journals. This seems that talking about the incident still remains an 
unwelcoming issue by the central government. Also, these articles writing about the incident mainly refer to 
the importance of environmental information disclosure, orderly citizen political participation, or the good 
interaction between the Xiamen government and the residents who expressed their opposition against the 
chemical plant.  
25 BBC, 28 October 2012.  
26 For clarity, unless it will not cause any confusion, full Chinese names are used in this dissertation to avoid 
confusion that if only surname is used, people might have the same Chinese surname. Also Chinese practice is 
followed in this dissertation with regard to Chinese name that family name is placed before given name.  
However, with regard to the name of an author of an English article, only family name is cited following the 
practice of academic English writing. The exception is when there is the possibility of causing confusion then 
full name is used, for instance, Wang Chenguang, and Wang Canfa are used when citing their articles/books 
in English published in the same year.  
27 Geall 2013, 22. 







 and by contrast, “actual legal mobilization occurs only when 
there is an active demand based on legal norms”.
 30
  Legal mobilization makes “the 
legitimacy of one's claim … grounded in rules of law” and creates new venues for 
political participation and citizen activism. 
31   The study of legal mobilization 
“focuses on demands rather than needs, on citizens rather than lawyers or judges, on 
decision making rather than access, and on invoking the law rather than compliance 
with it”,
32
 and it is of significant importance in helping to understand public 
participation in the political process and how citizens can affect political changes 
through the language of law. 33   A core understanding of legal mobilization, stated 
by political scientist Michael McCann, is as follows:  
[L]aw is … understood to be a resource that citizens utilize to 
structure relations with others, to advance goals in social life, to 
formulate rightful claims, and to negotiate disputes where interests, 
wants, or principles collide.  Legal knowledge thus can matter as both 
an end and means of action; law provides both normative principles 
and strategic resources for the conduct of social struggle.34 
From the perspective of legal mobilization, law is clearly not only about 
legislation and legal control, but also a resource for citizens to claim and defend 
their rights.  Law is not only about rules but also the strategic application of rules.  It 
is not static but rather about taking actions based on law.  In the words of Rachel A 
Cichowski, the processes of legal mobilization “involve the strategic action of 
individuals and groups to promote or resist change in a given policy arena”.
35
  
While many studies of the Chinese legal system focus to a large extent on its 
legislative development, social control and legal campaigns initiated by the 
government
36
–in other words legal development from the top-down, making the law 
and enforcing the law for social regulation and social control–recent studies have 
also shifted to emphasize the bottom-up mobilization of the law by the public to 
safeguard their rights, to sue government officials or act against polluting 
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  These studies have shown a growing trend of citizens invoking the 
law for their rights and interests, forming “both sites and agents of political 
change”.
38
  For instance, when analysing how citizens launch legal complaints based 
on the labour law in China, Gallagher argued that:  
laws are significant because they shape the expectations of citizens 
and rights of citizenship and enjoyment of the rule of law, should be 
treated analytical as political processes rather than as gifts 
bequeathed or withheld from above.
39
  
Following this trend, this dissertation takes a realist view of the law and treats the 
workings of law as not only a legal process but citizen participation in the political 
process.
40
  Legal practices relating to government information disclosure are a 
matter of legal mobilization, where citizens are asserting their rights through the 
medium of law and most of all by doing this, they interact with the authorities.  This 
is politics and it is political, even if citizens express explicitly that their actions are 
non-political and they are merely exercising their rights based on the laws.  To 
acknowledge the citizens’ role in legal mobilization is to acknowledge that law is 
clearly not unidirectional from state to citizen, it can also “endorse an active, 
assertive participatory citizenry that is central to a democratic society”.
41
 
There are different types of legal mobilization.  Political scientist Lisa Vanhala 
construes legal mobilization in the Oxford Bibliographies as follows.  In a broad 
sense, legal mobilization can refer to “any type of process by which individual or 
collective actors invoke legal norms, discourse, or symbols to influence policy or 
behaviour”.42  In its narrowest application, the term refers to “high-profile litigation 
efforts for (or, arguably, against) social change”. 43   A broad application of the 
concept of legal mobilization is applied in this dissertation.  Specifically, this 
dissertation focuses on two types of legal practices: the actions taken by individuals 
and different types of entities, including organizations, law firms, and the media, in 
using legal rules to request information disclosures from government agencies, and 
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administrative litigation (行政诉讼 ) 44  initiated by them to address failures of 
accessing environmental information through disclosure requests.  
The dissertation aims to study how the law is utilized by citizens and entities in 
China to create changes in the above-outlined area of environmental information 
disclosure, specifically, how citizen actions can or cannot influence the mechanism 
of government information disclosure, and how citizen litigation help to make 
Chinese courts to clarify legal issues and thus create more legal opportunities for 
future lawsuits.  Furthermore, how these changes can affect the interactions between 
the public and the state.  
Nevertheless, changes in any society do not come without obstacles.  It is well 
argued by scholars of China studies that in an authoritarian state such as China, legal 
mobilization, “whether by individual or by groups, and with or without a support 
structure, is likely to produce counter-mobilization from the state’s coercive 
organs”.45  Inevitably, the tradition of being a secrecy government and the lack of 
independence of the judicial system in China do not really nurture a favourable 
environment for open government information or for citizens to file administrative 
lawsuits against government agencies.  While individuals and entities have been 
actively using the new legislation to request that government agencies disclose 
information, government agencies have been hesitating over or even obstructing the 
providing of this information, resulting in an ineffective implementation of the new 
legislation.  
From the legal perspective, citizens shall be more willing to use the law when it 
works well.  A puzzling phenomenon thus occurs: even knowing that their actions 
are likely to result in failures to obtain the information or win the litigation, why do 
citizens and entities still take measures to request government information disclosure 
and take government agencies before Chinese courts? Focusing on environmental 
information disclosure upon request, the main aim of this dissertation is thus to 
understand this legal paradox: citizens and entities have been invoking the law 
demanding government information disclosure despite their being fully aware of the 
fact that various obstacles exist and the effectiveness of the new legal mechanism 
remains low.  
                                               
44 Administrative litigation and administrative lawsuit are used interchangeably in this dissertation. Both refer 
to the legal action taken by citizens to sue government agencies before Chinese courts.  





This puzzling phenomenon shall not be difficult to understand if we see it from a 
realist perspective of the law that, in the words of Michael Paris, law is regarded as 
“not much separate from politics. Rather, Law is simply one form of politics”.46  
While the public has not achieved their aim of obtaining the information requested, 
they have nevertheless utilized legal rhetoric and exercised legal practices that 
constitute a process of political participation.  Besides the end aim of information 
disclosure, they have also been creating social and political changes in the process of 
mobilizing the law.  Most of all, what they have been doing is sufficiently based on 
the laws that are promulgated by and shall be abided by the authorities.  In the words 
of Zemans, they made the legitimacy of their claims “grounded in rules of law”.47  
This makes their actions legal and within the scope of official rhetoric, and thus 
more tolerated or even encouraged by the authorities.  
This legal mobilization bears similarities with the “boundary-spanning 
contention” identified by China studies political scientist O’Brien that citizens 
employ “the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic 
power”,
48
 thus constitute “rightful resistance”
49
 and exert pressure upon government 
officials.  The difference is that, the boundary-spanning action in this dissertation is 
not contentious that it directly accuses official corruption or mismanagement in 
local-elections and village administration as discussed by O’Brien, but rather how 
citizens have been taking legal actions based on the authorities’ behalf to push 
forward the implementation of open government information mechanism.  During 
the process, citizens do not contend against government agencies; instead they are 
willing to cooperate for an effective implementation of the new mechanism, 
constituting an “embedded social activism”.
50
   
Aiming to study law in action, but not only in words, this dissertation particularly 
underscores the role of the social actors, including citizens and entities, and how 
they contemplate their situation and make their choices to interact with the 
authorities of both the government agencies and the courts.  All actors, including 
citizens and entities, government agencies and the courts, exist in various but 
interacting fields. 
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Bourdieu and Wacquant define the concept of field as “a patterned system of 
objective forces (much in the manner of a magnetic field), a relational configuration 
endowed with a specific gravity which it imposes on all the objects and agents which 
enter it.”
51
  Applying the concept of field in his study about environmental 
organizations in China, Yang argued that in the field, actors gather and frame their 
actions and interact with multiple institutional fields,
52
 such as the political sphere, 
the judicial system, the media and the Internet.  The relationships among different 
fields are not really equal due to the differences in power and resources.  The 
political field is usually in the dominant position while others are subordinate.  None 
of these fields can be completely autonomous but are relative to and interactive with 
each other.
53
  The community of individuals and entities that use the law for 
environmental information disclosure in this study can form one field. This field 
nevertheless does not exist alone but rather interacts with the government agencies, 
the courts, and other fields such as the community of the legal professionals and the 
Internet.  
Fields can also overlap and form a network or an umbrella field.  In this study, 
there are two umbrella fields: the political field as the authority, and the social field.  
Since there is no independent judicial system in China where the judicial system is 
directly under the leadership of the Political-Legal Committee (政法委) of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
54
–that is, directly under the sole leading political 
party from central to local level respectively–both government agencies and courts 
are included in the political field.  The social field refers to citizens, organizations, 
the media, the Internet and other supporting structures in the society, such as law 
firms.  Linking these two fields is the implementation of the OGI Regulations and 
the OEI Measures.  The two fields affect each other, with the political field holding 
the dominant influence and the social sphere remaining less dominant, but 
nevertheless affecting the political field in return.  Moreover, changes made by 
actions in the social sphere towards the political system also, in return, provide more 
opportunities for the social sphere to push forward for more changes.  The 
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interactions and changes thus keep on going forward and, during the process, each 
field shapes and in return is shaped by the changes incurred during their interactions.  
In the interactions between the two major fields, law plays a pivotal role. 
On the one hand, the law provides opportunities for the public to take legal 
actions.  On the other hand and most of all, citizen actions are “to an extent able to 
shape and create legal opportunities rather than always being shaped by them”.
55
  In 
this dissertation, the concept of legal opportunities is used instead of the concept of 
legal opportunity structure that refers to “the degree of openness or accessibility of a 
legal system to the social and political goals and tactics of individuals and/or 
collective actors.”
56
  First of all, legal opportunity structure is nevertheless, not static 
and unchangeable.  It can be changed by restructuring the legal system: for instance, 
establishing new specialised courts that specifically focus on environmental 
protection
57
 can clearly provide more legal opportunities for environmental lawsuits.  
It can also be changed through the external pressures of public opinion or litigation 
activism.  It is suggested by Vanhala that  
the static, snapshot image of “structure” as presented in some (but 
importantly not all) formulations of the LOS [legal opportunity 
structure] approach misses an important part of the story in explaining 
the emergence and progress of legal mobilization. … by shifting focus 
on to social movement agents, we can gain a more accurate picture of 





 In China, with the continuous effort of all actors and through administrative 
litigation, changes have been indeed happening with the legal opportunity structure: 
citizen activism in filing administrative litigation has created chances for Chinese 
courts to make rulings clarifying both procedural requirements and substantive 
issues in open environmental information administrative litigation.  Second, this 
study argues that legal opportunities can be extended out of the judicial system as 
well, for instance in the scope of administrative law that legal actions can happen 
between the public and government agencies even without going to the court.  
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Clearly, positive political responsiveness towards legal actions taken by the public, 
e.g., using the law to request for government information disclosure, is in fact also 
providing new opportunities for the public to utilize the law to approach government 
agencies.  
Nevertheless, legal actions taken by citizens studied in this dissertation are not 
specific behaviours “designed to influence political decisions” such as 
demonstrating or casting a vote.
59
  Rather, no matter they are information disclosure 
requests or filing court cases, they are mostly sporadic, individualized, fragmented, 
and most of all, in the words of rules of law established by the authorities, thus 
appearing non-political, or in the words of Zhou, they take forms of SULNAM 
participation that they are“spontaneous, unorganized, leaderless, non-ideological, 
and apolitical”.
60
  However, non-political actions could also be used for political 
aims, constituting part of political participation; moreover, when more people act in 
a similar way, cumulatively, they form an individualized collective activism,
61
  
actively playing a role in creating their legal opportunities and affecting the Chinese 
society and politics as well.   
To fully understand why and how citizens and entities have been taking legal 
strategies during this political process of legal mobilization, this dissertation takes a 
step-by-step approach by answering the following questions:   
 How has the top-down development of the legal institution that lays down 
the foundation for the public to request government information 
disclosure been established and developed in China? 
 What factors have been accelerating or obstructing the effects of 
environmental information disclosure requests in China? 
 How have the bottom-up legal strategies been utilized by the public to 
invoke the law to challenge the government authority on disclosing 
government environmental information? What are the effects? 
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1.3 The Significance of Studying Legal Mobilization in China 
Initiated within the United States, legal mobilization studies have provided an 
integrated approach of linking the interactions between society and politics.  
Academics have produced abundant studies of legal mobilization, particularly 




 or disability 
rights.
64
  There is also a rich scholarship integrating the studies of legal mobilization 
with social movement.
65
  These studies have demonstrated that material support,
66
 
legal awareness, support structure
67
 and political opportunities are important factors 
that can affect the role of law in bringing about social and political changes.  It is 
also suggested that financial resources are “necessary when groups embark on the 
expensive road of litigation”.
68
 
Studies about legal mobilization in China are nevertheless lacking.
69
  As 
suggested by Michael McCann, when discussing law and social movements, more 
comparative studies are needed on the topic of legal mobilization politics.
70
  The 
primary intention of this dissertation thus contributes to the study of legal 
mobilization with a particular focus on China, taking into account its different legal 
and political system.  
A study from the perspective of legal mobilization is of particular significance in 
understanding the interaction of the public and the state through judicialization in 
China while politicization (政治化) becomes so sensitive that depoliticization (去政
治化) has been utilized and preferred by more; under this situation, non-contentious 
legal practices become a very important alternative of political participation. From 
another perspective, the lacking of a democratic political environment can also 
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contribute to the using of legal language and rightful resistance. Analysing 
administrative reviews in post-1997 Hong Kong, Chan argued that the tension of 
discussing political reform has led to the “focus on the judiciary as a forum to make 
the Government accountable and responsive”; thus “the resort to judicial challenges 
as a means for pushing legal and political reform is itself a result of democracy 
deficit.”
71
  This exists with environmental activism as well.  The Chinese 
environmental law scholar van Rooij summarizes that, there are two types of actions 
that citizens have taken to get an effective remedy for their pollution-related 
grievances: legal action and political action.
72
 
Legal action includes various types of lawsuits against enterprises or 
government agencies for their failures, tort litigation against 
companies, and administrative litigation against enforcement 
authorities for negligence in conducting their environmental 
management or enforcement duties.  Political action includes 
complaints and petitions to enforcement authorities, petitions to higher 
levels of government, media involvement, and collective action 




Peter Ho argues that China’s environmentalism differs from its counterparts in 
the West and the ex-socialist states of Eastern and Central Europe in that it is 
generally not openly confronting the government.
74
  In general, non-contentious 
strategies of using the official language of law are not only practical but also less 
risky, and provide a channel for organizations and citizens to assert their 
environmental rights without confronting the authorities.  
Specifically, the new legislation of open government information has created a 
new “proper channel”, in the words of Burstein,
 75
 for the public to use legal 
language to assert their claims of information disclosure.  This proper channel is 
rather non-contentious, individually initiated, sporadic and less provocative.  
Furthermore, Burstein argued that to have a better understanding of the progress of 
political change, it is important to explore the activities within the proper channels 
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as well as other collective actions such as demonstrations, strikes and boycotts.
76
  
With regard to the situation of China, it is indeed of particular necessity and 
importance to study the proper channels of legal mobilization while the classic 
social movement repertoire of contentious activities, such as collective 
demonstrations or protests, are still highly restrained and strictly controlled by the 
authorities.
77
   
A study in this proper channel of environmental information disclosure also helps 
us to understand the development of public participation in environmental matters in 
China.  Generally, public participation in environmental matters happens in three 
aspects: environmental information disclosure, environmental impact assessment, 
and environmental litigation.  Access to environmental information constitutes the 
first prerequisite for public participation in environmental matters.  It reflects the 
first stage of public participation in environmental matters.  Arnstein divided public 
participation into three stages: nonparticipation, tokenism and citizen power.
78
  
Nonparticipation includes manipulation that put people into groups for the “purpose 
of ‘educating’ them or engineering their support”, and therapy brings people 
together to “adjust their values and attitudes to those of the larger society”,79 both 
provide an illusionary involvement of the public.80  Tokenism includes informing, 
consultation, and placation of citizens.  The highest stage citizen power refers to 
partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. 81   In partnership, negotiation 
exists between citizens and power holder.  Delegated power enables citizens to 
engage in joint decision-making.  And citizen control makes people to demand 
power to take full participation in decision-making. 82  Studies about public 
participation in environmental matters, from collective actions of anti-dam, chemical 
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plant and incinerator, to environmental impact assessment, generally agree that 
environmental participation in China is still nascent and tokenism.83  What is the 
situation with regard to environmental information disclosure then? This study thus 
also fills the gap and examines public participation from the perspective of access to 
environmental information.   
This study further enriches academic research on law in context and in action.  To 
write down laws on paper is always the first step; however, this never ensures that 
laws will be implemented and rights will be delivered to the people automatically.  
To gain a deep understanding about how law works, there must be more works 
focusing on Chinese law in action.
84
  This approach can also help to solve the 
dilemma of the discussion on the traditional dichotomy of China’s legal system 
whether it is totally rule of law or totally not rule of law.  Law shall never be 
understood from a single point of view, for instance, if the government is taking all 
measures to implement rule of law; or unidirectional, from the top down.  It depends 
on more diverse actors besides the government itself.  To neglect the role of citizens 
in mobilizing the law is one-sided understandings that law means citizens’ obey to 
it.
85
  Instead, legal mobilization launched by the public reflects a more interactive 
role of the law and how the public can participate and make changes in the political 
process through the language of law.   
Moreover, this study also helps us to understand the complex relationship 
between the state and society in China.  As Professor Schick-Chen argues, a new 
approach can be applied when studying Chinese legal culture from two interactive 
lines: the social-legal sphere and the politico-legal setup.  Based on the presumption 
that “any change in the interplay between law and politics would have an impact on 
the law and society relationship, while any shift in the socio-legal sphere would be 
equally followed by an adjustment of the politico-legal set-up,” she further argues 
that “the intersections of these two lines of interaction can be identified as the points 
of manifestation of legal culture as well as indications of the direction in which the 
latter is developing”.
86
  Through the lens of legal mobilization, a study on 
environmental information disclosure upon request thus also fulfils the function of 
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helping us to understand the interrelatedness of the politico-legal and socio-legal 
systems in China.  
Last but not least, this study provides us a new perspective of understanding 
social movement in China.
87
  It raises the question about how legal mobilization can 
or cannot form part of social movement in China, and whether and to what extent 
unorganized collective action can/shall be regarded as an alternative or part of social 
movement and how law plays its role in social movement and political change in 
China.  
1.4 Previous Studies About Open Government Information in China 
Studies on open government information laws in China have mainly started in the 
past decade.  In the past few years, more attention has been paid by researchers in 
this field along with the promulgation and implementation of the new OGI 
Regulations with books published and academic articles flourishing.  However, 
studies focusing on open environmental information are very limited.  Therefore, 
this review of the existing scholarship does not focus on only environmental 
information disclosure but open government information from a general perspective.  
Chinese books concerning open government information mainly dealt with 
introduction to the open government information mechanism,
88
 guidance on the 
implementation of OGI Regulations
89
 or administrative litigation concerning 
information disclosure,
90
 and comparative studies on open government 
information.
91
  Written by law professors who participated in the OGI legislation 
process or drafting of the OEI Regulations, officials from the State Council (SC) 
Legal Office
92
 and also justices from the Supreme People’s Court of PRC,
93
 these 
books mostly intended to prepare for the implementation of OGI Regulations.  
There is also a sufficient amount of articles on open government information in 
China.
 
This has shown that open government information has attracted attention 
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among academics in China.
94
  The following discussion presents some 
representative arguments in studies on open government information in China.  
Generally, these articles discussed three main issues: the importance and principles 
of open government information laws, problems concerning the law implementation, 
and the theoretical problems of OGI Regulations.  
Starting from the very beginning of the issuance of the OGI Regulations, legal 
studies have started to pay attention to problems with the OGI Regulations via both 
case studies and legal analysis.  It is widely agreed that there are legislative defects 
in the OGI Regulations.
95
 Analysing the so-called first open government information 
case, 
96
 Chen Yi argues that double “glass doors” erected by the administration and 
the judiciary have impeded the public’s success in obtaining government 
information upon disclosure request.
97
  This exposes several legislative defects of 
the OGI Regulations: the unclear scope of disclosure and non-disclosure, and a lack 
of delineation of state secrets, business secrets and individual privacy.
98
  He further 
points out that the main reason why plaintiffs met with double obstacles was 
because administrative agencies and courts still did not take the OGI Regulations 
seriously.  The legacy of “not to disclose as principle and to disclose as exception” (
以不公开为原则, 以公开为例外) and “the important is the undisclosed and the 
disclosed is unimportant” (重要的都是不公开的 , 公开的都是不重要的) still 
prevail in Chinese administration.
99
  Moreover, the failure of the Chinese courts as 
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Wang Xixin, Professor of Administrative Law and Director of the Center for 
Public Participation Studies and Supports at Peking University, has highlighted 
another legislative defect of the OGI Regulations: Article 8 of the OGI Regulations 
had a logical contradiction which provided great dodging space (规避空间) for 
government agencies to refuse disclosure.
101
  Article 8 stipulates that “[n]o 
administrative agency may endanger national security, public security, economic 
security or social stability when disclosing government information”.  Originally 
this article was enacted to safeguard public interest.
102
  But it created the risk of it 
being used as an exception of disclosure in that government information that might 
affect state security, public security, economic security and social stability shall not 
be disclosed.
103
  In practice, this rule of “three securities one stability” (三安全一稳




Besides the problems with unclear rules in the OGI Regulations, theoretical 
deficiency also exists.
105
  It is argued by Xu Siyi that the core value of open 
government information is to strengthen democratic politics, but not only for the 
three aims stipulated in the OGI Regulations: to safeguard the public’s access to 
government information, administrative agency to promote administration according 
to law and to realize the government’s service function.
106
  According to him, the 
OGI Regulations are lacking the value of democratic politics and have granted 
special rights to the government, making the government prevail over the public in 
open government information.
107
  Xu Siyi further argues that the lack of the value of 
democratic politics is reflected with several other deficiencies in the regulations.  
Briefly, the regulations not explicitly state the principle of “to disclose as principle 
                                               
100 Chen Yi 2008; Wang Xixin 2011. 
101 Wang Xixin 2011, 65-66.    
102 Ibid.; see also, Cao Kangtai 2007, 50. 
103 Wang Xixin 2011, 65-66. 
104  For example, when Southern Weekend requested EPBs to disclose lists of enterprises that received 
environmental penalties, Tianjin EPB refused to disclose the information, alleging that the disclosure might 
affect state security, public security, economic security, and social stability. (Nanfang zhoumo, 23 June 2010) 
For further analysis on more cases where Article 8 used as information disclose refusal reason, please see 
Chapter 3 & 4. 
105 Xu Siyi 2010. 
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and not to disclose as exception” (以公开为原则, 以不公开为例外) provides the 
possibility for government departments to use all kinds of reasons to refuse 
information disclosure, for instance, the idea of three securities and one stability, 
and information belonging to a state secret or business secret.
108
 Moreover, Xu Siyi 
also pointed out that an effective access to justice is lacking in the OGI 
Regulations.
109
  This negative evaluation on the OGI Regulations and linking it with 
democratic politics seems rare in Chinese academic articles, as most articles simply 
discussed problems existing with legal rules, but did not refer to the political system 
in China.  
Analysing court cases of government information disclosure, Chen Yongxi found 
out that Chinese courts basically have a trend to make a narrow interpretation of the 
right to information.  That is, the courts did not acknowledge that all citizens have 
the right to information as an independent legal right, but related citizens’ right to 
information to their personal rights and property rights.  This has shown that 
Chinese courts have only emphasized the function of open government information 
to safeguard citizens’ other concrete rights, but lessened its role of supervising the 
government and promote democratic participation.
 110
 
Compared to Chinese research, Western studies on China’s open government 
information are more likely to relate law implementation to the wider background of 
China’s political and social system.  Generally, it is agreed that the promulgation of 
China’s OGI Regulations itself has shown great progress in China’s administration 
from being a secret state
111
 to a transparent government, but its implementation also 
faces enormous challenges and “a transformation of bureaucratic culture”.
112
  In 
2007, an American scholar of Chinese law, Jamie Horsley, predicted directly after 
the promulgation of the OGI Regulations that it “will take Chinese agencies and 
officials a long time to get used to, let alone comfortable with, the new concept of 
government being obliged to share information with its citizens”.
113
  This can be 
explained with a comparative study to other researchers’ arguments.  Before the 
coming into effect of the OGI Regulations, Hubbard pointed out that there were 
                                               
108 Xu Siyi 2010, 65. This dissertation will later argue that in practice, not only the rules of exceptions in the 
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obstacles faced by the central government in ensuring consistent implementation of 
the regulations nationwide due to the unclear rules and lack of guidance and 
inconsistent models developed by central ministries and local governments.
114
  He 
specifically pointed out that the “real paradox of open government information in 
China is its introduction into a non-democratic political system” since “[f]reedom of 
information has a strong ideological connection with democracy”.
115
 The 
establishment of the open government information mechanism in China was more a 
top-down political project that the central government believed that popular 
supervision would aid the central’s control of its decentralized government.
116
  
Therefore the OGI Regulations are of instrumental value to the central government 




In April 2010, nearly two years after the OGI Regulations came into effect, 
Horsley summarized that “while individuals had greater luck obtaining information 
relating to their personal lives, government agencies have been generally reluctant to 
provide information on government operations and policies, and Chinese courts 
have frequently refused to accept lawsuits over information disclosure or have found 
in favour of the government”.
118
  She also argued that a promising element 
concerning the implementation of the OGI Regulations was that the Chinese public 
had started to play an active role in access to government information and the OGI 
Regulations seemed to have “an impact within Chinese society and on government 
policy”.
119
   
English studies focusing particularly on China’s open environmental information 
have also started to appear.  A study based on the implementation of open 
environmental information laws between 2008 and 2009 in China shows that the 
political economy of a city is likely to affect the willingness of city leaders to 
promote environmental transparency and cities based on single industry are more 
likely to resist implementing transparency requirements compared to cities that 
depend less on concentrated industrial sector.
120
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In another research article analysing information disclosure pilot programs in two 
Chinese cities between 1999 and 2000, Li demonstrated that the success of 
top-down open environmental information depended on the “commitment, 
perception and resources” of local leaders.  She further suggested that, concerning 
the new OGI Regulations, active non-governmental organization (NGO) 
engagement could put pressure from the bottom up and help to establish a web of 
dialogue to further enable the public to participate in environmental decision-
making.
121
  Clearly, both government commitment and public activism are crucial in 
realizing government information disclosure.  Focusing on information disclosure 
for environmental risk management, researchers have shown that the 
implementation of the OEI Measures in China is “improving but far from 
widespread, full and effective”.
122
  They conclude that the lack of enforcement and 
the ambiguity of some rules in the OEI Measures and the “longstanding closeness, 
secrecy and monopoly of information in China’s political system”
123
 have made the 
implementation ineffective.   
In his research focusing on how organizations use the obtained environmental 
information, Johnson argued that while the new legislation created additional space 
for non-state actors, NGOs were nevertheless constrained in acting on information to 




To summarize, previous studies on open government information and open 
environmental information pinpointed problems and findings in at least five aspects.  
First, there are inborn defects in the OGI Regulations that might affect its effective 
implementation.  Second, there is value deficiency in a lack of democratic politics in 
the OGI Regulations.  Third, the existence of decentralization might also affect the 
implementation of the law due to inconsistent practices.  Fourth, the authoritarian 
and non-transparent political system is not favourable to the new mechanism of open 
government information.  Last, public awareness and citizen activism is important in 
pushing forward open environmental information.  Crucial in opening the door to 
research on China’s open government information, these studies reveal various 
problems and findings from different perspectives.  However, the actors, no matter 
whether individuals or groups, who invoke the law to demand government 
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information disclosure, and their strategies, are to a large extent still neglected in 
previous studies.  Particularly, it is still unclear why citizens and organizations have 
remained active in mobilizing the new legislation despite the fact that so many 
problems exist and the implementation of the law is not really effective. 
1.5 Research Methodology and Sources 
This dissertation studies the role of agents, including individuals and entities, i.e., 
environmental organizations, law firms, and the media, in invoking the law to push 
forward open environmental information in China.  It is an interdisciplinary study 
adopting approaches of legal studies and methods of sociological research.  The 
research is based on multi-case studies and aims to find out what the legal tactics 
taken by citizens and organizations are, for what causes they have taken these 
strategies, their contextual interface with the authorities, and the effects of their 
actions.  
The sources for my research are Chinese laws, court judgments, books and 
journal articles, cases of individual information disclosure requests, surveys and 
reports by NGOs and other entities, web news and reports, blogs and microblogs of 
individuals and NGOs, interviews with pollution victims, lawyers and NGO officers, 
direct observation, and seminars.  Undoubtedly, the Internet is changing our lives 
unprecedentedly, and the way we conduct research to a certain extent. Chinese 
legislation can be obtained from government or university law school websites 
easily nowadays, and some are also available in English.  Nevertheless, some 
translations are made by the author when needed, either because official translation 
is not available or available translation is not concise.  Academic discussion can be 
followed by perusing the core Chinese legal journals, for example, China Legal 
Science (中国法学) and Legal Science Research (法学研究), via the online Chinese 
database CNKI (中国知网) and Wanfang (万方), which are all accessible from the 
University of Turku.
125
  I can also obtain some court judgments and documents of 
information disclosure requests from the Internet as well as easily keep in touch with 
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or follow my informants afterwards via emails or Sina weibo (新浪微博), a twitter-
like Chinese microblog.  
This research is largely based on cases of environmental information disclosure 
requests collected by the author.  In total, 28 cases and eight surveys of 
environmental information disclosure requests are collected and documented.
126
  
These cases and surveys all relate to disclosure requests with regard to 
environmental information, thus excluding other government information disclosure, 
for instance information relating to government budget spending.  Environmental 
information in this dissertation generally refers to any information that relates to the 
environment, including information of the environment or that affects the 
environment.  This dissertation adopts the categorization of environmental 
information by two Chinese researchers that it includes six categories of 
environmental information listed by Chinese scholars: environmental legislation and 
policy, environmental management, state environmental guidance, environmental 
conditions, environmental knowledge, and production and people’s lives that affect 
the environment.
127
   
Most of the requests analysed here were submitted to environmental protection 
agencies.  In China, there are generally four levels of these agencies. From the top 
down, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (环保部 MEP) as the central 
environmental administration agency, provincial-level Environmental Protection 
Departments (环保厅 EPDs)128 at the second level, and Environmental Protection 
Bureaus (EPB 环保局) at various levels including municipality-level EPBs at the 
second level,
129
 city-level EPBs at the third level, and district or county-level EPBs 
at the fourth level.
130
  Additionally, some cases relate to requests for environmental 
information disclosure submitted to other government agencies.  
The cases and surveys analysed in this dissertation all occurred between May 
2008, when the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures came into effect, and 
August 2012 when the case collection was completed, and cover almost all the cases 
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of environmental information that could be located within the period chosen.  In 
China, there are no official statistics available with regard to environmental 
information disclosure requests, nor is there a compilation of related court cases; 
these cases were mostly originally located by the author through the Internet search 
engines Google, and Baidu (百度), a Chinese search engine, and later numbered and 
documented by the author.  It must be agreed that due to the censorship in China, 
this method of case collection has its own limits of being incomplete.  Nevertheless, 
the collection of the cases shall be regarded as sufficient in comparison to the case 
collection of the China Transparency Organization (CTO).
131
  Established in 
November 2008, CTO is the major academic, non-government and non-profit 
website about open government information in China.
132
  It has the most 
comprehensive collection of open government information cases in China.  
Hundreds of media reports reposted under the category of “information disclosure 
cases” on the website of CTO up to August 2012 cover 20 cases of environmental 
information disclosure requests, which are all included in the cases collected by the 
author.  Additionally, eight more cases were collected by the author through Internet 
searches.  The data analysed in this study can also be compared with a search via 
Chinacourt.org dated 22 October 2012 that shows 69 court judgments about 
government information disclosure, but none of them concern environmental 
information disclosure.  A similar result was found by searching Lawinfochina, the 
largest Chinese law database, on the same date. It shows 206 court judgments about 
government information disclosure, but none of them relate to environmental 
information disclosure.  It also shows four media reports and, among them, only one 
relates to environmental information disclosure. 
The case studies in this research are supported with both first-hand and 
second-hand materials, ranging from interview transcripts to media reports, from 
information disclosure request documents to court judgments, collected by the 
author through the Internet as well as during her three stages of fieldwork between 
2010 and 2012 in China.  The fieldwork lasted for two months in 2010, one and half 
months in 2011, and one month in 2012.  
Since this dissertation mainly aims to analyse the process of citizens invoking the 
law to request government environmental information disclosures, and particularly 
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the interactions between the public and government agencies in the process, it does 
not particularly intend to pursue the detailed end results of all the requests.  For 
simplicity and convenience of documentation, the cases are categorized on the basis 
of the information disclosure requester and the content of the information requested 
for disclosure instead of each information disclosure request.  Practically, it is also 
almost impossible to have an accurate number of all requests submitted since some 
were not submitted successfully, or refused or ignored and resubmitted, or were 
revised and resubmitted.
133
  In principle, requests submitted by the same or very 
closely related person, for instance from the same family, and concerning 
information relating to one environmental issue are regarded as one case.  Most of 
these cases cover more than one request addressing one or several different 
government agencies.  For instance, Xie Yong
134
 submitted several environmental 
information disclosure requests to different environmental protection agencies from 
the local county level EPB to the central level MEP, he also submitted one request in 
the name of his wife. However, all his requests concern information of the local 
incinerator that is alleged to have caused his child’s sickness.  Therefore, all these 
requests are regarded as one case, although there are at least five information 
disclosure requests by him and his wife.  However, in other circumstances, one 
request can also constitute one case, such as: Mao Da submitted three requests with 
regard to three different pieces of environmental information about three different 
issues towards three different government agencies;
135
  his requests constitute three 
cases in the study.   
The cases in my study occurred in various places in China.  The fieldwork was 
also multi-sited, though clearly, out of capacity and it being not necessary, I did not 
go to all the places where the cases were located.  During my fieldwork in China, 
besides collecting research materials, I conducted interviews, did on-site 
observations, as well as attended related seminars.  For the interviews I usually 
planned my questions and made appointments with my interviewees in advance.  
Either in advance or at the start of the interview, I informed my interviewees of the 
purpose of my research and interviews.  I conducted in total 32 interviews
 136 
and   
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transcribed all the interviews as well.  My interviewees consist of eight lawyers, 
eleven ENGO officers (one is also a lawyer), eight individuals who are pollution 
victims or environmental information disclosure requesters, four law professors, 
three government officials.  The number of interviewees does not exactly correspond 
with the number of interviews due to the reason that it occurred twice two people 
were interviewed at the same time and two lawyers were interviewed twice.  
Twenty-two of the interviews were conducted face-to-face.  Two of them were 
conducted at the pollution victims’ homes, which provided me the chance to make 
on-site observation as well.  Nine interviews were made via phone calls. One was 
conducted through email.  Mostly, I prepared the interview questions in advance, but 
during the interviews I also asked prompt questions following the interviewees’ 
replies.  The interviews usually lasted between half an hour to one hour.  Most 
interviews were recorded with the approval of the interviewees and later transcribed 
by myself.  A few interviews were not recorded due to various reasons. For 
example, with interviews with government officials, there was the concern that 
recording might cause people to feel nervous or cautious in responding to my 
questions, thus I chose to keep notes only.  I also did not record one interview that 
was conducted in a very crowded and noisy conference room of a law firm where 
my interview was submerged in simultaneous discussions by several other groups of 
lawyers and clients.  
I want to make it clear that the interviews with government officials were limited.  
In total, I only talked with three officials from one EPB.  This is mainly due to the 
reason that approaching government officials without a go-between person could 
probably only result in official talks echoing government reports on open 
government information publicities.  Nevertheless, I was fortunate that one of the 
EPB officials I interviewed was very open-minded and environmentally concerned 
and he did provide me insightful thoughts and helpful understanding.  His opinions, 
in fact, also correspond with experiences encountered by some of my other 
interviewees.   
Besides the interviews, I attended in total nine seminars organized by 
environmental non-governmental organizations (hereafter as ENGOs) in Beijing.  
Some seminars directly related to open environmental information, for instance the 
seminar on the three years of implementation of open environmental information 
organized by Friends of Nature (自然之友), the Beijing-based oldest ENGO in 
China, in April 2011, and the seminar on information disclosure concerning Zijin 





( 达尔问自然求知社), a young ENGO based in Beijing, in July 2010.  Others were 
not directly related to open environmental information but were nonetheless 
environment related.  Attending relevant seminars helped me to gain direct 
knowledge from people who work or are interested in environmental protection.   
Additionally, I also had informal conversations with people I happened to meet 
during my fieldwork, and my experience echoes with Chinese scholar Liang’s 
experience that  
learning to engage oneself in natural and unexpected conversations 
with people who have experience and knowledge on the research 




Although I have documented almost all the cases that I can find so far, it might be 
criticized that the number of cases studied is still limited.  I would like to reiterate 
that in the context of China’s size and complexity, any study on China, no matter 
whether quantitative or qualitative, bears the risk of being limited and impossible to 
apply to the whole situation: this research is no exception.  Additionally, this multi-
case study is not meant to be exhaustive and representative, but rather to draw 
findings about access to government-held environmental information, a new 
phenomenon in China that only came into sight in 2008, and help to provide 
concrete insights on understanding the complexity and the paradox of the 
relationship between the state and society in China.  The aim of these case studies is 
to help us understand the meaning of actions, the particular context within which the 
actors take actions, the processes of their taking actions, and the causal 
explainations.
138
  Nevertheless, conclusions based on case studies at least offer us 
some “internal generalizability” that applies “within the setting or group studied”,139 
and the findings can be tested by future research as well. 
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1.6 Dissertation Framework  
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  This introductory chapter presents the 
background and theory of the research, the research questions, related previous 
studies, research methodology and sources of materials.  
Chapter two is a general review of the top-down development of the legal 
institutions concerning access to environmental information in China.  This chapter 
maps the development of Chinese laws with regard to access to environmental 
information and provides a picture of the formation of the legal structure of 
environmental information disclosure in China. 
Chapter three reviews the general situation of the public making requests to 
government agencies for environmental information disclosure.  This chapter 
explores the effectiveness of the implementation of the new regulations based on 
statistical data of cases and surveys collected by the author, and analyses the 
possible causes to the ineffectiveness of environmental information disclosure.  It 
emphasizes how legal rhetoric is utilized by government agencies, mitigating the 
socio-legal power in challenging government authorities.  
Chapter four takes a bottom-up approach and focuses on how the public invokes 
the law to request government agencies to disclose environmental information 
despite the obstacles and impediments to obtaining the information. It discusses the 
purposes of their requests, the strategies they take and the effects their requests bring 
about.  This chapter particularly analyses how various actors and their supporting 
structures have been mobilizing the law to their causes before government agencies, 
and what effects they have achieved.  
Chapter five continues with the analysis of how citizens and entities mobilize the 
law and bring administrative lawsuits before Chinese courts.  It focuses on the 
development of administrative lawsuits with regard to how open environmental 
information litigation has helped to create new legal opportunities, affecting both 
government agencies in dealing with environmental information disclosure requests 
and Chinese courts in accepting and adjudicating related lawsuits.    
Chapter six summarizes the findings concerning how legal mobilization by the 
public has pushed for the open environmental information mechanism to work in 
China, and the theoretical implications of understanding the complex interactions 





2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCESS TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION IN CHINESE 
LAW FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
To understand environmental information disclosure, it is also necessary to 
understand the broader legal framework in which it exists.  Therefore, differing from 
the other chapters focusing only on open environmental information upon disclosure 
request, this chapter is written from a broader perspective. Without a body of 
legislation, there would be no rules for people to initiate legal mobilization.  The 
development of the legal system in China since the late 1970s is the de jure and de 
facto prerequisite for Chinese citizens’ legal activism.  This chapter thus reviews the 
major development in Chinese legislation that lays down the basis for environmental 
information disclosure.  It is a normative study focusing on the development of law 
on paper, which nevertheless has helped to shape the legal practices taken by 
citizens and entities analysed in the following chapters.  
The following section of this chapter first summarizes the development of the 
legal system in China, and the sources and hierarchy of Chinese law.  Secondly, it 
reviews the major development of China’s environmental law.  Thirdly, it reviews 
and discusses the different sources of law concerning open environmental 
information in China.  Lastly, it concludes the recent legal development pertaining 





2.1 The Legal Development in China 
The legal development
140
 in China has been a “long, winding, challenging, and even 
repetitive task”.
141
  This research divides it into the pre-1976 period where limited 
progress was achieved and the post-1976 period where China has been endeavouring 
to establish its legal system “to rule the country according to law”. 
2.1.1 Chinese Law pre-1976 
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, legal 
development in China briefly experienced four periods.  According to the law 
professor Wang Chenguang of Tsinghua University, the first period was the initial 
stage of legal system construction, between 1949 and 1956.  During this period, the 
CCP abolished all the laws promulgated by the Kuomingtang Republican 
government, such as the “Six Laws Pandect” (六法全书),142 and started to establish 
its own laws.
143
  The development of the legal system was slow and limited.  Only a 
few laws were promulgated on an ad hoc basis as an expedient strategy of solving 
emerging issues, for instance the Outline of the Land Law (土地法大纲) and the 
Marriage Law (婚姻法), except for the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution (宪法) 
as the greatest achievement.
144
  The second period is the stagnant stage between 
1957 and 1966 when the Anti-Rightist movement was launched and no real effort 
was taken to establish the legal system.
145
  Most law schools were closed down or 
merged with other departments; labelled capitalists and rightists, intellectuals, 
judges, lawyers and other professionals were persecuted, and some were sent to the 
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  “Legal nihilism” and “class struggle legal science” had 
started to dominate the legal system in China and law became the slave of 
politics.
147
  This continued and reached its climax to the third period of legal 
modernization between 1966 and 1976, the “destructive period” of the Cultural 
Revolution.
148
  Almost all laws and the entire legal system were demolished during 
this stage and personal pronouncements and party policies replaced law.149  During 
this phase, citizens’ rights were taken away. 150 
2.1.2 Legal Reform post-1976 
Wang Chenguang regards the period from 1976 until the present day as the fourth 
period of China’s legal development within China, when it rebuilt its legal system, 
thus calling it the “golden era of legal development”. 151   Since the late 1970s, China 
has been building its legal system incrementally and it seems that progress has been 
made in its construction towards “ruling the country according to law” (依法治
国). 152   Legal development in China relates to its political change as well as 
economic reform from its very beginning.
153
  Learning the lessons of the Cultural 
Revolution, aiming to prevent any future recurrence of the lawless days and to start 
China’s economic construction, Deng Xiaoping, the leader of China at that time, 
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of 2010.  In 1999, “ruling the country according to law and building a socialist rule of law country” (依法治
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changed China’s governing framework by introducing economic reform and 
“socialist legality” (社会主义法制) at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CCP in 1978.
154 
 





  This legal development between 1978 and present has been further 
divided by two professors of the Chinese Academy of Governance,
157
 Yuan 
Hongshu and Yang Weidong, into three further stages.  During the first stage, 
between 1978 and 1992, the main task was to re-establish the authority of law: to 
promulgate basic statues, from the Constitution (宪法) to the Organic Law of the 
People’s Court (人民法院组织法) and Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate 
(人民检察院组织法), Criminal Law (刑法) and Criminal Procedural Law (刑事诉
讼法) and Interim Regulations on Lawyers (律师暂行条例); to rebuild the judicial 
institutions, administrative implementation institutions, for example the Industry and 
Commerce Bureaus, Tax Bureaus, other important government administrative 
agencies; and the establishment of law firms.
158
  The second stage started from 1992 
when the Fourteenth CCP Congress decided to take up the route of constructing a 
socialist market economy, which lasted until 2002.  During this period, the aim of 
legal development was to meet the requirement of the transition from a planned 
economy to socialist market economy, and “ruling the country according to law” 
started to be established as a major governing strategy and was written into Article 5 
of the Chinese Constitution with its third amendment in 1999.  To administer 
according to the law was also emphasized.
159
 The third stage is from 2002 until the 
present.  In 2002, the sixteenth National Congress of the CCP stated that China 
would start to build a xiaokang (小康 literal translation: little comfort) or a 
moderately well-off society in an all-round way and speed up socialist 
modernization.  Therefore, legal development shall assist China’s construction of its 
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  An important step in the third stage is that “to administer 
according to law” (依法行政) and “to establish government ruled by law” (法制政
府) were set as the main tasks of governance.161  
It is clear that during the past 30 years, the central government has been 
increasingly emphasizing the role of law as a governing strategy in China.
162
  
Moreover, although it is generally agreed that there is no rule of law in China, the 
concept of rule of law is nevertheless elusive and contested.  It is pointed out by 
Peerenboom that “[d]ebates about the meaning of rule of law shall not blind us, 
however, to a broad consensus as to its core meaning and essential elements”. 
163
  
Inevitably, today Chinese legislation contains some basic elements the Western 
notion of rule of law embodies–equality before the law, the supremacy of law, and 
law shall impose limits upon power.
164
  Based on his thin theory of rule of law that 
“law must impose meaningful limits on the ruler and all are compatible with a thin 
rule of law”,165 Peerenboom argues that China is going towards some form of rule of 
law, “albeit a Statist Socialist version”, but also contains elements of other forms,166 
and with oppositions and occasional setback.167  A similar argument by Jianfu Chen 
is that there have been signs showing China is moving towards the rule of law, 
though it is premature to treat these latest developments as representing a firm 
trend.168  
2.1.3 The Sources of Chinese Law 
Chinese legislation appears in various forms.  Different terms are used to refer to the 
different legal instruments within China’s legal system; for consistency and clarity, 
this dissertation adopts the terms according to the Legislation Law of the PRC (中华
                                               
160 Yuan Hongshu & Yang Weidong 2009, 1.   
161 State Council, Outline for Promoting Law-based Administration in an All-round Way, 2004; Yuan 
Hongshu & Yang Weidong 2009.  
162 Li Buyun 2007, 9; See, also Wen Jiabao, 27 August 2010, Speech at the National Working Conference on 
Administration According to Law; State Council, 2004, Outline for Promoting Law-based Administration in 
an All-round Way; The State Council Information Office, 2008 Government Whitepaper on the Rule of Law. 
163 Peerenboom 2006, 63. 
164 See, e.g., Li Buyun 2008; Li Buyun 2007; Xu Xianming 1996. 
165 Peerenboom 2002, 4. 
166 Ibid., 570. 
167 Ibid., 2002, 559. 





人民共和国立法法)169 and with reference to the book of Introduction to the Legal 
System of the People’s Republic of China by Professor Albert Chen.
170
  Based on the 
Legislation Law, the major sources of Chinese law include: the Constitution (宪法), 
law (法律), administrative regulations (行政法规), local regulations (地方性法规), 
autonomous regulations (自治条例), separate regulations (单行条例) and rules (规
章).  The Constitution is promulgated by the National People’s Congress (NPC), 
laws are passed by the NPC or its Standing Committee; administrative regulations 
are issued by the State Council; local regulations are passed by local congresses and 
their standing committees; autonomous regulations and separate regulations are 
issued by people’s congresses and their standing committees of national autonomous 
regions.  Rules can be further categorized into ministry rules (部门规章)171 and 
local government rules (地方政府规章 ). 172   Ministry rules are issued by the 
“ministries and commissions of the State Council, the People's Bank of China, the 
State Audit Administration as well as the other organs endowed with administrative 
functions directly under the State Council may, in accordance with the laws as well 
as the administrative regulations, decisions and orders of the State Council and 
within the limits of their power, formulate rules”.
173   Local government rules are 
made by the “people’s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, 




Different types of legislation have different legal statuses according to the 
hierarchy of their promulgators.  With regard to the Constitution, laws, 
administrative regulations, local regulations and local government rules, there is a 
clear hierarchy according to the hierarchy of their promulgators.  Namely, that the 
Constitution prevails over the others,
175
 and that laws, administrative regulations, 
local regulations
176
 and local government rules are in a top-down hierarchy, 
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  The general principle is that lower level legislation cannot conflict 
with higher level laws.  If two pieces of conflicting legislation are at the same level, 
the new legislation prevails over the old legislation.  However, with regard to 
ministry rules, local regulations and local government rules, their legal status is 
rather unclear.
178
  Generally it is argued that ministry rules regulate different scopes 
of administration than local regulations and local government rules, which mostly 
regulate local issues.  Thus there is no clear hierarchical relationship between the 
former one and the latter two.  If any conflict occurs between them, it shall be 








In practice, the situation can be more complex and confusing.  Li and Otto have 
argued that there has been dramatic progress in Chinese legislation, but there have 
also been problems and tensions developed at the same time.  The numerous 
legislators have caused the problem of “law coming out of various doors” (法出多
门 ), which affects the unity of law and the consistency of law, and renders 
                                               
177 Legislation Law, Article 79, Article 81. 
178 Gu Jianya 2006, 49; Li & Otto 2002, 26. 
179 See, e.g., Gu Jianya 2006, 29; for detailed analysis of China’s law making, please see, Li and Otto 2002; 







autonomous regulations & 
separate regulations 





implementation more difficult.  Second, it has caused the problem of the 
overstepping of power (越权立法), or that one legislator may legislate to regulate 
issues that shall be within another legislator’s scope of responsibility.  Third, 
authorities have been competing with each other to make the legislation favourable 
to their interests, resulting in departmentalism (部门主义).180  There is also the 
problem of confusion with regard to the inconsistency of naming different types of 
legislation in China.  Generally, with regard to the Constitution and laws, there is no 
such problem.  However, with regard to regulations and rules, their titles might be in 
several forms, and some of these forms may be used for legislation issued by 
legislative bodies at more than one level of the hierarchy of law-making.
181
  For 
instance, local government rules and ministry rules are all called 规章 in Chinese.  
The same type of legislation might also be called different names: the OEI Measures 
are ministry-level rules (部门规章), but they are named “measures” (办法).  And 
ministry rules also appear with other titles, such as the Medical Waste Management 
Technical Standards (标准 ).  Moreover, legislation can also be categorized as 
regulations for trial implementation (试行 ) or interim measures (暂行办法 ).  
However, they are all part of formal laws in China with legal effects, though they 
bear the certain intention of acting experimentally in the legal system and it is 
possible that they will be revised according to the experience gained during the 
course of theirs implementation.
182
  
2.2 Developing China’s Environmental Legislation 
Although a comprehensive legal system formally started to be built after 1978, 
Chinese environmental law had already started to develop by the early 1970s.  In 
recent years, legislation concerning public participation in environmental matters 
has been developing dynamically.  This change corresponds with the general 
evolution of state policies on environmental protection in China that includes three 
main stages: the 1970s command and control policy, the 1980s market-based policy, 
                                               
180 Li & Otto 2002, 26. 
181 Chen 2011, 143. 
182 Ibid., 144; A general review on the sources of law and law-making in China, please see Chen 2008, 171-
206;  Alford and Liebman also made detailed discussion on the NPC and its Standing Committee on law-





and the information, dialogue and cooperation mechanism since the 1990s.
183
  
Accordingly, Chinese laws concerning environmental protection have experienced 
the development from basic environmental protection laws with the state as the 
dominant regulator, through market-based economic penalties and economic 
incentives upon enterprises, to the latest state of promoting public participation in 
environmental matters via environmental impact assessment and open government 
information.  
2.2.1 The Emerging of Environmental Law 
The earliest development of Chinese environmental law began in the early 1970s,
184
 
spurred by China’s attendance at the United Nations’ (UN) Conference on Human 
Environment held in Stockholm.
185
  In October 1971, China gained its UN 
membership.
186
  On 5 June 1972, China sent its delegation of 40 members to the 
conference.  This was the largest Chinese delegation sent to an international venue 
during the period of Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 where law was 
almost completely abandoned and the whole nation was in chaos.  The participation 
in the UN conference made the Chinese delegates realize that the environmental 
problem did not only belong to capitalist countries, it also existed in socialist 
China.
187
  China thus started to be aware of its environmental pollution problems.  
On 5 August 1973, the first national environmental protection conference was held 
in Beijing.  The conference lasted for half a month and it disclosed many serious 
environmental problems China faced at that time, for instance, pollution in a 
reservoir near Beijing, industrial pollution in the Yellow River, and pollution caused 
by thermal power stations.
188
  Shortly after the conference, in order to “avoid and 
reduce the serious environmental problems experienced by developed countries in 
hopes of demonstrating the progressiveness and superiority of socialism”,
189
 the SC 
passed China’s first legal document concerning environmental protection, Several 
Rules Regarding Environmental Protection and Improvement (关于保护和改善环
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境的若干规定 EPR Rules).190  Issued for trial implementation, the EPR Rules had 
10 articles. Most of the articles contain only general rules on environmental 
protection; nevertheless, Article 4, for the first time in Chinese legislation, explicitly 
stipulated the principle of “three simultaneous” (三同时 ), which requires “all 
newly-constructed, expanded, or reconstructed enterprises to have environmental 




2.2.2 The Development of Environmental Law Post-1976 
The next step of the development of environmental law was after 1976 when China 
started to rebuild its legal system. During this period, law started to be regarded as 
an important policy tool in China’s political, economic and social transformation.
192 
 
It is argued, by the environmental law professor Wang Canfa, that “during China’s 
three decades of reform and opening (改革开放), environmental law has become 
one of the most rapidly developing areas of law.”
193
  Up to 2012, there were about 
30 laws regulating environmental protection and natural resources protection 
promulgated by the NPC, 25 administrative regulations issued by the SC, and more 
than 700 local regulations and local rules issued respectively by local People’s 
Congresses and local governments.  There are also around a thousand national 
environmental standards made by the central government agencies.  China has also 
ratified about 50 international conventions on environmental protection.
194
  
The development of China’s environmental legislation since the beginning of its 
reform and opening can be roughly divided into three periods.
195
  The first phase 
was between 1978 and 1982 while China started to rebuild its legal system.  The 
most significant environmental legislation is the promulgation of the Environmental 
Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国环境保护法 EP 
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Law) on 13 September 1979 at the Eleventh Meeting of the Standing Committee of 
the Fifth NPC.  Regarded as the fundamental environmental law by academics,
196
 
this law served as “the starting point for environmental protection law in China.”
197
  
This EP Law was issued for trial implementation; it nevertheless, for the first time, 
solved many fundamental legal issues concerning environmental protection in 
China.
198
  It stipulated the establishment of environmental administrations, and a 
few important environmental mechanisms that are still in use today, such as the 




Between 1982 and 1997, the main corpus of environmental legislation was 
basically established.
200
  Abundant basic environmental laws and regulations were 
issued, including the Marine Environmental Protection Law (海洋环境保护法), 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution Law (水污染防治法 PCWP Law), Land 
Administration Law (土地管理法), Prevention and Control of Environmental Noise 
Pollution Law (环境噪声污染防治法), and Regulations on Nature Reserves (自然
保护区条例).  Most importantly, the amendment of the PCWP Law in 1996 for the 
first time stipulated explicitly that “EIA reports must include opinions from work 
units and residents in the area where the construction project is to be built.”
201
  This 
implied that related parties were entitled to access information about the project.  On 
the policy side, in 1996 the NPC passed the Ninth Five Year Plan on National 
Economy and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives to the Year of 2010 
(国民经济和社会发展第九个五年计划和 2010 年远景目标), emphasizing that:  
economic development, city and rural development and environmental 
protection shall be planned, implemented and developed 
simultaneously, all construction projects must have plans for and fulfil 
requirements of environmental protection. … [The state] shall improve 




                                               
196 Wang Canfa 2010, 499-502. 
197 Ibid., 495. 
198 See, Sun Youhai 2008, 19. 
199  The three simultaneous system requires environmental protection measures must be simultaneously 
designed, constructed and operated along with the project.  See, EP Law, Article 25.   
200 Sun Youhai 2008, 20. 
201 PCWP Law, Article 13; See also, Wang Canfa 2010, 525; Du 2009, 143.  
202 The NPC, 1996, The Ninth Five Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development and Long-





Although abundant laws were promulgated during this period, environmental 
protection has not been strengthened together with the emphasis on economic 
growth, environmental pollution and ecological problems were worsening rapidly
203
 
along with China’s fast industrial development and economic growth.   
The third phase of the development of environmental law was started after 1997 
and continues to the present day.  During this phase, a system of environmental law 
started to emerge
204
 in which more basic environmental laws have been revised or 
promulgated.  A few examples of legislation adopted in this period include the 
Regulations on the Protection of Basic Farmland ( 基 本 农 田 保 护 条例 ), 
Environmental Impact Assessment Law (环境影响评价法 EIA Law), Promotion on 
Cleaner Production Law (清洁生产促进法 PCP Law), Interim Measures on Public 
Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment (环境影响评价公众参与暂行办
法 PPEIA Measures), and Plan Environment Impact Assessment Regulations (规划
环境影响评价条例 PEIA Regulations), and most of all, the OGI Regulations and 
the OEI Measures were issued in early 2007.  Generally, this period has been 
regarded as a revitalization of environmental rule of law
205
 that a comprehensive 
system of environmental legislation has been established in China. 
During this period, China has also strengthened its environmental protection 
capacity by upgrading the National Environmental Protection Agency (国家环境保
护 局 ) from sub-ministry to ministry level, named the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (国家环境保护总局 SEPA) in 1998, but renamed the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (环保部 MEP) in 2008.  The restructuring of 
the central environmental protection mechanism aimed to solve environmental 
problems incurred with heated economic growth.
206
  
2.3 The Emergence of the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures 
The emergence of the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures is in fact part of 
China’s transition toward government transparency from its long tradition of 
government secrecy.  Generally, it appears that this transition grows out of many 
causes: the “open village affairs” (村务公开) movement started in the early 1980s, 
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China’s economic growth and information technology development, the basic World 
Trade Organization requirement that China has to comply with since its accession in 
2001, the government’s promoting of rule of law, eradication of corruption, and 
maintaining social stability.
207
  With regard to the issuance of the OGI Regulations 
and the OEI Measures, it is specifically pointed out by Horsley that:   
[a] mixture of economic and political motives has driven the 
authoritarian Chinese Communist Party leadership toward greater 
transparency. China’s international and bilateral commitments 
require greater transparency and provide an external impetus toward 
greater openness.  However, the main motivations underlying the OGI 
Regulations are largely domestic: broader sharing of government 
information in the service of economic development, improving 
people’s lives, enhancing trust between the public and the government, 
curbing government corruption and promoting better governance at 
all levels of government.
208
 
There are also other arguments about the emergence of China’s open government 
information law that makes it distinguishable from the development of open 
government information laws in other countries.  Generally, an accountability deficit 
and globalization are the two common discourses for the adoption of open 
government information in the international community.  The accountability deficit 
discourse argues that the control of information by the government is to maintain 
power in itself, and information disclosure can help to solve this problem and 
enhance liberal democracy.
209
  This has resulted in the establishment of the 
mechanism of open government information in many liberal democracies before the 
1990s.  Since then, and especially during the 2000s, a recent wave of open 
government information has developed in newly democratic countries, and others, 
along with the globalization, which enables countries to share experiences.
210
  
However, neither of the two explanatory models applies to the situation in China, as 
argued by Xiao Weibing.  China is lacking the liberal democratic elements, such as 
rule of law, free media, and active civil society, that help to lay down the foundation 
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for heated debate about government accountability.
211
  Second, globalization is a 
follow-up but not a key driver in China establishing its open government 
information system.  Instead, he argues that three main elements have made China 
establish its open government information mechanism.  First, the development of 
improved information flow in the Chinese government information environment has 
enabled the Chinese government to accept a transparent approach to government 
information management instead of a secretive one.  Second, it is part of a wider 
policy of developing grassroots democracy promoted by the central government in 
China. Third, the administrative law reform has made the Chinese government 
acceptable to external monitoring.
 212
  
Differing from Xiao’s reasoning of China’s establishing the open government 
information mechanism based on information flow, Hubbard argued that the 
Chinese government started it as a political project to control its decentralized 
government and subordinate government organs through popular supervision.
213
  
In practice, the central government’s promotion of “open government affairs” (政
务公开) stimulated the emergence of open government information as well as the 
subsequent open environmental information in China.  The open government affairs 
program was originally inspired by the practice of open village affairs that started in 
the early 1980s,
214
 which “kicked off the move toward greater openness throughout 
the country”.
215
  Starting in the 1990s, the open government affairs program was 
introduced incrementally throughout the country.  It requires administrative agencies 
to make their administration activities open to the public.
216
  In December 2000, the 
General Office of the CCP (中共中央办公厅) and the SC General Office jointly 
issued a notice
217
 requiring all township (乡镇) governments to carry out open 
administration in order to realize public supervision.  By 2006, the open government 
affairs system was established in all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and cities 
directly under the central government, and 15 sub-provincial cities (副省级城市).  
Further to this, 36 central ministries issued open government affairs normative 
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documents (规范性文件).218  This rapid development of open government affairs 
requires local governments to make accessible both government information and 
government activities.  However, one major difference between the system of “open 
government affairs” and the mechanism of open government information is that the 
former only concerns the government disclosing relevant information on its own 
initiative; it does not grant the public the right to request the government to disclose 
information, while the latter requires both.  
More importantly, since late 2002, experimental points ( 试点 ) 219  of open 
government information have started to appear in China.
220
  In December 2002, the 
first local government rules concerning open government information were issued 
by Guangzhou city government.
221
  Following this, local government rules 
concerning open government information also started to emerge in Shanghai, 
Beijing, Chengdu and other cities.
222
  Open government information legislation is 
therefore also a process from local experimental experience to national regulations.  
However, the initiation of open government information shall not be completely 
understood as a bottom-to-top initiative, as Heilmann pointed out that:  
China’s experiment-based policy-making requires the authority of a 
central leadership that encourages and protects broad-based local 
initiative and filters out generalizable lessons but at the same time 
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He further points out that China’s “from point to surface” (由点到面) is in fact:  
experimentation under hierarchy, that is, the volatile yet productive 
combination of decentralized experimentation with ad hoc central 




Compared to policy experiments, academic research on open government 
information started even earlier.  In 1997, the Law Institute of the China Academy 
of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院 CASS) was consulted by the National 
Administration for the Protection of State Secrets (保密局 NAPSS) concerning 
revising the State Secret Law (保密法 SS Law).  It is clear that secret keeping and 
information disclosure are like two sides of the same coin: the delineation of one 
decides the scope of the other.  Upon the consultation by the NAPSS, Zhou Hanhua, 
researcher and professor of the Law Institute at CASS, suggested that the amending 
of the SS Law should start by clarifying information disclosure.  This proposal was 
nevertheless not accepted by the NAPSS who was afraid that pushing forward open 
government information did not really match its administrative responsibility.
225
  
Nevertheless, a research on government information development, utility and 
management (政府资源的信息资源开发利用与管理) was launched consequently 
at CASS, though due to the sensitivity of government information disclosure, the 
research project did not even use the concept of open government information (政府
信息公开) at that time. 226  
The first document that used the concept of open government information 
appeared in 2002, the same year that China first started its “experimental point” of 
open government information in Guangzhou city.  The central government issued an 
administrative document concerning the issues of drafting open government 
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quickly push forward the establishment of e-governance legal system.  
To make appropriate legislation proposal, to push forward the 
promulgation of related laws and regulations.  To research and draft 
administrative regulations and rules concerning e-signature, open 
government information as well as Internet and information security, 
e-governance management.  To build a basic mechanism promoting e-
governance construction, operation and management.
227
  
Although open government information was, for the first time, clearly used in a 
central government document, according to this message the promotion of open 
government information was not really initiated to facilitate public access to 
information but was more or less a by-product of China’s building its e-governance 
and internet information security management.
228
  
In 2002, the Law Institute of CASS submitted its first expert version of the draft 
OGI Regulations to the SC.  In 2004, the draft version was submitted again to the 
SC. Only in 2006 did SC list the promulgation of the Regulations as its priority and 
planned to pass them in 2007.
229
  In January 2007, the OGI Regulations were 
passed by the SC at its 165th Executive Meeting and became effective in May 2008.  
In a press conference in light of the issuance of the OGI Regulations, Zhang Qiong, 
Deputy Director of the SC Legal Affairs Office stated that:  
推行政府信息公开，是科学执政、民主执政、依法执政的必然要





 open government information is the necessary requirement of 
carrying out scientific administration, democratic administration and 
administration according to law; … to fully implement the regulation 
is beneficial to safeguard the right to obtain government information 
by citizens, legal persons and other entities, to realize the people’s 
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right to know, right to participate and monitor, and to make 




This statement shows clearly that the issuance of the OGI Regulations was 
indispensable for building a transparent government and guaranteeing public access 
to government information.  This seemingly shifted open government information 
from being a by-product of e-governance and Internet security to a matter of public 
access to government information and right to participate.  
The OGI Regulations also require “competent departments or offices of the SC” 
to formulate specific meansures to further implement SC regulations.
231
  In February 
2007, SEPA became the first ministry-level agency to do this by issuing the OEI 
Measures.
232
  This was regarded as both an outcome of promoting public 
participation and enterprise information disclosure by SEPA in the past years as well 




Thus, the OGI Regulations laid the foundation for the OEI Measures and together 
they form the most important legislation with regard to open environmental 
information in China.  However, rules concerning environmental information 
disclosure do not exist only in these two regulations.  Other laws promulgated 
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before as well as after the OEI Measures also provide a legal basis for access to 
environmental information.  The following section thus provides a general review on 
the laws, regulations, rules and other legal documents, that have either explicit or 
implicit rules with regard to environmental information disclosure.    
2.4 The Path of Legislation Towards Open Environmental Information  
In China, there is no clear consensus or clarification on the concept of access to 
environmental information.  Several concepts are regarded as relating to access to 
environmental information, including the right to know (知情权) and the right to 
environmental information (环境信息权).  It has been argued that the right to know 
refers to the right of the public to obtain and to know, for example, 
environment-related information.  It is realized through disclosing environmental 
information by the government either voluntarily or upon disclosure requests by the 
public.  Another discourse goes further, arguing that the right to information is 
consisted of a bundle of rights; it not only refers to the right to know the information, 
but also the right to disseminate environmental information, and the right to be 
given a remedy if the right to information is violated.
234
  Therefore, the right to 
environmental information is derived from the right to know, but contains more 
aspects than merely getting to know the environmental information.  Nevertheless, 
there is no clear distinction between the right to know and the right to 
information.
235
  When talking about access to environmental information in Chinese, 
“the right to know” and “the right to information” are both adopted to refer to 
“access to information”.  
Moreover, it is also argued that access to information shall consist of two 
elements.  First, the government shall provide environmental information to the 
public; second, the government shall hear and consider feedback and 
communications from the public.  Therefore, access to information constitutes a 
dual-direction communication between the government and the public.
236
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2.4.1 Environmental Information Disclosure pre-OEI Measures 
Although there were local government rules concerning open environmental 
information, there was no nationwide legislation regulating access to environmental 
information in effect before the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures came into 
effect in May 2008.  However, access to environmental information was implied in 
other general and special environmental laws, regulations, and rules, particularly 
legislation concerning the EIA.  Major laws that have rules concerning access to 
environmental information include: the EP Law, the Prevention and Control of 
Atmospheric Pollution Law (大气污染防治法 PCAP Law), The EIA Law, the PCP 
Law, and the PPEIA Measures.
237
  
2.4.1.1 The Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
As one of the earliest environmental legislation−the EP Law, adopted and enforced 
since December 1989, only briefly refers to environmental information disclosure in 
two articles. Article 11 states that:  
The competent agencies of environmental protection administration 
under the State Council and governments of provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government 
shall regularly issue bulletins on environmental situations (环境状况). 
Article 31 stipulates that the entity that has caused or is likely to cause an 
accident of pollution shall make the situation known to other entities and residents 
who are likely to be harmed as well as report the incident to the competent 
environmental protection administration agency.  
Both articles are information-holder centred, and public access to information 
depends on whether they are informed by the government, or the concerned entity.  
Moreover, the scope of information the public can access is limited, since 
environmental situations only concern general information of the environment, 
                                               





water quality or air quality,
238
 but not specific projects that might affect people’s 
health, or the pollutant discharge information of one enterprise.  Furthermore, 
environmental information that concerns incidents or other exigencies causing or 
threatening to cause pollution only applies when there is a pollution incident 
occurring or going to occur, therefore daily industrial emissions within the standard 
is excluded from information disclosure.  
Moreover, there is a lack of sanctions if the government or private entities fail to 
fulfil their obligations.  In reality, the requirement by the EP law to disclose 
information concerning pollution incidents has been neglected repeatedly even in 
severe environmental pollution incidents.  For example, in July 2010, the Zijin 
Mining Group delayed its information disclosure to the public for nine days after a 
leak of 9,100 cubic meters of acid from the plant’s wet sewage facilities into the 
Ting River, resulting in serious pollution and the death of 1,890 tons of aquatic 
life.
239
  And in July 2011, the first information disclosure concerning a serious oil-
field leakage caused by ConocoPhilips China in the Bohai Sea was made by State 
Oceanic Administration one month after the accident occurred on 4 June.
240
  
Furthermore, both enterprises were not sanctioned for the delay of their information 
disclosure, though they were ordered to compensate for the losses caused by their 
pollution. 
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2.4.1.2 The Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution Law 
The PCAP Law was amended and adopted by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on 29 April 2000, and became effective as of 1 
September 2000.  It imposes obligations upon both enterprises and government 
agencies to disclose environmental information.  Article 20 of the PCAP law 
stipulates explicitly that private enterprises whose activities caused environmental 
incidents that might result in air pollution shall immediately take measures to 
prevent air pollution, inform entities and residents that might be affected by air 
pollution, and report the incident to the environmental protection agencies.  Under 
the circumstance that heavily polluted air causes harm to people’s health and 
security, the local governments shall inform the public of any dangerous 
environmental conditions or pollution incidents in good time.241  Article 23 requires 
environmental agencies of local governments of large and medium-sized cities to 
release air quality environmental reports at fixed intervals.  These reports shall 
include the quality of air pollution in cities, the types of main pollutants and the 
levels of harmful effects of this pollution.242   
American Chinese law experts Alford and Liebman have argued that as one of the 
early environmental laws, the PCAP law “takes steps towards increasing public 
awareness of environmental problems”.
243
  However, with regard to information 
disclosure, the PCAP Law bears much similarity to the EP Law.  First, both laws are 
information-holder centred, and there is a lack of punishment if the information 
holder, either a private enterprise or public actor, does not fulfil their duty to 
disclose.  Second, the information that shall be disclosed is limited to serious 
environmental incidents and the general condition of the environment.  Although the 
law requires government agencies to inspect enterprise pollutant discharge,
244
 it does 
not grant the public access to information of environmental pollution or other 
environmental information concerning specific enterprises.   
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2.4.1.3 The Law on Promotion of Cleaner Production of the People’s Republic 
of China   
Effective in 2003, the PCP Law takes one step further in explicitly stipulating that 
the state encourages the public to participate in dissemination, education, promotion, 
implementation and supervision regarding clean production.
245
  Moreover, it 
specifically requires the state agencies responsible for environmental protection at a 
provincial level
246
 to publish a list of heavily-polluting enterprises in local primary 
media.
247
  It also requires enterprises that appear on the list to periodically publish 
the status of the discharge of their major pollutants and submit it to public 
supervision.
248
  Imposing the obligation on the government agencies responsible for 
environmental protection and heavily-polluting enterprises to disclose information in 
newspapers or on websites, the PCP Law plays an instrumental role in providing a 
channel for the public to find out about environmental information concerning 
specific enterprises.
249
  Nevertheless, it is still limited to information about the 
heavily-polluting enterprises, and other enterprises are excluded from the 
compulsory requirement of environmental information disclosure. 
In 2003, based on the PCP Law, SEPA decided to launch a nationwide work of 
enterprise environmental information disclosure to promote public monitoring of 
enterprise environmental activities and issued the Bulletin on Enterprise 
Environmental Information Disclosure (EEID Bulletin).
 250
  According to the EEID 
Bulletin, enterprises that are obliged to publish their environmental information have 
a wide margin of choice in deciding by which means they will publish their 
environmental information.  They can choose to publish the information on the 
websites of SEPA or provincial EPDs, in newspapers, via other media, or in printed 
brochures.  This in fact leaves the possibility open for enterprises to choose 
approaches to fulfil their obligation of information disclosure which avoid making 
the information effectively or broadly accessible to the public, if they intend to do so 
for their own sake. For instance, they may publish environmental information in an 
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unpopular local newspaper with limited subscription, or by printing a few handouts 
of their environmental information.  
The only compulsory and strict requirement in the EEID Bulletin is that the 
environmental protection agencies in the locality in which the enterprises are 
registered shall make the enterprises publish their environmental information on 
SEPA’s website under certain serious circumstances.  These circumstances include:  
a. an enterprise’s major pollutant discharge does not meet the national 
or local pollutant discharge standard twice or more during regular 
environmental inspections; 
b. an enterprise’s pollutant discharge surpasses the total emission 
volume allowed by the emission license twice or more during regular 
environmental inspections; 
c. an enterprise incurred two or more violations of environmental laws 
during on-site environmental inspections; 
d. an enterprise causes major polluting accidents; 




These rules have reflected the most important concerns of the state regarding 
environmental problems, namely enterprises’ repeatedly polluting, heavily-polluting 
enterprises, and pollution-related collective petitions.
252
   
Compared to the EP Law, the PCP Law and its further enforcement guidance the 
EEID Bulletin have explicitly extended public access to environmental information 
about heavily-polluting industry.  This further imposes pressure on various 
enterprises to alleviate or prevent pollution.  If the PCAP Law “takes steps towards 
increasing public awareness of environmental problems”,
253
 the EEID Bulletin and 
the PCP Law in fact constitute the first step towards access to environmental 
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information by explicitly imposing obligations upon both environmental protection 
agencies and all heavily-polluting enterprises to disclose environmental information, 




Nonetheless, like the early environmental laws, both the EEID Bulletin and the 
PCP Law are still information-holder centred and access to information through 
disclosure request is lacking.  In other words, the public does not have a positive 
right to request that either a government agency or an enterprise disclose 
environmental information.  This could probably be explained by the discourse that 
the PCP Law is, in essence, an environmental economic law that affirms and 
normalizes government activities to interfere appropriately in the economic sector to 
prevent environmental pollution;
255
 thus, it is not a law that regulates public 
participation in environmental matters as such.  
2.4.1.4 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environmental Impact 
Assessment    
The EIA Law was promulgated in October 2002 and entered into force on 1 
September 2003.  It is important to notice that, distinguishing it from previous 
environmental laws, the EIA Law is the first Chinese law that explicitly makes 
public participation one of its general principles;
 256
  it is also the first law that not 
only implies active access to information but also passive access to environmental 
information.  In this sense, it constitutes the second major step forward towards open 
environmental information. 
In the first part of its General Principles, the EIA Law stipulates that:  
the state encourages relevant entities, experts and the general public 
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In its subchapters it further clarifies that if a subject plan (专项规划) or construction 
project (建设项目) “may cause unfavourable environmental impacts or directly 
involve the environmental interests of the general public”, opinions of relevant 
entities, experts and the general public shall be sought by the program planning unit 
or the construction entity through holding demonstration meetings (论证会) or 
hearings (听证会) or any other means, unless it is provided by the state that it shall 
be kept confidential.
258
  Although access to information has not been explicitly 
stipulated in the EIA law, undoubtedly demonstration meetings and public hearings 
cannot be held without the public knowing the relevant environmental information.  
Thus, organizing a demonstration meeting and hearing (or via any other means) de 
facto creates the possibility of public access to environmental information.  
Moreover, during demonstration meetings or hearings, the public does have the 
chance to ask questions about the program or construction project, which, as a 
matter of fact, constitutes passive access to information.  The EIA law also 
embodies a dual-direction communication with regard to access to information.
 259
  
It requires the program drafting entities and project construction units to take public 
feedback into consideration as well as state whether public opinion has been taken 
or refused in their environmental impact assessment report for examination and 
approval.  
2.4.1.5 Interim Measures on Public Participation for Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
The PPEIA Measures belong to ministry-level rules.  Issued by SEPA on 14 
February 2006 and entered into force on 18 March 2006, the PPEIA Measures have 
been proclaimed by the Legal Daily (法制日报) as the first legal document on 
public participation.
260
  The vice minister of SEPA, Pan Yue, stated that the PPEIA 
Measures not only clarified the public’s right to participate in environmental impact 
assessments but also set rules on the scope, procedure, means and duration of public 
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The PPEIA Measures until today constitute the first national legislation explicitly 
setting out the most detailed rules with regard to access to information.  Moreover, 
they explicitly include not only active access to information but also passive access 
to information.  Thus, compared to the EIA Law’s implied passive access to 
information, the PPEIA Measures takes a third step forward, towards open 
environmental information.  Aiming to promote and regulate public participation in 
environmental impact assessment,
262
 it clearly states in its General Principles that 
construction entities or the entrusted environmental impact drafting entities during 
the environmental impact report drafting period, and the environmental protection 
agencies during its assessment and approval process, shall publish relevant 
environmental impact information and listen to public opinion.
 263
  The whole 
Section 1 of Chapter 2 of the PPEIA Measures concerns environmental information 
disclosure.  This section includes five articles defining in detail who shall disclose 
the information, the content of the information, and the means to make the 
information public.  It particularly points out that the impact on the environment by 
construction projects, and measures taken to prevent or decrease the negative impact 
on the environment, shall be made public; it also stipulates that the public shall be 
informed when and how they can obtain additional information from the 
construction entity or its entrusted environmental impact assessment entity.
264
  This 
stipulation of obtaining additional information is de facto a stipulation of passive 
access to information that the public has the right to request government information 
disclosure.  Moreover, similar to the EIA Law, the PPEIA Measures also have rules 
implying the dual-direction communication of environmental information by 
requiring construction entities and their entrusted drafting entities, and the 
environmental protection agencies, to consult the public.
265
  
In brief, the PPEIA Measures constitute a dividing line between implied and 
explicit public access to environmental information.  Most of all, they set out the 
most detailed rules concerning access to information during the process of the 
environmental impact assessment of a construction project.  However, construction 
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projects are, under most circumstances, carried out by private entities, which 
therefore implies that the PPEIA Measures mostly impose the duty upon private 
entities instead of government agencies to disclose relevant information.  While 
there is a lack of clear rules on the government’s role and responsibility in 
guaranteeing access to environmental information, the PPEIA Measures cannot be 
regarded as comprehensive and profound.  
2.4.1.6 Summary 
Access to information in Chinese law from the EP Law to the PPEIA Measures has 
mainly undertaken a path from the implied to the explicit, from the government 
disclosing information on its own initiative to encouraging the public to request 
information disclosure, and from a one-direction to dual-direction communication.  
However, despite the legislative developments, access to environmental information 
before May 2008 remained limited in the scope of information that could be 
accessed or disclosed and deficient in a state-dominated and public-marginalized 
structure.  
First of all, access to information mainly depends on whether the information 
holders are willing to disclose; the rules concerning access to information are 
insufficient, mostly limited to environmental impact assessment.  Most 
public-concerned information–such as pollutant emissions of enterprises near to 
residential areas–is not accessible.  Without access to environmental information, it 
would be difficult for the public to effectively help protect the environment from 
being polluted or actively participate in environmental governance.
266
  
Second, although both government agencies and enterprises were required to 
disclose information to the public, it seems that when compared to government 
agencies, enterprises bear more of the responsibility with regard to information 
disclosure.  Moreover, there is a lack of clarification on the government’s obligation 
and responsibility to regulate enterprises’ information disclosure. Few constraints on 
state authorities were imposed to ensure that enterprises act strictly according to law 
and disclose their environmental information to the public.   
Third, there was almost no strict responsibility imposed upon either the 
government or the enterprise if they fail to disclose relevant information.  In the PCP 
                                               





Law, there were rules stating that when an enterprise fails to publish its pollutant 
discharge information the relevant government agencies responsible for 
environmental protection shall publish the discharge information, and may also 
impose a fine upon the enterprise.
267
  However, this “may impose” shows a lenient 
attitude towards violating enterprises, indicating that enterprises may also not be 
punished.  
To conclude, rules regarding access to environmental information before May 
2008 were rather vague, lenient towards information disclosing parties, 
information-holder centred and lacked a responsibility mechanism.  Regarding the 
defects and weaknesses of the legislation concerning access to environmental 
information, scholars have various suggestions to improve the situation.  It has been 
proposed, for example, that an open environmental information system be 
constructed, based on citizens’ right to obtain environmental information and 
participate in environmental protection activities; second, that special laws should be 
drafted on open government information; third, access to information and public 
participation shall be combined closely, not only in environmental impact 
assessment, but expanded to other areas of decision-making, for example, legislation 
and policy-making.  Furthermore, it had been suggested that the scope of 
environmental information should be expanded and the system of government 
information disclosure extend from urban to rural areas; various means should be 
adopted to make environmental information available to the public, for example by 
constructing websites, organizing press conferences, and holding demonstration 
meetings; and enterprise information disclosure systems should be improved, based 
on the experience of the trial cities.
268
  Other suggestions include, learning from the 
Aarhus Convention and based on China’s situation, to promulgate special open 
information laws, and to amend the EP Law with one chapter added that particularly 
deals with environmental information disclosure.  Thus, the legislation should 
clarify the following factors: the definition and scope of environmental information, 
the information disclosure subject and means of disclosure, disclosure procedures, 
exceptional circumstances, and legal remedies.
269
  While it is not definite how 
academic discourses have resulted in the promulgation of the open government 
information legislation, it is clear that scholarly discussion has pointed out new 
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possibilities for China’s legal development of establishing its mechanism of open 
government information.  And some suggestions have also clearly been reflected in 
China’ establishment of its open government information mechanism.  For instance, 
it has been argued that open government information legislation could be issued as 
administrative regulations to act as a transitional experiment and provide experience 
for improvement, to be upgraded into law in the future.270  So far, open government 
information legislation does consist of regulations and rules but not laws.     
2.4.2 Strengthening Access to Information: 2008 and Beyond 
In May 2008, the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures came into effect.  
Additionally, open environmental information has also appeared in other legislation 
promulgated in recent years, mainly in the newly revised Prevention and Control of 
Water Pollution Law (水污染防治法 PCWP Law) in 2008, The Circular Economy 
Promotion Law (循环经济促进法 CEP Law) that came into force as of 1 January 
2009, and the Plan Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (规划环评条例
PEIA Regulations) effective since 1 October 2009.
271
  These laws and regulations 
have further shaped China’s open environmental information mechanism. 
2.4.2.1 Special Legislation on Open Government/Environmental Information 
The OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures were promulgated in early 2007 and 
both came into effect in May 2008.  The OGI Regulations, belonging to the category 
of regulations promulgated by the SC, prevails over the OEI Measures, which are 
ministry rules.  Nevertheless, they all belong to special legislation concerning open 
government information, and bear many similarities.  The following discussion 
therefore adopts an integrated and comparative approach by analysing the two 
pieces of legislation together. 
Article 1 of the OGI Regulations explicitly and directly states that its objective is 
to guarantee the public access to government information.  Although the OGI 
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Regulations do not concern environmental information directly, they require all 
levels of government and their agencies to disclose various kinds of government 
information, which includes government-held environmental information.  It 
specifically stipulates that state agencies shall voluntarily disclose information that 
concerns the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or other organizations, 
information that should be widely known by the general public or concerns the 
participation of the general public, development planning, regional planning, 
information on the approval of great construction projects and their implementation, 
and urban construction information.
272
   
The OEI Measures specifically require environmental protection agencies to 
disclose environmental information.  Most of all, besides the listed types of 
information that shall be disclosed, there is a clause stating that the environmental 
protection agencies shall also disclose other environmental information that shall be 
disclosed according to laws, regulations and rules.
273
  The Measures also require 
enterprises to disclose environmental information.
274
  
Besides voluntary disclosure by public actors, both pieces of legislation stipulate 
that citizens, legal persons and other entities can request that government agencies 
disclose environmental information.
275
  In other words, the legislation has rules 
about both passive access to information, that the public can seek information from 
public authorities, and active access to information, that the public shall receive 
information, and the obligation of authorities to collect and disseminate information 
of public interest without the need for a specific request.
276
  
Furthermore, both pieces of legislation set clear rules regarding legal remedies for 
failure to disclose information.  They stipulate explicitly that citizen, legal person or 
other organization, if they think an administrative agency fails to fulfil its obligation 
to disclose information according to law, have the right to report or inform
277
 its 
superior administrative department, supervisory department or other competent 
government department.  The public can also apply for administrative 
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reconsideration (行政复议)278 before the competent government department or bring 
an administrative lawsuit to the court if they believe that a specific administrative 
act committed by an administrative agency in carrying out government information 
disclosure work has infringed their legal rights and interests.
279
   
The OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures together constitute a milestone in 
safeguarding access to environmental information, clearly stipulating who the 
information disclosure duty bearers and rights holders are, the broad scopes of 
information to be disclosed, and the procedures for access to information.   
Nevertheless, no rules are without exceptions.  Both pieces of legislation have 
exception rules stating that information involving state secrets, commercial secrets 
or individual privacy may not be disclosed.
280
  Generally speaking, it is undisputable 
that these elements shall be regarded as exceptions concerning information 
disclosure.  However, the problem under China’s situation is that it is very difficult 
to delineate these exceptions according to current Chinese laws, particularly when 
related to state secrets and commercial secrets.  In China, state secrets “shall be 
matters that have a vital bearing on state security and national interests and, as 
specified by legal procedure, are entrusted to a limited number of people for a given 
period of time”
281
 and they can be determined by all levels of governments and their 
departments, and the basis on which something can be classified as state secret is 
very broad.
282
  Therefore, any information could possibly be classified as a “state 
secret”.  The problem with the exception of commercial secrets is not as serious as 
that of state secrets; however, due to the secret nature of a commercial secret, it is 
difficult for information applicants to know if the commercial secret used by the 
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It is also argued that a legislative defect exists with Article 8 of the OGI 
Regulations. Its stipulation of the “three securities one stability” created the risk of 
Article 8 being used as an additional exception of disclosure in that government 
information that might affect state security, public security, economic security and 
social stability shall not be disclosed.
284
 
2.4.2.2 Prevention and Control of Water Pollution Law 
The PCWP Law was adopted by the NPC Standing Committee on 28 February 2008, 
and entered into force as of 1 June 2008.  Only one article in the PCWP Law 
stipulates open environmental information: Article 19 requires a list of local 
governments that fail to reach their indicators of the reduction and control of the 
total discharge of major water pollutants to be published by their higher-level 
environmental protection agencies; information of enterprises that seriously pollute 
the water environment in violation of the PCWP Law shall be disclosed by 
environmental protection agencies at or above the county level.
285
   
Compared to its sister law−the PCAP Law, the PCWP goes further in requiring 
that it be made public if local governments fail to achieve their environmental 
protection targets.  This imposes a pressure on local governments to take measures 
to fulfil their pollutant emission targets.  
Both the PCAP Law and the PCWP Law are similar in that only active access to 
environmental information is stipulated.  However, compared to the PCAP Law, 
stating that information about air pollution accidents shall be made public 
immediately,
286
 no similar rules are stipulated by the PCWP Law.  Moreover, unlike 
the PCAP Law, the air quality situation shall be disclosed periodically;
287
 no 
requirement can be found under the PCWP Law on periodic disclosure of 
information about the water situation.  
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2.4.2.3 Circular Economy Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China  
The CEP Law was issued on 29 August 2008 by the Standing Committee of the 
NPC and came into effect as of 1 January 2009.  A circular economy refers to the 
process of “reducing, reusing and recycling activities conducted in the process of 
production, circulation and consumption”.
288
  The CEP Law stipulates both active 
and passive access to environmental information.  Passive access to information is 
stipulated by Article 10 (3), in that:  
citizens have the right to report acts of wasting resources and 
damaging the environment, and have the right to access to government 
information about the development of circular economy and propose 
their opinions and suggestions.
289
 
Although it is not clear how citizens can realize this right to obtain government 
information, it is nevertheless clear that the right to environmental information is 
embodied by the law.  And moreover, it is a mutual-communication of information 
since citizens can also “propose their opinions and suggestions”. 
Active access to information is stipulated by Article 17, in that: 
the state shall set up a circular economy statistical system, strengthen 
the statistical management of resource consumption, comprehensive 
utilization and waste production, and publish the major statistical 
indicators to the public on a regular basis. 
290
 
It appears that this looks more like a guidance of statistical indicators rather than the 
situation of circular economy production.  This corresponds with the purpose of the 
law in that it is formulated to promote a circular economy, improve the efficiency of 
resources, protect the environment and realize sustainable development,
291
 but not to 
regulate and control enterprises’ activities. 
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2.4.2.4 Plan Environment Impact Assessment Regulations 
The PEIA Regulations came into effect on 1 October 2009.  They set rules 
regulating environmental impact assessments on comprehensive and subject 
developing plans ( 综合规划和专项规划 ) made by governments and their 
administrative agencies.  Access to environmental information is implied in the 
regulations in that a plan-drafting unit shall organize demonstration meetings, 
hearings or other means to consult the opinion of relevant entities, experts and the 
public before submitting a report on a subject plan, including plans for approval on 
industry, agriculture, husbandry, forestry, fishery, communications, city construction, 
tourism, and natural resources’ exploitation.
292
  Therefore, similar to the EIA law, 
access to information is only implied in the process of consultation when the public 
was informed about the plan before submitting their opinion; it is also possible that 
the public could request information disclosure when participating in the 
consultation period.  Moreover, a dual-direction communication concerning access 
to information also seems possible from the stipulation that the drafting unit shall 
attach a statement on whether it adopts the public opinion and its reasons when 
submitting the report. 
However, although the PEIA Regulations state that this concerns both 
comprehensive plans and subject plans, evidentially from the rules, access to 
information only applies to subject plans, such as industrial development plans, 
agricultural or tourism development, but not comprehensive plans, for example 
plans with regard to land use, regional development plans, and sea area or river area 
development plans.
293
  This corresponds with the EIA law, which also does not 
apply to comprehensive plans.
294
  On the one hand, although it is argued that this is 
due to government departments being afraid of public participation and causing 
trouble in environmental policy making, it is in conformity with its upper level 
law.
295
  On the other hand, it shows the sole government control over drafting 
comprehensive plans in China.  
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In brief, there has been visible legislative development since 2008 until now 
concerning open environmental information.  Moreover, the promulgation of the 
OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures has become a landmark in establishing 
China’s open environmental information mechanism.  However, problems still exist 
with vague and unclear rules, and broad exceptions in both pieces of legislation.  
These problems have also been repeated or even augmented by normative 
documents issued by the SC as guidance for government agencies to carry out the 
work of open government information.  
2.5 From State Council Opinions to the Supreme People’s Court 
Judicial Interpretation on Open Government Information  
Besides laws, regulations, and rules, several other legal documents also regulate the 
current situation of open environmental information by government agencies.  They 
include the one notice and two opinions by the General Office of the SC, and the 




2.5.1 One Notice and Two Opinions on OGI Regulations 
In order to effectively implement the OGI Regulations, the General Office of the SC 
issued one notice and two opinions in August 2007, April 2008 and January 2010, 
respectively.
297
  These documents are normative documents (规范性文件) that shall 
be used as a reference (参照使用) for all government agencies.  In China, normative 
                                               
296 There is also legal document regulating enterprise environmental information disclosure. For instance, in 
February 2008, SEPA issued the Guidance on Strengthening Public-listed Companies Environmental 
Protection Supervision and Management. It requires a mechanism of environmental information disclosure to 
be established with regard to public-listed companies, and companies whose environmental information is not 
disclosed according to the requirements shall be reported to the China Securities Regulation Commission. The 
Commission shall act according to the Measures on Public-listed Companies Information Disclosure.  
297 SC General Office, Notice on Preparing Well for Implementing the Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China on Open Government Information, 4 August 2007; SC General Office, Opinion on Several Issues of 
Implementing the PRC Open Government Information Regulations, 29 April 2008; SC General Office, 





documents, generally bearing government names in red as headers, are also called 
Redhead Document (红头文件 ); although not formal laws they play a very 
important function in government administration.  It is argued that the growing 
importance of administrative normative documents in practice changes 
“administrative rule of law” to “rule of normative rules”.
298
  The notice generally 
called all government agencies to make full preparation in order to implement the 
OGI Regulations.  The opinions provided further guidance on how to implement the 
OGI Regulations.  
Urging government agencies to disseminate government information and fulfil 
their obligation under the OGI regulations, it seems that the opinions also set 
requirements that may impede effective implementation of the OGI Regulations and 
the OEI Measures.  For example, it is argued by Horsley that the SC’s opinion on 
handling OGI requests “appears to endorse a restrictive interpretation of the ‘special 
needs’ language of Article 13 of the [OGI] Regulations”.
299
  
There are two points of views on “special needs of production, livelihood and 
scientific research” stipulated by Article 13 of the OGI Regulations.
300
  The first 
holds that Article 13 provides the reason for information disclosure requests but 
does not impose restraints upon information requesters.  Therefore, everyone has the 
right to request the government to disclose information.
301
  The second is a more 
restrictive interpretation, stating that the clause limits the scope of information 
requesters, and so citizens, legal persons, and other organizations must have special 
needs related to their production, livelihood, or scientific research in order to request 
a governmental information disclosure.
302
  There is also the argument that the 
restricted interpretation fits the present situation, within which governments at 
different levels in China are lacking sufficient capacity to fulfil their obligation 
concerning information disclosure.
303
   
Both opinions issued by the SC General Office stated that government agencies 
may (可以) refuse to provide information if the disclosure does not relate to the 
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applicant’s special needs of production, livelihood and scientific research.
304
  
Although both opinions used “may” instead of “must”, in theory and in practice 
there is a clear trend that Article 13 is interpreted restrictedly, by imposing 
constraints on information disclosure requesters.
305
  Unlike the OGI Regulations, the 
OEI Measures does not have rules concerning the special needs of the applicants to 
request an environmental information disclosure.
306
  However, while the opinions 
issued by the SC shall be applied to all government agencies, all environmental 
protection agencies must take into consideration the SC’s opinions in their 
administering of environmental information disclosures.   
In fact, the restricted interpretation of “special needs of production, livelihood 
and scientific research” has already been applied in cases concerning environmental 
information disclosures.  For example, in the case of Sun Nong v. Zhuhai EPB, the 
appealing court dismissed the applicant’s claim of action, stating that his request 
addressed to the EPB regarding used battery disposal information did not concern 
his special needs of production, livelihood and scientific research.
307
  Nevertheless, 
the Supreme People’s Court relaxed the requirement of “special needs” in its judicial 
interpretation, which will be discussed in the following section 2.5.2. 
Both opinions also clearly excluded information that might affect “three securities 
and one stability” (三安全一稳定)308 from the scope of what shall be disclosed.   
If disclosure of government information that is requested by a 
requester might endanger state security, public security, economic 
security and social stability, according to the stipulations information 
should not be disclosed and the requester may be notified that such 




                                               
304 SC General Office, Several Issues of Implementing the PRC Open Government Information Regulations, 
29 April 2008, Article 14; SC General Office, Opinion on Doing a Good Job of Disclosing Government 
Information on Request, 12 January 2010, Article 1.  
305 More discussion, see, Chen Yongxi 2011. 
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environmental protection departments to disclose government environmental information”.  
307 Sun Nong v. Zhuhai EPB, Guangdong Zhuhai City Intermediate People’s Court Administrative Litigation 
Ruling, (2009) zhuzhongfaxingzhongzi No.50, 17 December 2009. 
308 More discussion about this, please see chapter 1.4. 
309 SC General Office, Opinion on Several Issues of Implementing the PRC Open Government Information 
Regulations, 29 April 2008; Similar requirements are stipulated by the 2010 Opinion, see, SC General Office, 
Opinion on Doing a Good Job of Disclosing Government Information on Request, 12 January 2010. The cited 





Although it has been argued that the “three securities and one stability” is in fact 
more a criteria to balance whether the disclosure might affect them, but is not an 
exception of non-disclosure,
310
 the opinions here clearly adopted the latter discourse. 
The opinion issued in 2010 also has a clarification on the scope of state 
information as it stated that  
internal management information made or obtained by administrative 
organs during their day-to-day work or in-process information (过程
性信息) under discussion, research or examination in general is not 
government information that should be disclosed as referred to in the 
Regulations.
311
   
Lastly, a new principle, “one issue one request” (一事一申请) 312  established by 
the SC opinion of January 2010 might impose potential obstacles concerning 
government information disclosure upon request.  Article 3 of the opinion says that, 
in reality, sometimes one request asks for information compiled and kept by several 
government agencies, or some requests concern many categories of information and 
items (项目).  Under these circumstances, it is difficult for government agencies to 
provide the required information.  To increase working efficiency and to make it 
convenient for the information disclosure requester to obtain information, in 
requests containing many items (项目较多的申请) the addressed administrative 
agency can ask for the request to be adjusted according to the principle of “one issue 
one request”.  In other words, one government information disclosure request shall 
only correspond to one government information item.
313
  The principle thus allows 
government agencies, if considering that more than one item of information is being 
requested, to require information disclosure requesters to revise their requests.  This 
might produce an additional burden for the public to make several requests if more 
than one piece or type of information is needed.  Another problem with this 
principle is that there is no clear interpretation on what constitutes one issue or item.   
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information in process. Further discussion and analysis, please see Chapter 4.  
312 SC General Office, Opinion on Doing a Good Job of Disclosing Government Information on Request, 12 
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2.5.2 Rules on Several Issues of Adjudicating Open Government Information 
Administrative Litigation 
Along with the development of government information disclosure upon request, 
administrative lawsuits started to appear.  However, the lack of a consistent and 
unified interpretation of the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures made it difficult 
for courts to adjudicate administrative litigation concerning government information 
disclosures.
314
  Moreover, inconsistent rulings have already appeared.
315
  According 
to Shen Gui, deputy director of the Law School of Peking University, there is at 
least a lack of clear interpretation on three issues under the OGI Regulations: rules 
of exceptions, the scope of government agencies that can be requested to provide 




Aiming to clarify these issues, the SPC drafted a judicial interpretation–Rules on 
Several Issues of Adjudicating Open Government Information Administrative 
Litigation (OGI Judicial Interpretation).  In China, in a strict sense, courts do not 
have the power to interpret either laws or regulations.  Nevertheless, judicial 
interpretations do affect the implementation of laws and regulations since all courts 
must follow the interpretations from accepting cases to issuing judgments.
317
  
Generally, judicial interpretation aims to provide a unified basis and rules for 
accepting, adjudicating and deciding such cases;
318
 it can also help to prevent 




On 2 November 2009, the SPC started to seek public opinion on the judicial 
interpretation.  The public consultation lasted until 30 November 2009, a total of 29 
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  The SPC received several hundred comments and suggestions,
321
 and there 
was also academic discussion on the judicial interpretation.
322
  
More than one year later, on 13 December 2010, the judicial interpretation was 
passed by the Judicial Committee of the SPC (最高人民法院审判委员会); another 
half a year later, it was made available to the public, on 29 July 2011. It then came 
into effect as of 13 August 2011.
323
  
The interpretation clarifies some basic issues concerning adjudicating open 
government information litigation.  It first specifies the scope of administrative 
litigation that shall be accepted by the court
324
 as well as the situations that the court 
can refuse to accept.
325
  
The judicial interpretation also tried to clarify other controversial rules in the OGI 
Regulations.  Concerning the “special needs of production, livelihood and scientific 
research”, the new interpretation states clearly that “if the defendant refuses to 
provide the information based on the reason that the government information does 
not concern the applicant’s special needs of production, livelihood or scientific 
research, the people’s court may ask the plaintiff to make an explanation on the 
issue of special needs.”
326
  Compared to the draft version of the judicial 
interpretation that required the information requester to prove his/her information 
disclosure request is based on his/her special needs of production, livelihood and 
scientific research,
327
 its final version takes a more relaxed attitude towards the 
plaintiff (the information disclosure requester) and does not impose the strict burden 
of proof upon the plaintiff.  The new judicial interpretation can thus, to a large 
extent, prevent state agencies simply using the special needs requirement to push 
away their obligation of disclosure. 
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With regard to the controversial issues of “three securities and one stability” and 
“information in process, discussion or under review shall not be disclosed”, the new 
judicial interpretation did not give any explanation.  However, on the one hand this 
can be seen as progress compared to the draft version that stipulated both as 
exceptions of disclosure,
328
 though on the other hand it leaves these issues as 
pending problems.  Will the courts simply follow the SC opinions that information 
that falls within them shall not be disclosed?  Due to the limited courts cases about 
open government information, it is still too early to tell.  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter mainly focuses on the development of Chinese law, particularly 
environmental law and the emergence of its open government information 
legislation.  The development has shown that a legal framework of access to 
environmental information has been established and has shaped the possibilities that 
Chinese citizens and other entities can utilize if they wish.      
Discussing the process of China’s legalization, Liang argues that it serves the aim 
of supporting the Chinese government to “legitimize the power control of the central 
state” and also controls power abuse through setting up “legal boundaries for all 
governmental functions”; nevertheless, he also states that law “has an important 
function of granting substantive rights to Chinese citizens within a modern 
system.”
329
  The coming into effect of the OEI Measures and the OGI Regulations 
have, for the first time, explicitly granted the right to the public to request that 
government departments disclose environmental information.   Moreover, it seems 
that the creation of the right to information by the OGI Regulations and the OEI 
Measures have also helped to revitalize the rules of environmental information 
disclosure in other laws and regulations, which have existed but remained mostly 
dormant before the official establishment of the open government information 
mechanism, to be utilized by the public.
330
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With regard to the newly promulgated regulations of open government 
information, Zhou Hanhua, professor of law at CASS, one of the drafters of the OGI 





The OGI Regulations stipulate access to government information as a 
legal obligation for government agencies … They realize the 
transformation of the maximization of the interest from concerning a 
small group of people to public interest.  They constitute a great leap 
in aspects of concept and system.  To promote open government 




The ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius said that “laws alone cannot carry 
themselves into practice” (徒法不足以自行), law on paper can never become law 
in action automatically.  The promulgation of new rights does not lead to their 
self-realization; the effect of laws mainly depends on those who apply the laws, and 
achieving an effective nationwide transparent mechanism of environmental 
information disclosure depends on various factors.  
On the one hand, in the field of open environmental information, government 
agencies have been effortlessly striking a tough balance between environmental 
protection, economic development, public rights and interests, and social stability.  
On the other hand, in today’s China the law is not only a form of social control but a 
tool for the public to push for social and political change.
332
  In the field of open 
environmental information, the public, from individuals to NGOs and other entities, 
have already been actively using rules from both the new legislation and old laws to 
request government information disclosures.
333
  Have they succeeded in obtaining 
the information?  Why and how have they been invoking the new legal rights?  
What impact on the social and political system have these actions made?  The next 
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chapters endeavour to answer these questions by painting the picture of open 





3 ACCESSING TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION UPON REQUESTS: 
PRACTICES AND OBSTACLES 
As discussed above, in China, the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures all came 
into effect in May 2008; together, they formally established China’s open 
environmental information mechanism.  Ever since they came into effect, citizens 
and organizations have been actively requesting that government agencies disclose 
environmental information.  Based on the documented 28 cases and eight surveys 
compiled by the author, this chapter gives an overview of the actual situation of 
environmental information disclosure upon request and the factors impeding an 
effective realization of information disclosure in China.  
This chapter first reviews the general situation with regard to the realization of 
environmental information disclosure upon request.  Second, it further illustrates the 
interactions between the two lines of the socio-legal sphere and political system 
through case studies.  Following this is a further analysis of how legal rhetoric is 
utilized by government agencies, mitigating the socio-legal power in challenging 
governmental authority.  Lastly, the chapter concludes with the implications of these 
findings.   
3.1 An Overview of Environmental Information Disclosure Upon 
Requests 
According to the Ministry of Supervision, in 2011, 1.3 million OGI requests were 
submitted in 31 provinces and more than 85% of them resulted in information 
disclosures; 3,000 OGI requests were submitted to central government agencies, and 
more than 70% resulted in information disclosures.334  It appears that compared to 
these official statistics, the cases and surveys in the following discussions show a 
                                               





rather different picture.  It is difficult to say that the findings in this study, due to the 
limitation of the collection of the cases and surveys, represent the general situation.  
Nevertheless, they give us the reflection of the implementation of open 
environmental information mechanism in China.  More importantly, most of the 
surveys cover a wide range of target environmental protection agencies, for instance, 
the survey by IPE covers 113 cities across China, and thus bear some representation 
of the general situation as well.  
Among the author’s own 28 cases analysed in this study, a large majority of the 
requesters did not get the information they requested.  Specifically, there were 19 
cases in which the requesters did not get the information requested, which equals to 
about 68% of the total cases; among the nine other cases, in eight cases, including 
three taken to court,
335
 information was disclosed.
336
  In the case of Huang 
Jianxin,
337
 the EIA report was provided after he took the case to court but it was 
alleged to be a false report.  
 
Chart 3-1 Result of information disclosure requests out of 28 cases 
 
With regard to the few positive results, many of them were not obtained easily. 
The requests by lawyer Yan Yiming,
338
 as one of the earliest environmental 
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information disclosure requests cases in China, have shown this clearly.  Yan 
applied to Anhui EPD and Henan EPD.  He requested environmental information 
disclosures concerning enterprises whose emission levels were higher than the 
national or local emission standard, enterprises causing serious pollution, etc.   After 
several rounds of correspondence and a complaint to the MEP, he received some 
positive feedback from the Anhui EPD regarding lists of serious polluting 
enterprises and 132 key enterprises under wastewater monitoring at a provincial 
level.  However, he only received one reply from the Henan EPD saying that there 
was only one enterprise in Henan Province not complying with the emission 
standard.  Yan regarded the reply from Henan EPB as an intentional avoidance to 
provide the relevant environmental information.
339
  Similar experiences were 
encountered by other requesters who got the information disclosed.  Xu Taisheng, a 
Shanghai resident, spent three years fighting for the disclosure of the inspection 
record concerning Bao Steel Corporation, which was located only hundreds of 
metres away from his home.  Only after his persistently using almost all available 
means, including administrative litigation and petitions to Beijing Supreme People’s 
Court, his case was settled with a non-public hearing among all parties.
340
 
Compared to individual cases, surveys conducted by different entities have also 
shown the ineffective realization of open environmental information upon request 
more clearly due to the sufficient amount and large scale of their disclosure requests. 
The earliest experiment requests by Friends of Nature’s Shanghai members 
mainly concerned water-related environmental information disclosures.341
  
Between 
July 2008 and November 2009, Friends of Nature’s Shanghai members submitted 
environmental information disclosure requests via various means, including emails, 
letters and on-site applications, to the Shanghai municipality EPB and its district 
EPBs.  In total there were 32 requests, eight of which, or 25%, were provided with 
information; 24, or 75%, were refused the disclosure of information or had no reply.  
Among the 24 negative replies, two cited state secrets, business secrets and privacy 
as reasons for refusal; two stated that information disclosure was not within the 
government agency’s scope of responsibility; seven replied that the information did 
not exist; two said that the information was not government information; three 
justified the refusal with other reasons; and eight others kept silent.
342
  For example, 
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the Shanghai Municipality EPB refused to disclose the water monitoring report for 
the Shanghai drinking water preservation area and emission information of 
Sino-French Water Company stating, respectively, that the disclosure might cause 
“public fear” and concerned a business secret.  Several other district bureaus refused 
to provide environmental information based on the reasons that information did not 
exist or information did not belong to the scope of government information.
343
  
The information disclosure requests launched by Greenpeace towards 15 EPBs 
met with similar results.  In 2009, Greenpeace published its report
344
 concerning the 
information disclosure of 20 subsidiaries of 18 companies belonging to Global 500 
or China’s top 100 listed companies.
345
  While preparing the report, between June 
and August 2009, Greenpeace made 15 requests to different EPBs and received only 
three positive replies: two provided the link of their websites that contained the 
concerned enterprises’ information (Mudanjiang EPB, Heilongjiang EPD), and one 
provided the information by email (Ningbo EPB).  Positive replies constituted only 
20% of the total requests.  There were various replies to the other 12 requests; 
among which, three stated that the information did not exist, (Tianjin Taida District 
EPB, Shanghai EPB, Shanghai Baoshan District EPB), one said there was no 
responsible person for the requested information disclosure (Shenyang EPB), eight 
did not answer the phone or email, or picked up the phone but hung up on 
discovering it was an information request or avoided answering the question of 
information disclosure (Zhuzhou EPB, Lanzhou EPB, Shiyan EPB, Hubei EPD, 
Hefei EPB, Dazhou EPB, Yulin EPB, Suzhou EPB).
346
  
With regard to government information disclosure upon request, Southern 
Weekend (南方周末报), one of the prominent newspapers in China, conducted a 
survey between May and June 2010.  On 20 May 2010, Southern Weekend sent out 
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29 requests to provincial-level EPDs in China by fax.
347
  It asked each EPD to 
provide lists of enterprises that had received environmental administrative penalties 
within its jurisdiction between January and May 2010 and the causes for imposing 
the penalties.  As of 23 June 2010, 12 replied with a positive attitude, three refused 
to reply, one raised an unreasonable condition, and the other 13 remained silent 
without making a formal reply.  
 






The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (公众环境研究中心 IPE), an 
environmental NGO based in Beijing, conducts surveys and publishes annual reports 
concerning government environmental information disclosure in China.
349
 During 
                                               
347  In China, provincial level government refers to province, autonomous region and municipality 
governments that are directly under the administration of the Central Government. There are in total 31 
Environmental Protection Departments (EPD 环保厅) at provincial level, including 22 province EPDs and 
five autonomous region EPDs, in mainland China. Environmental protection agencies in the four 
municipalities are named Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB 环保局). EPB also refers to environmental 
protection agencies at city, district and county-level. In total, Southern Weekend sent out 29 faxes asking for 
environmental information disclosure. It did not send requests to Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai 
Autonomous Region due to lacking of sufficient contact information.  
348  The Chart is made based on the related news report. See, Nanfang zhoumo, 23 June 2010. 
349  To date 5 October 2013, there are four reports, respectively for the year 2008, 2009-2010, 2011, 2012, 
published by IPE and its collaborating partner Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-profit 
environmental organization headquartered in New York, the United States. NRDC has an office in Beijing. 
The first three reports have Chinese and English versions. The references cited in this dissertation refer to the 





each survey, IPE requested 113 EPBs 350  to provide the information of lists of 
enterprises that received environmental administrative penalties.351  According to the 
three annual reports: for 2008–2009, 44 replied with 27 city EPBs providing full or 
partial information requested; 352  for 2009–2010, 49 replied with 32 providing 
information;353 for 2010–2011, 42 provided the requested information.354  According 
to the statistics available, for the years 2008–2009 and 2009–2010,355 less than 30% 
of the 113 environmental protection bureaus gave positive replies to IPE’s 
environmental information disclosure requests.  A large majority of the EPBs did 
not provide the information; among them, some directly refused to provide the 
information and others used a multitude of excuses to justify their non-disclosure of 
the information.   
                      










Year 2008-2009 Year 2009-2010
No. of EPBs IPE
submitted information
disclosure  request (113
cities)
No. of EPBs that
provided complete
information
No. of EPBs that
provided incompelte
information
No. of EPBs that refused
to provide the
information
No. of EPBs that did not
provide the information
based on other reasons
 
                                               
350 The 113 cities include 110 Key State Environmental Protection Cities, extensively distributed across the 
eastern, central and western regions of the country. These cities are designated in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan 
for Environmental Protection. Additionally, three other cities, Dongguan, Yancheng and Erdos, are also 
included. IPE & NRDC 2011, report, 52. 
351 There is slight change with regard to the information requested for disclosure, the information requested 
for disclosure for the first survey also includes public complains investigated by EPBs.   
352 IPE & NRDC 2008 report, 29.  
353 IPE & NRDC 2009-2010 report, 28.  
354 IPE & NRDC 2011, report, 17. 
355 The statistics available was not possible for a full comparison.  Therefore, I only chose to compare the first 
two survey results here.   
356 The chart was made by the author based on statistics from IPE & NRDC’s annual reports on China’s 





A comparison of the available statistics shows that there is progress with regard 
to environmental information disclosure upon requests.  The full mark for disclosure 
upon request is 18, if divided by 2, 9 can be set as a middle mark. Between 2009 and 
2010, 43 got 9 or over 9; in 2011, the number is 48.  Nevertheless, in each year, the 
number that got less than 9 still prevails over the opposite group, between 2009 and 
2010, it is 70, in 2011, it is 65.
357
  This clearly shows that a large majority of EPBs 
is still unwilling to disclose information of polluting enterprises that got penalties.  
The information disclosure requests submitted by Wang Xing, a journalist at the 
Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报), showed mixed results.358  Between 7 and 
9 December 2011, Wang submitted his information disclosure requests through the 
31 official websites of all the provincial-level EPDs and municipality-level EPBs, 
and the MEP.  The information he requested for disclosure was: whether a PM2.5
359
 
and Ozone monitoring system was established in the province; the annual average 
concentration data of PM2.5 and Ozone; since 1 October 2011, the daily average 
PM2.5 and Ozone; if a monitoring system was established, what changes were seen 
in the reports of city air quality.  
According to the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures, in general, government 
agencies should reply within 15 working days.  One month later, on 10 January 
2012, 11 requests had failed to be submitted for various reasons: for instance, 
registration was required and registration was waiting for approval, online 
submission forms could not be opened, identification was required or no online 
submission procedure existed.
360
  Among the 21 requests successfully submitted 
online, 12 agencies replied, only the Shanghai EPB directly provided PM2.5 data 
and 11 stated that either they did not monitor PM2.5 or it was research data and 
could not be disclosed.  Nine agencies either provided a reference number without 
further information or did not provide any reply.361 As PM2.5 was not listed as part 
of the air quality monitoring system at that time, it was not surprising that the 
information requested was mostly not provided.  However, Wang Xing’s requests 
                                               
357 These statistics are summarized by the author based on three reports by IPE & NRDC. (See IPE & NRDC 
2009-2010 report, 13-15; 2011 report, 6-7.) In 2012, the number got 9 or over 9 increases to 59, and less than 
9 is 61. (See IPE & NRDC 2012 report, 22-24.) It shall be clarified that the IPE & NRDC 2012 report is 
published after August 2012 when the author completed her case and survey collection. The reason of having 
it here is to illustrate the most recent situation of environmental information disclosure upon request in China. 
358 Survey 6. 
359 PM2.5 refers to particles less than 2.5 micrometres in diameter and it is believed to pose the greatest health 
risks. 
360 Please see Appendix 8.6  for detailed record of the requests and their submission results.  





have shown more problems than simply this.  First of all, the failures of request 
submissions have shown that by early 2012, about one third of the provincial-level 
EPDs and municipalities EPBs still did not have a functional online information 
disclosure request system.  Second, some agencies chose not to provide any reply, 
also reflecting their inactive attitude towards information disclosure requests. 
The two most recent surveys were conducted respectively by the Wuhu Ecology 
Centre in Wuhu City, Anhui Province (Wuhu Ecology Centre) and the Impact Law 
Firm based in Beijing.  Considering incinerators as a hotly-debated issue, while 
incinerators are the major source of dioxin, Wuhu Ecology Centre decided to request 
the disclosure of dioxin-related information. 362   The Wuhu Ecology Centre’s 
information disclosure requests were also submitted to all provincial-level EPDs and 
municipality EPBs, plus the MEP.  The request is based on the MEP Guidance 
Opinion on Strengthening the Work of Preventing Dioxin Pollution that states all 
provincial-level environmental protection agencies, including municipality EPBs, 
should disclose the information of key enterprises that emit dioxin. 363   Since 
December 2011, they submitted information disclosure requests to 27 
provincial-level EPDs, four municipality EPBs, and the MEP.  They requested that 
the agencies disclose their 2011 list of key enterprises that emit dioxin.  
After submitting the disclosures, they did not only wait and see but continuously 
made phone calls to confirm that the agencies would reply. As one officer of the 
Wuhu Ecology Centre said: 
如果你不联系，他们不会来联系你的。  
If you do not contact them, they will never contact you.
 364
   
For instance, the Wuhu Ecology Centre made three phone calls, and sent two 
couriers to submit the request to the Sichuan EPD.  Until 6 June 2012, with regard to 
their requests, 23 agencies replied, eight did not respond, and no request was 
submitted to the Tibet EPD as no related disclosure request procedure could be 
found.  Among the 23 that replied, two EPDs provided the list, one EPD provided a 
link from which already available information could be found on the Internet, all the 
others used various kinds of reasons stating that the information could not be 
                                               
362 Interview with NGO officer, 15 June 2012. 
363 MEP, Guidance Opinion on Strengthening the Work of Preventing Dioxin Pollution, 19 October 2010, 
Article 3(7). 







  The following chart shows the very inconsistent and various results of 
replies encountered by their requests.  
 






The results of the Wuhu Ecology Centre’s information disclosure requests also 
show the lack of coordination between the EPDs with regard to information 
disclosure.  Some EPDs are not clearly aware of dioxin emission monitoring.  For 
instance, while the list of enterprises that emit dioxin belongs to the category of 
mandatory disclosure, four provincial EPDs that already disclosed them still said 
that they did not have the list when encountering the request. 367   While some 
provided the requested information directly, others still used “state secret” or “social 
                                               
365 A detailed table of Wuhu Ecology Centres’ information disclosure requests, please refer to Appendix 8.7.  
366 This chart is made by the author based on materials provided by Wuhu Ecology Centre. 
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stability” to refuse disclosure; this has also shown the inconsistent implementation 




[environmental information disclosure] is a very good channel for 
environmental organizations to push forward for disclosure, to make 
the public know more about environmental information transparency.  
Four years later, its function should have been more effective… we are 
very disappointed with the government agencies. 
368
  
Differing from the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist Wang Xing and the 
Wuhu Ecology Centre who requested provincial-level environmental protection 
agencies for information disclosure, the Impact Law Firm submitted its requests to 
city-level EPBs.  Nevertheless, compared to provincial-level EPDs, city-level EPBs 
respond to information disclosure requests in a similar manner.  In 2012, the Impact 
Law Firm conducted a survey of information disclosure requests made to 80 EPBs 
across China.  The survey targets were carefully selected and the request procedure 
was well planned.  First, the chosen cities belonged to cities that have the most 
density of waste-water enterprises according to the List of 2011 Key 
State-Monitored Enterprises.  A hypothesis exists that as the MEP requires key 
monitoring to be carried out in cities where there are more enterprises that emit 
waste water, the EPBs in these cities should pay more attention to environmental 
information disclosures and environmental monitoring.  Second, in order to 
understand the different results with regard to individually-submitted requests and 
entity-launched requests, during the process some requests were submitted under 
individuals’ names and others under the name of the Law Firm.369  
Moreover, in order to avoid unclear and inconsistent content of the information 
requested for disclosure, the information content was decided based on the OEI 
Measures.  Specifically, they requested for the disclosure of eight types of 
information from the 17 types of information under Article 11 of the OEI 
Measures.370  The information requested for disclosure mostly related to the main 
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pollutant emission situations, enterprises with pollutant emissions above the national 
standard, enterprises that had received administrative penalties for pollution, 
enterprises with serious pollution incidents, and the whereabouts of pollutants.371 
Among the 80 requests, eight were submitted under the name of the Law Firm, 
from which four were replied to directly, two were replied to after further 
communications, and two had no reply; 72 were submitted by individuals, with 16 
direct replies, 41 replies after further communications, and 15 with no reply. In 
general, among the 80 requests, 20 were replied to within the time limit, 43 were 
replied to after further communications, and 17 were not replied to.372  During the 
survey, after the requests were submitted, further communications were generally 
taken in order to facilitate a better result, they included: 12 phone calls to the 
monitor line of the MEP, 48 direct calls to EPBs, 41 applications for administrative 
reconsiderations and four times of bringing administrative litigation. 373   This 
probably contributed to the comparatively positive result in that in total 63 EPBs 
replied to the requests.  However, this does not mean that all 63 EPBs provided all 
eight types of information.  This number is only a summary of the EPBs that 
provided any information, including those that provided only one type of 
information.  Therefore, it is necessary to read into the results with regard to each 
type of information request.  Table 3-1 shows that, although all eight types of 
information requested for disclosure belong to the type covered by mandatory 
disclosure, most EPBs are unwilling to provide the full information on request. 
 
  
                                               
371 Impact Law Firm 2012,  report, 5.  
372 Statistics summarized by the author based on the Impact Law Form 2012 report. 















Information on allocation of total emission 
quotas of major pollutants and its 
implementation. 
80 45   
Information on issuance of a pollutant 
emission permit. 
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Results of quantitative examination of 
comprehensive improvement of urban 
environment. 
80 39  
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List of enterprises with severe pollution and 
whose emission of pollutants is greater than 
the national or local emission standard or 
whose total emission of pollutants is greater 
than the quota of the total controlled emission 
determined by the local people’s government. 
80 8 Among those did not provide 
the list of enterprises, most 
answered “there was no 




Enterprises belonging to the above but also 
refusing to disclose the information regarding 
disposal of pollutants as required: what 
penalties they got.  




List of enterprises that have incurred serious or 
extraordinarily serious environmental pollution 
accidents or events.  
80 2  
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List of enterprises that refused to enforce 
effective environmental administrative penalty 
decisions. 
80 7  
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Enterprises who voluntarily disclosed the 
information regarding the type, volume and 
disposal of pollutants emitted; what awards 
they got.  
80 3 Provided list of enterprises 
that received awards, and 
types of awards. 
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If the EPB has implementable laws, 
regulations and other documents regarding 
main pollutants. 
80 31 14 said to implement MEP 
Notice of Eergy saving and 
Emission Under the 12th 
Five-year Plan; 16 state 
standards, laws and 
regulations; One said, there 
are no specific state laws and 




Please list the main pollutants in your 
jurisdiction. 
80 32 17 provided the same four 
types of pollutants; others 
provided various lists of 
pollutants  
 
                                               





Based on the above table, it is clear that information disclosure with regard to the 
general situation of pollutant emissions, including the total emission quota and 
permits (1st type of information), related laws and policies (7th type of information) 
and types of pollutants (8th type of information), is easier to realize.  On the 
contrary, information disclosures concerning specific polluting enterprises, 
including lists of polluting enterprises (2nd, 3rd, 4th types of information), and lists 
of enterprises that received penalties or awards (5th, 6th types of information), is 
more difficult to realize.  With regard to the latter information, it was stated by most 
EPBs that there were no enterprises that emitted pollutants over the standards, 
caused serious or extraordinarily serious environmental pollution accidents, or 
received administrative penalties.  However, with regard to enterprises that had 
caused serious pollution accidents, the Impact Law Firm found a reported pollution 
accident in Nantong, although the Nantong EPB replied that no accident had 
happened.
375
  This shows clearly that either the Nantong EPB did not do a good job 
in monitoring environmental accidents or it did not want to disclose the information.  
When the law firm communicated with Tangshan EPB, one EPB official replied that:  
不可能没有超标排污的企业，但是如果一旦公之于众，会影响这
些企业的经济效益。所以环保局不愿意公布这样的信息。 
It is impossible that there is no enterprise with emissions over the 
standard, however, if this information was disclosed, the economic 
interests of the enterprises would be affected.  Therefore, EPBs are not 
willing to disclose the information.
376
 
The survey by Impact Law Firm also corresponds with the report by ARTICLE 
19, an international organization promoting freedom of information based in London, 
and the Centre of Legal Aid for Pollution Victims (污染受害者援助中心
CLAPV)
377
 that the EPBs performed best in disclosing standard, non-sensitive 
information, such as the institutional setup of the organization, its duties and contact 
information, and performed worst in disclosing specific information of polluting 
enterprises, for instance, lists of heavily-polluting enterprises that had violated 
emission standards.378  Moreover, most types of information requested for disclosure 
in the above surveys in fact belongs to the scope of information that government 
                                               
375 Impact Law Firm 2012, report, 10. 
376 Ibid., 9-10. 
377 Survey 5. 





agencies should disclose on their own initiative based on the OEI Measures
379
 or 
other laws.  Therefore, the fact that NGOs were able to obtain the information upon 
request does not necessarily mean that other public information disclosure requests 
would be responded to in the same manner. 380   That specific environmental 
information not listed as mandatory disclosure is indeed more difficult to obtain has 
also been shown in individual requests that mostly concern a more specific 
enterprise’s information.  
On the other hand, with regard to the same information requested for  
disclosure, it is often that different government agencies reply very differently.  The 
inconsistent responses reflect the argument of “fragmented authoritarianism”381 in 
the implementation of open environmental information laws.  The implementation 
of laws holds similarities with the implementation of policies in China, in that: 
policy made at the centre becomes increasingly malleable to the 
parochial organizational and political goals of the various agencies 
and regions charged with enforcing that policy.  Policy outcomes 
result from incorporating the interests of the implementation agencies 
into the substance of the policy itself.  The result is that policy 
outcomes are often at a considerable variance with the initial goals of 
the policy makers at the top.
382
  
With regard to environmental information disclosure policy implementation, local 
government agencies have still been manipulating their discretion to a large extent, 
shown in the above cases and surveys.  Moreover, complicated interactions between 
the government agencies and the public with regard to information disclosure have 
shown the difficulties and obstacles for the realization of a smooth and efficient 
environmental information disclosure in China.   
                                               
379 OEI Measures, Article 11 (11), (12). 
380 See, also IPE & NRDC 2011, report, 17. 
381 Lieberthal & Oksenberg 2010, 5.   





3.2 Information of Heavily Polluting Enterprises, Incinerator EIA, 
and Yangtse River Nature Reserve Proposal: Four Illustrative 
Cases  
Noticeably, we have a very negative picture here with regard to the realization of 
environmental information disclosure reflected by the cases and surveys of this 
study.  How does this happen? Why is it as such? Further discussions of the 
obstacles and problems with regard to accessing environmental information are 
needed here.  The following four cases are chosen mainly for their illustration of the 
interactions between the public and the government and their reflecting of citizen 
and organization’s legal mobilization and counter-mobilization from the government 
side in the process of accessing environmental information.  The first case happened 
between Greenpeace, an experienced international environmental organization, and 
the Zhuzhou EPB, with regard to information about polluting enterprises in the city 
of Zhuzhou, Hunan Province (湖南省株洲市).  The subsequent two cases concern 
information about an incinerator, one of the most concerning issues for NGOs as 
well as the general public presently in China.  The fourth relates to a broader 
environmental protection issue–a nature reserve–and thus constitutes a public 
interest related information disclosure request.  Only the second request was 
submitted by an individual, the third and the fourth cases were submitted by 
environmental organizations, Green Beagle and Friends of Nature, respectively.  In 
the first case of Greenpeace’s information disclosure request, the processes and 
happenings between the ENGO and the Zhuzhou EPB are illustrated in detail in 
order to provide a complete picture of the interactions between the two parties.  No 
such illustration is applied to the latter cases in order to avoid repetition.  However, 
it must be remembered that in fact most environmental information disclosure 
requests are processed with difficulties and impediments during the interactions 





3.2.1 Three Rounds of Environmental Information Disclosure Requests 
Between Greenpeace and Zhuzhou EPB
383
 
In October 2009, Greenpeace published its report Silent Giants: an Investigation 
into Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure in China concerning the 
information disclosure of 20 subsidiaries of 18 companies belonging to Global 500 
or China’s top 100 public listed companies.384  After the compilation of the report, 
Greenpeace decided to launch a further information disclosure request to 
government agencies, aiming to test to what extent environmental information 
disclosure can be pushed forward in China.  
Greenpeace decided to submit its environmental information disclosure request to 
the Zhuzhou EPB for two reasons.  In 2009, serious heavy metal pollution causing 
health problems and collective incidents occurred frequently all over China, 
arousing attention both domestically and internationally. 385   Coincidentally, two 
metal companies, Zhuzhou Cemented Carbide Group Co. Ltd. (Zhuzhou Hard Metal 
Co.) and Zhuzhou Smelter Group Co. Ltd. (Zhuzhou Smelter Co.), are among the 
list of enterprises that did not disclose their pollutant discharge information in 
Greenpeace’s report.386  Both enterprises are located in Zhuzhou, a medium-sized 
city near its provincial capital city Changsha in Hunan Province.  
3.2.1.1 Six Information Disclosure Requests 
In mid-December 2009, Greenpeace submitted in total six information disclosure 
requests to the Zhuzhou EPB.387  Four requests were related to the environmental 
information of Zhuzhou Hard Metal Co. and Zhuzhou Smelter Co.  Two asked for 
the disclosure of Pollutant Discharge Registration Forms filed by the two companies.  
Two other requests were related to environmental information that should have been 
made public by the two enterprises.  The first two requests were made according to 
                                               
383 A detailed case study of information disclosure requests between Greenpeace and Zhuzhou EPB, please 
see, Wang 2012.  
384 Greenpeace 2009, report, 5.  
385 See, BBC News, 14 August 2009; BBC News, 20 August 2009; Xinjing bao, 3 August 2009.  
386 Greenpeace 2009,  report, 4, 9, 11. 
387 Greenpeace, Information disclosure requests submitted to Zhuzhou EPB, 16 December 2009. 






Article 21 of the PCWP Law and Article 6 of the Management Regulations for 
Levying and Utilizing Pollution Discharge Fee (排污费征收使用条例  PDF 
Regulations).  Both of these pieces of legislation require enterprises that discharge 
pollutants to file the categories, volume and other discharge information about those 
pollutants to local EPBs.  The two final requests were based on the OEI Measures 
that require enterprises whose pollutant discharge exceeds the regulatory standard to 
publish their environmental information in primary local media as well as file the 
information with the local EPBs.388  The EPBs should disclose the lists of such 
enterprises to the public.389   In 2008, each company received a notice from the 
Zhuzhou EPB to halt operation due to pollutant discharges higher than the 
regulatory standard and to make remediation in order to meet the environmental 
protection requirements.  This means that both companies belonged to the above 
category of enterprises that should file their environmental information to the local 
EPB. 
Besides the information concerning the two metal companies, Greenpeace also 
requested that the Zhuzhou EPB disclose information with regard to its evaluation 
result of local enterprises’ environmental activities.  This disclosure request was 
made according to the local government rules issued by Zhuzhou Government in 
2004, Trial Measures on Managing Information Disclosure Concerning Industrial 
Enterprises Environmental Activities (工业企业环境行为信息公开化管理试行办
法 Zhuzhou EA Measures).  The Zhuzhou EA Measures require the evaluation 
result of local enterprises’ environmental activities to be made public via the media.  
However, in reality it is difficult to find the complete list of these enterprises and 
other detailed environmental information relating to the enterprises, for example 
categories of pollutants or the volume of pollutant discharge.  
Thus, based on Article 12 of Zhuzhou EA Measures–stating “the credit evaluation 
of enterprise environmental activities shall be carried out according to the principles 
of justice, publicity and equality, strict evaluation procedure, and under public 
supervision”–Greenpeace requested that the Zhuzhou EPB disclose the complete 
version of the document Notice on Evaluation on City Industrial Enterprises 
Environmental Activities and Information Disclosure in 2008.  
In the sixth request, Greenpeace asked the Zhuzhou EPB to disclose the list of all 
local enterprises whose pollutant discharge or volume of pollutant discharge 
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exceeded regulatory standard.  This request was made mainly based on the PCP Law 
stating that the government at provincial level shall publish a list of names of 
heavily-polluting enterprises in local primary media390 and the OEI Measures stating 
that the environmental protection department shall disclose, on its own initiative, a 
list of enterprises creating severe pollution. 391   An enterprise whose pollution 
discharge exceeds national or local standards, or whose pollutant discharge in total 
volume exceeds the regulatory limits determined by the local people’s governments, 
belongs to the category of enterprises generating severe pollution.392 
Greenpeace submitted its environmental information disclosure requests in 
mid-December 2009.  In general, government agency should reply to an information 
disclosure requester within 15 working days.393  The whole information disclosure 
request by Greenpeace in fact lasted half a year, going through a complicated 
process consisting of three rounds. 
3.2.1.2 The First Round 
On 18 December 2009, Greenpeace submitted all six information disclosure requests 
by fax, and later also sent the request forms by courier.  Until one month later, 
Greenpeace did not hear anything from the Zhuzhou EPB.394  On 18 January 2010, 
Greenpeace called the Zhuzhou EPB.  One official answered the phone and said he 
did not clearly know the matter of environmental information request submitted by 
Greenpeace.  Greenpeace then asked about Director Y,395 who signed the courier’s 
acknowledgement of receipt; the official said that Director Y was in a meeting.  
On the following day, Greenpeace called the Zhuzhou EPB again and asked for 
Director Y.396  One official answered the phone and first said that Y was in another 
government office and he was not sure when Y would be back; later the same 
official changed his reply and said that Y was in his office.  When asked whether the 
Zhuzhou EPB had received the information disclosure requests sent by Greenpeace, 
the official said that Greenpeace should directly call Y’s office.  Greenpeace said 
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394 Greenpeace, footage of phone call dated 18 January 2010. 
395 In consideration of research ethics, I only used initials when referring to officials in this dissertation. 





that they had tried several times but nobody answered the phone.  The official then 
said that people did not always answer office phones since there might be 
commercial telephone calls.  Knowing that Y was in his office, Greenpeace asked 
the official to pass a message to him that Greenpeace would like to call him 
immediately, but this was refused.  Nevertheless, Greenpeace called again moments 
later, and was told by the same official that Y said that the information disclosure 
request forms were in circulation to be read (传阅) in the EPB and they happened to 
be under review by one deputy director who was at the moment abroad for a study 
tour.  The official therefore suggested that if Greenpeace wanted the issue to be 
proceeded quickly, it could resend the forms and the Zhuzhou EPB would try to 
reply soon.  This Greenpeace did, refaxing the information request forms on the 
same day.  However, no response from the Zhuzhou EPB was heard until two 
months later when Greenpeace called the Zhuzhou EPB again.  
In March 2010, Greenpeace called the Zhuzhou EPB for the third time397 and was 
told that the information disclosure request was being processed, to be dealt with, 
and Director F was in charge of the matter at the moment.  Greenpeace then called F 
but again nobody answered the phone.  Only after Greenpeace called the office 
again and informed them that they could not get through on the line, Greenpeace got 
F on the phone.  F said that she was aware of the information requests; however, 
they could not provide the information to Greenpeace due to two reasons.  First, they 
consulted their leaders concerning the matter and the leaders said that the 
information was sensitive, concerned public-listed enterprises, and constituted 
business secret.  Second, the Pollutant Discharge Registration Forms were too long, 
about 200 pages, to be provided.  When asked about the evaluation result concerning 
local enterprises’ environmental activities, F replied that they did not have the 
information since the Information Centre was still in its preparation phase.  
Greenpeace said that pollutant discharge information was not a business secret, and 
insisted that the Zhuzhou EPB should reply according to the law.  F replied that she 
would ask her leaders and reply later to Greenpeace.  Again, neither she nor any 
other official from the Zhuzhou EPB replied until another two months later.   
                                               





3.2.1.3 The Second Round 
In order to place some pressure upon the Zhuzhou EPB, Greenpeace sued the 
Zhuzhou EPB before Zhuzhou Intermediate People’s Court on 12 April 2010 and 
put forward two claims: first, the Zhuzhou EPB should reply to Greenpeace 
concerning the information disclosure requests within 15 days; second, it should 
provide Greenpeace with the required information.  Zhuzhou Intermediate People’s 
Court notified Greenpeace that it received the application and later informed 
Greenpeace that the case could not be accepted due to the reason that there was no 
causal relationship between Greenpeace and the Zhuzhou EPB’s administrative act 
of information disclosure.  Nevertheless, while the acceptance of the case was still 
pending, the Zhuzhou EPB replied to Greenpeace by fax on 13 May 2010 and 
provided corresponding answers concerning all six environmental information 
requests.398 
As to the four requests concerning Zhuzhou Hard Metal Co. and Zhuzhou 
Smelter Co., the Zhuzhou EPB suggested that Greenpeace seek the information from 
the two companies directly.  Regarding the environmental information of the two 
metal companies’ pollutant discharge, the Zhuzhou EPB also emphasized that the 
two companies all made rectifications, and attached letters which were originally 
sent to the Zhuzhou EPB from the two companies addressing the rectification issue, 
with the corresponding replies.  
With regard to the request concerning the evaluation result of enterprises’ 
environmental activities, the Zhuzhou EPB briefly answered that they had already 
informed the result to all key industrial enterprises in Zhuzhou.  
Finally, concerning the list of enterprises with severe pollution, the Zhuzhou EPB 
said that it did not inspect and assess enterprises’ pollutant discharge since there was 
no law requiring them to do so. 
3.2.1.4 The Third Round 
Although Greenpeace received a reply from the Zhuzhou EPB, it did not get the 
information it requested.  Facing this situation, Greenpeace wrote a letter to the 
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Zhuzhou EPB on 7 June 2010, further clarifying their requests and reiterating the 
legal basis for the information disclosure requests. 399   Greenpeace particularly 
emphasized that information obtained by EPBs during their administrative operation 
constituted government information that should be disclosed upon disclosure request 
by the public according to law. 
This time, within 14 working days, on 24 June 2010, the Zhuzhou EPB responded 
with further explanation that the information requested by Greenpeace could not be 
provided.400 
With regard to the environmental information of Zhuzhou Hard Metal Co. and 
Zhuzhou Smelter Co., the Zhuzhou EPB said that it had not refused Greenpeace’s 
request concerning the providing of the Pollutant Discharge Registration Forms of 
the two metal companies, but just clearly expressed that the information can be 
obtained by Greenpeace from the two metal companies directly, according to 
Chapter 3 of the OEI Measures.  
With regard to the evaluation result concerning local enterprises’ environmental 
activities, the Zhuzhou EPB explained that it was not certain whether the evaluation 
information could be disclosed.  The Zhuzhou EPB was at that time undertaking a 
process of consultation.  
Concerning the list of enterprises generating severe pollution, the Zhuzhou EPB 
replied that Greenpeace shall address the information disclosure request to the 
Zhuzhou EPB’s higher level EPB, since Article 17 of the PCP Law only requires 
provincial-level government departments to publish such a list and it does not 
require city-level EPBs, for instance the Zhuzhou EPB, to carry out this work.  
In short, although this time the Zhuzhou EPB responded quickly, it still did not 
provide any of the information requested by Greenpeace.  So far, despite three 
rounds of interactions spanning half a year, Greenpeace had not received the 
information it requested from the Zhuzhou EPB.  
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3.2.2 Xie Yong’s Environmental Information Disclosure Requests concerning 
Huji Incinerator  
Xie Yong’s environmental information disclosure relates to his civil litigation 
against a local incinerator, which he claims caused his son’s sickness.
401
  Xie 
Yong’s wife lived less than 200 metres away from Saite Tianying Huanbao Huji 
Incinerator (Huji Incinerator) in Hai’an County, Jiangsu Province (江苏省海安县) 
during and after her pregnancy.  Xie Yong’s son was diagnosed with cerebral palsy 
and epilepsy months after he was born. 
With regard to Xie Yong’s environmental information disclosure requests, more 
specifically, four levels of government agencies were involved, from lower to higher 
hierarchies in Chinese government administration: Huji Town, Hai’an county-level 
City, Nantong City, and Jiangsu Province (胡集镇、海安县、南通市、江苏省).  
In June 2010, Xie Yong submitted his first information disclosure request to the 
Hai’an EPB. In his information disclosure request letter, he stated clearly that: 
“according to the OEI Measures issued by SEPA with order No. 35 on 11 April 
2007, I request Hai’an EPB to disclose the following information”.  Briefly, Xie 
Yong requested the disclosure of the following information: SEPA’s approval 
document with regard to the Huji Incinerator; the Huji Incinerator’s EIA approval, 
and the Huji Incinerator’s approval document concerning city development planning 
and environmental hygiene; and the Hai’an EPB’s and Natong EPB’s monitoring 
inspection reports of the Huji Incinerator from the beginning of its operation until 
the autumn of 2009.
 402
  
On 13 July, the Hai’an EPB replied that: “according to SEPA’s OEI Measures 
(SEPA order No. 36), we answer as follows”.  In brief: the Huji  
Incinerator was approved by the Nantong EPB; its planning and environmental  
hygiene requirement was regulated by other administrative departments, and did not 
belong to the category of information that should be disclosed; and the  
inspection report did not belong to the scope of information that shall be  
disclosed according to the OEI Measures.
403
 
Failing to obtain the requested environmental information from the Hai’an EPB, 
on 27 July 2010 Xie Yong submitted his information disclosure request to the 
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Nantong EPB, the upper-level EPB above the Hai’an EPB.  Again, he clearly stated 
his legal claim was based on the OEI Measures.  This time, he required the Nantong 
EPB to: first, disclose the Huji Incinerator’s EIA Report; second, to order the Hai’an 
EPB to disclose its inspection report on the Huji Incinerator between 15 November 

















Comrade Xie Yong, We received your request of disclosing 
information concerning Hai’an Huji Incinerator.  According to the 
OEI Measures (SEPA Order No.35), we reply as follows: 
According to the Reply (Huanhan [2008] No.50), “when the public 
requests environmental protection departments to disclose 
environmental impact assessment reports or tables and other related 
EIA documents, environmental protection departments may provide 
the contact of the EIA project construction entity or EIA evaluation 
entity, and tell the public to request the information from the EIA 
construction entity or evaluation entity.”  We now notify you of the 
EIA document contact person … 
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… According to Article 4.1 of the Environmental Inspection 
Management Measures [EIM Measures] “county-level EPBs are 
responsible for managing environmental inspection work”, please 
contact Hai’an County EPB for the inspection report. …
405
 
Except for providing its approval document with regard to the EIA report as an 
attachment to the reply, the Nantong EPB de facto pushed Xie Yong to the project 
construction entity concerning the EIA report, as well as back to the Hai’an EPB 
with regard to the inspection statistics, despite the fact that the Hai’an EPB had 
already refused to provide the information requested.  
Nevertheless, Xie Yong did not give up. In October 2010 he submitted a second 
information disclosure request towards Nantong EPB, and again asked for the 
disclosure of relevant information relating to the Huji Incinerator, its Pollutant 
Emission Permit, project completion environmental protection assessment result, 
and the Nantong EPB’s administrative penalty upon the Huji Incinerator.
406
  Xie 
again listed his legal basis, including the Administrative License Law, the OGI 
Regulations, and the OEI Measures, together with his information disclosure request.  
The Nantong EPB replied that the Nantong Environmental Inspection Centre had 




On 25 November 2010, Xie Yong also submitted his information disclosure 
request to the Jiangsu EPD. He requested for the disclosure of the Huji Incinerator’s 
EIA report approval and approval basis, issuance of pollutant emission permit, and 
information concerning relocation of households within 300 metres of the 
incinerator. 
408
  In the Jiangsu EPD’s reply letter, it stated that: “according to the 
OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures, we provide the information as follows”.  In 
brief: first, the approval report was attached and the approval basis was the EIA Law; 
second, the Hai’an EPB issued a temporary permit for the incinerator’s operation 
and Jiangsu did not issue any permits; and third, the county government was 
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Lasting for almost half a year, with four information disclosure requests 
submitted, being pushed from one EPB to another, from the EPB to the construction 
company, and from the EPB to local government, except for a few documents 
stating EPB’s approving the incinerator, Xie Yong practically failed to obtain any of 
the specific information relating to the pollutants emission of the incinerator or the 
documents—for example EIA documents based on which the incinerator was 
approved—that he requested. 
Besides using the channel of environmental information disclosure, Xie Yong 
also sued the local incinerator for causing his son’s illness, but he lost both in the 
first instance and the appeal court.
410
  As the Huji Incinerator was already closed 
down, the EPB’s inspection statistics in fact remained a key source for Xie and his 
lawyers to bear the burden of proof in the civil litigation.  Nevertheless, Xie’s 




In February 2012, Xie Yong again submitted an information disclosure request 
towards the Jiangsu EPD.  The Jiangsu EPD refused to disclose the requested 
information, stating that information with regard to the incinerator’s qualification 
approval, including the preview opinion, project introduction, operation contract, 
and inspection report, was internal information according to the Measures for the 
License Administration of Qualification for Operation of Environmental Pollution 
Control Facilities (环境治理许可管理办法 EPC Measures).412 
In 2012, Xie Yong submitted his information disclosure request to the MEP. He 
requested that the MEP disclose the Incinerator’s permit approval, the introduction 
of the project, and its operation inspection reports.  The MEP replied to Xie that the 
permit approval information can be found on the website of the MEP.  As to the 
information about the introduction of the project, its operation contract and 
operation inspection reports, the MEP stated that according to Article 23 of the OGI 
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Regulations that it concerned business secret thus needed to consult the incinerator 
company.
413
    
 Failing to get the information, Xie Yong also used his wife’s name and submitted 
a new information disclosure request towards the MEP.  This time, the request only 
related to the disclosure of the inspection report.  Nevertheless, the same result 
happened, with the MEP stating that the information concerned business secrets, and 
the enterprise needed to be consulted.
414
   
3.2.3 Environmental Information Disclosure Requests Between Green Beagle 
and Jiangsu EPBs 
In 2011, to support Xie Yong’s lawsuit as well as impose external pressure upon 
local EPBs to take open environmental information seriously, Green Beagle, a 
Beijing-based ENGO, submitted information disclosure requests towards the three 
environmental protection agencies in Jiangsu Province from which Xie Yong had 
failed to obtain environmental information. Learning from the lessons of Xie Yong, 
that it took months to get a reply from each environmental protection agency 
requested to disclosure information one by one, Green Beagle submitted its three 
requests at the same time to three environmental protection agencies, hoping to get a 
faster reply.
415
   
The information requested by Green Beagle for disclosure includes: the EIA 
Report of the Huji Incinerator, the EIA report and its approval concerning a sewage 
treatment plant for the new Huji Incinerator Energy Plant that will replace the Huji 
Incinerator, and inspection statistics and reports about the Huji Incinerator between 
June 2006 and October 2009.
416
  
The Jiangsu EPD replied that concerning the EIA report, Green Beagle should 
ask the project construction entity or the EIA compiling entity according to SEPA’s 
reply letter.
417
  With regard to the inspection statistics, both the Jiangsu EPD and the 
Nantong EPB replied that it was the responsibility of the county-level EPB, and 
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Green Beagle should ask the Hai’an County EPB.
418
  The Hai’an EPB’s reply was 
only one sentence, briefly stating that the Huji Incinerator Energy Plant was 
approved by the Jiangsu EPD.
419
  
Both the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures stipulate that citizens, legal 
persons and other organizations have the right to report or inform the superior 
administrative organ, supervisory organ or the competent government organ if they 
consider an administrative organ fails to fulfil its obligation to disclose information 
according to law.
420
  This can be realized by applying for an administrative 
reconsideration ( 行政复议 ).  Green Beagle thus brought an administrative 
reconsideration before the Nantong EPB.  It required the Nantong EPB to order its 
lower-level Hai’an EPB to disclose the requested information of inspection statistics.  
On 4 May 2011, the Nantong EPB accepted Green Beagle’s application.
421
  
Nevertheless, the Hai’an EPB still refused to provide the requested information.  It 
stated that EIA reports and waste fluid treatment methods were business secrets.  As 
to the inspection statistics concerning pollutants emission, the answer was the same 
as it was stated in the reply to Xie Yong, that according to the EIM Measures, they 
were not required to be disclosed; moreover, this information also concerned 
business secrets.  Additionally, the Hai’an EPB suggested that the purpose of Green 
Beagle’s information disclosure request was for scientific research, which was 
against the original purpose of the OGI Regulations based on the 2010 SC 
opinion,
422




Green Beagle later consulted the Nantong EPB.  The Nantong EPB replied that it 
needed to consult its higher-level EPB to decide if the information should be 
disclosed or not.
424
  Nevertheless, the final result of the administrative 
reconsideration seems positive in that the Nantong EPB revoked the reply by the 
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Hai’an EPB and ordered it to make another information disclosure.
425
  But the order 
from its superior did not make the Hai’an EPB change its reply.  In its reply after the 
administrative reconsideration, it insisted again that they were not sure if the 
inspection statistics should be disclosed according to the EIM Measures and they 
needed to consult their higher-level EPB.
426
 
3.2.4 Friends of Nature and the Yangtze River Nature Reserve Readjustment 
In early 2011, the MEP made public a list of nature reserves for public consultation.  
The document showed that the Rare and Endemic Fish Nature Reserve in the upper 
reaches of the Yangtze River (Yangtze River Nature Reserve) was approved by the 




Friends of Nature regarded the information provided for public consultation to be 
insufficient, and requested the MEP to disclose the following information: the 
Yangtze River Nature Reserve’s readjustment application letter; its readjustment 
investigative report; and its assessment opinion made in the 2010 assessment 
meeting and the meeting minutes.  About one month later, the MEP replied to 
Friends of Nature that the first two types of information were under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA);
428
 as to the assessment opinion, 
the Review Committee applied a voting system, and the meeting minutes only 
recorded the assessment result, which can be consulted via the MEP’s website.
429
  
The website turned out to be the one on which the notice of the promotion and 
readjustment of nature reserves were posted.
 430
  
Based on the MEP’s reply, on 17 February 2011, Friends of Nature requested that 
the MoA disclose the first two types of information.  Since the MEP’s reply 
concerning the assessment opinion did not provide anything new, Friends of Nature 
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again requested that the MEP disclose the information of the voting result 
concerning the Yangtze River Nature Reserve, and the list of Review Committee 
members. 
By 9 March, the MoA replied that the information requested was “information in 
process” (过程中信息) that should not be disclosed.431  It seems that the MoA 
adopted the explanation about “information in process” made by the 2010 SC 
opinion.432  With regard to Friends of Nature’s second information disclosure request 
concerning the list of Review Committee experts, the MEP replied that the 
information should not be disclosed until the members complete their term in the 
position.  The MEP also stated that if Friends of Nature had any suggestions or 
requirements, it could help by forwarding them to the Review Committee.
433
 
Facing this situation, Friends of Nature applied for administrative reconsideration 
before the MoA. The decision was the same.  Friends of Nature then applied for 
administrative reconsideration before the SC.  Nevertheless, to date, 21 August 
2012,
434
 Friends of Nature had not received a decision from the SC, despite the 




3.3 In the Political Sphere: Legal Rhetoric as Counter-mobilization? 
The above cases have demonstrated that citizens and organizations have been 
actively and persistently using the law to request government agencies for 
environmental information.  Nevertheless, their effort still resulted in vain of getting 
the information.  While pointed out by experts of China studies that legal activism in 
an authoritarian state such as China, “whether by individual or by groups, and with 
or without a support structure, is likely to produce counter-mobilization from the 
state’s coercive organs”,
436
 the above cases are no exceptions. 
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Undoubtedly, counter-mobilization can appear in various forms.  While a direct 
crack down or repression of activists are the most visible, counter-mobilization can 
also appear in implied manners such as using legal rhetoric by government agencies 
to discourage, therefore deactivate, legal mobilization.  No matter whether it 
concerns information relating to the local incinerator or the nature reserve, in the 
above four cases refusals were also made based on legal reasons.  Moreover, legal 
reasons not only made the non-disclosure legal and unchallengeable, but also 
effectively depoliticized the issues and masked the discretionary choices of the 
government agencies.  
The OEI Measures explicitly stipulate that its enactment is to promote and 
standardize the environmental disclosure work of government environmental 
protection agencies and enterprises, and to safeguard the rights and interest of 
citizens, legal persons and other organizations to obtain environmental information, 
and to promote public participation in environmental protection.
437 
 The failures of 
Xie Yong and the three ENGOs have suggested the failure of the achievement of 
this aim.  
As the above cases demonstrate, the aim of the laws–to realize transparent 
government by empowering the public and imposing restraints upon government 
actors–has been strategically offset by the utilization of legal rhetoric, reflected with 
applying rules based on laws, regulations, rules, and normative documents, by 
government agencies to refuse the disclosure of the information.  In other words, the 
law has become the counter-argument for government agencies, obstructing the 
legal mobilization in the field of environmental information disclosure.  Specifically, 
the counter-argument is mostly based on legislative exceptions, inconsistent rules 
and government normative documents.   
3.3.1 Legislative Exceptions: Legal Basis or Excuse?  
Both the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures stipulate that information 
involving state secrets, business secrets or individual privacy may not be 
disclosed.
438
  The major problem is that these exceptions are very difficult to be 
delineated according to current Chinese laws.  In China, state secrets can be 
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determined by all levels of governments and their departments, and the basis for 
classifying a state secret is very broad.
 439
  Business secrets are also difficult to 
determine due to their nature of secrecy, especially for the public.
440
  Wang Canfa, 
director of the CLAPV and a professor of environmental law at the Chinese 
University of Political Science and Law, has noted that: “although the regulations 
list 17 types of information that should be disclosed and only one short clause on 
exemptions, that one short clause has become a catch-all.” 441 
This “catch-all” appeared within the communications between Greenpeace and 
the Zhuzhou EPB, when they replied that the information of polluting enterprises 
information was sensitive, concerned public-listed enterprises, and constituted a 
business secret. It also happened in the Hai’an EPB’s reply to Green Beagle as the 
EPB stated the definition of business secrets should be applied to EIA reports, waste 
fluid treatment methods, and inspection statistics.442  It is in fact not rare that EPBs 
use these exceptions to refuse an information disclosure, even when the information 
requested is mandatory information; for instance, lists of enterprises that received 
environmental administrative penalties, which should be disclosed by government 
agencies on their own initiative.  However, when IPE requested that EPBs disclose 
this type of information, the idea of business secrets was applied by several agencies 
as a basis of non-disclosure.
443
  
“Business secrets” also appeared often in non-disclosure of pollutant emission 
information.  For example, in other known cases, the Shanghai Municipality EPB 
used the “business secret” reason to refuse disclosing emission information of Sino 
French Water.
444
  And the Pudong EPB told Greenpeace that BASF said its emission 
pollution was a business secret.  As BASF disclosed the same type of information in 
the EU, America and Canada, it remains rather dubious that it should be regarded as 
business secret only in China.
 445
 
“State secrets” did not appear as often as “business secrets”.  Nevertheless, when 
Mao Da, an environmental activist, requested that Beijing EPB disclose information 
concerning household waste landfill pollution risk in Beijing, their answer was that 
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the information was a state secret.
446
  In fact, Mao’s information submission was 
based on a news report titled Beijing Household Waste Landfill Pollution Risk 
Report Freshly Came Out, Half With Medium to High Level Poisonous Pollution 
Risk.
447
  Moreover, a doctoral dissertation titled Landfill Pollution Risk Assessment 
in Beijing-China can be found on the Internet.
448
  The same also happened with the 
Wuhu Ecology Centre with regard to their disclosure requests related to dioxin 
information; while some EPDs provided the requested information directly, others 
stated that it was a state secret and could not be disclosed.
449
  
Clearly, a broad margin of appreciation existed when the government agencies 
applied these exceptions in order to refuse information disclosure requests. 
Besides the above-stipulated exceptions, the controversial Article 8 of the OGI 
Regulations
450
 has also been utilized as a legal basis to refuse information disclosure. 
Article 8 stipulates that:  
no administrative organ may endanger national security, public 




Although it is argued that this article shall be regarded as the criteria of discretion 
but not exception,
452
 in practice this clause of “three securities one stability” has 
already become a justification for government agencies to refuse information 
disclosure.
453
  For instance, the Tianjin EPB replied that to disclose the list of 
enterprises that received penalties would affect their commercial reputation, 
business secrets, economic stability, and social stability.
454
  The same reasoning also 
appeared in the Tianjin Wuqing Forestry Bureau’s reply concerning an information 
disclosure request related to the Dahuangbao Wetland Nature Reserve.455  When a 
few EPDs disclosed information of enterprises that emit dioxin to the Wuhu 
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3.3.2 Inconsistent Rules in Various Laws and Their Obfuscation 
Scholars have argued that Chinese environmental laws are “general and often 
intentionally ambiguous”, giving leeway for local governments to “interpret them in 
ways that are as consistent as possible with local objectives.”
457
  And this often 
results in the phenomena of “national policies, local countermeasures” (上有政策, 
下有对策 ) to evade strict environmental regulations. 458   The vagueness and 
ambiguity of Chinese law in fact also appears in the inconsistency of rules in 
different laws and regulations.  Most inconsistent rules de jure and de facto do not 
conflict with each other; however they do bear different content that provides more 
alternatives for government departments to pick and choose, or to interpret as they 
wish.  For instance, with regard to Greenpeace’s information disclosure request, the 
Zhuzhou EPB’s final reply stated that the disclosure of the list of enterprises 
generating severe pollution shall be requested from the provincial-level EPD 
according to Article 17 of the PCP Law and, as a city-level EPB, the Zhuzhou EPB 
was not under the legal obligation to carry out this work.459  However, according to 
the OEI Measures, the information of seriously polluting enterprises comes under 
mandatory information disclosure:
460
 does this mean that only provincial-level EPDs 
are under this obligation and other EPBs are excluded?  Regardless of this, the 
unclear inconsistency makes environmental information disclosure more difficult to 
enforce.  
Some inconsistent rules also directly conflict with each other.  In Green Beagle’s 
information disclosure request concerning the inspection statistics of the local 
incinerator,
461
 the Hai’an EPB refused to disclose them based on the EIM Measures 
that  
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environmental inspection information shall not be made public or 
disclosed without approval according to law.  And environmental 
monitoring inspection statistics, documents and result, if belong to the 
scope to be kept secret, shall be managed according to state security 
regulations.462  
The OGI Regulations and OEI Measures require government agencies to disclose 
information upon receiving a disclosure request unless the information belongs to 
the exceptions.  If it is not stipulated by any law that inspection information belongs 
to the exceptions, then it clearly belongs to the information that shall be disclosed 
upon request.  Thus, stating that the disclosure of inspection information needs to be 
approved, the EIM Measures seem rather contradictory to the OGI Regulations and 
the OEI Measures.  
Moreover, it appeared that the Hai’an EPB’s use of the EIM Measures was also 
not supported by others.  Responding to Green Beagle’s information disclosure 
requests, both the Nantong EPB and the Jiangsu EPD stated that the information 
about inspection statistics should be sought by Green Beagle from the Hai’an EPB; 
neither of them mentioned that this kind of information should not be disclosed.  In 
fact, the same type of information–the inspection report of Baosteel, the largest steel 
corporation in China–was provided to Xu Taisheng, a Shanghai resident after his 
persistent fight requesting the Shanghai EPB to disclose the information. 463   
However, the inconsistency of rules de jure is not an unsolvable problem.  The 
EIM Measures came into effect as of 1 September 2007, and the OEI Measures 
became effective from 1 May 2008; both are ministry-level rules.  The OGI 
Regulations became effective on 1 May 2008 and belong to a higher-level hierarchy 
of SC administrative regulations.  Thus, according to the principle that, regarding 
legislation at the same level, new law prevail over old law464 and, when concerning 
all laws, regulations, and rules, the legislation at a higher level of hierarchy prevails 
over legislation at a lower level, 465  the OGI Regulations prevail over the OEI 
Measures and both prevail over the EIM Measures.  Therefore, inconsistencies 
among them should be decided accordingly.  
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3.3.3 The Effect of Normative Documents 
In China, government departments can issue normative documents (规范性文件) to 
be used as reference (参照使用) by their subordinate government agencies.466  It is 
argued that the growing importance of normative documents in practice changes 
“administrative rule of law” to “rule of normative provisions”.
467
  
In order to effectively implement the OGI Regulations, the SC has so far issued 
one notice and two opinions providing further guidance for government 
departments.
468
  Both opinions stated that government agencies may refuse to 
provide information if the disclosure does not relate to the applicant’s special needs 
of production, livelihood, and scientific research.
469
  This is argued to be a restrictive 




“Special needs” appeared indirectly in the Hai’an EPB’s reply to Green Beagle’s 
administrative reconsideration, stating that according to the 2010 SC opinion, 
information disclosure requests for scientific research did not belong to general 
applications.471  
Another problem relates to the 2010 opinion saying that:  
internal management information made or obtained by administrative 
organs during their day-to-day work or in-process information under 
discussion, research or examination in general is not government 
information that should be disclosed as referred to in the 
Regulations.472  
When Xie Yong requested that the Jiangsu EPD disclose the information about 
the local incinerator, although without mentioning the 2010 opinion, “internal 
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information” was applied by the EPD as the reason for non-disclosure, stating that 
the documents and inspection reports belonged to internal management information 
and should not be disclosed.473  
In the MoA’s reply to Friends of Nature concerning the Nature Reserve 
readjustment, “in-process information” was used to justify its non-disclosure of the 
review committee’s decision due to the fact that the final decision had not then been 
made by the SC.
474
 
“In-process information” also appeared indirectly in Mao Da’s information 
disclosure requests concerning the risk assessments of household waste landfill 
pollution in Beijing.
475
  The Beijing EPB stated that the information could not be 
disclosed since the data was not complete and still needed further investigation.  In 
fact, the assessment started in 2006 and Mao submitted his request in 2009.  The 
effect of the SC opinion also appeared in another request by Mao concerning waste 
management.  The MEP replied that information of organic pollutant management 
was “internal management information” and could not be disclosed.476 
In 2012, the same basis was used to refuse Green Beagle’s request to the MEP for 
the disclosure of a report with regard to PCBs
477
-containing electrical equipment and 
wastes in eight key provinces.
478
  
Besides the SC opinions, SEPA’s reply letter concerning the disclosure of EIA 
report
479
 constitutes a normative document as well.  The problem with SEPA’s letter 
is that it de facto forms an effective approach for EPBs to pass disclosure of EIA 
documents to EIA compiling entities, construction entities, and enterprises.  Several 
EPBs in Jiangsu replied to both Xie Yong and Green Beagle that they should seek 
the EIA information from the project construction entity or EIA compiling entity.480  
Although SEPA’s reply does not state that EPBs do not bear the obligation to 
provide EIA reports, it nevertheless supports the idea that EPBs can tell information 
                                               
473Case 12; Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPD, Jiangsu Province Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court Administrative 
Litigation Judgment, (2010) Ningxingchuzi No. 26, 13 August 2010, 7.  
474 Case 20. 
475 Case 7. 
476 Feng Yongfeng 2011; Friends of Nature open environmental information seminar, 27 April 2011. 
477 PCBs refers to polychlorinated biphenyls. They all belong to persistent organic pollutants. 
478 Case 23; Zhongguo kexuebao, 23 April 2012.  
479 SEPA, The Reply Concerning Issues on Disclosing EIA Documents for Construction Projects Upon Public 
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480 Case 12, Case 22; Nantong EPB, Reply to Green Beagle, 18 March 2011; Jiangsu EPB, Reply to Green 
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requesters to seek the information from enterprises first hand.  Even if SEPA did not 
intend to transfer the obligation of disclosing EIA documents from government 
agencies to private entities, it at least alleviates the government agencies’ obligations 
to disclose information.
481
  This can only be seen as discouraging the public from 
seeking EIA information from government agencies.  An EPB official said that 
without the SEPA letter, they would at least consider providing EIA reports upon 
disclosure requests; however, it was now their first natural choice to tell requesters 
to seek EIA reports from an EIA compiling entity or construction entity.482  Another 
problem connected to the function of SEPA’s letter, of passing EPBs’ obligations to 
private entities, is that enterprises are not under any legal responsibility to provide 
EIA reports upon information disclosure requests.  Therefore, the public succeeding 
in obtaining the information from enterprises instead of EPBs remains less 
promising.  
More problematically, it is difficult to rectify the situation if these normative 
documents violate laws and regulations.  According to the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law of the P.R.C. (行政复议法 AR Law), citizens, legal persons or 
other organizations, when filing an administrative reconsideration on a specific 
administrative act, may also file an administrative reconsideration to review the 
provisions on which the administrative act was based, if they consider that the 
provisions are not legitimate.
483
  The provisions here refer to normative 
documents.484  The applicability of this rule is limited to the condition that filing for 
an administrative reconsideration on normative documents must be done together 
with filing regarding a specific administrative act, simultaneously.  That is, the law 
does not allow any independent filing for an administrative review on normative 
documents per se.  
Moreover, the issuance of normative documents by central government agencies 
and its consequent utilization by government agencies in refusing to disclose 
environmental information have indicated that in these cases of environmental 
information disclosure, “fragmented authoritarianism” is not the single picture.  
While fragmented practices with regard to open government information still exist 
that it is very often that different replies are made by government agencies with 
                                               
481 More discussion about the SEPA letter and its effect upon public access to information, see, Zhao 2010, 
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regard to a same information disclosure request, local practices sometimes are also 
consistent when a certain type of practice is favourable to them all, for instance, to 
apply SEPA’s reply letter to push away their disclosure obligation.  
3.3.4 Behind the Legal Rhetoric  
Noticeably, government agencies have not been making all efforts to realize 
environmental information disclosure.  Instead, all kinds of justifications have been 
adopted to push away their obligation of disclosure, to provide a reply with no 
concrete content, or to simply direct the requesters from one government department 
to another–the question is why the information requested in the above cases is so 
difficult to get disclosed.   
Naturally, the “historical tension between economic growth and environmental 
protection” also exists in China: in fact, with the former frequently taking priority.
485
  
In general, environmental protection plans and environmental quality statuses, or 
information concerning the general situation of the environment, is easy to obtain 
through a disclosure request.  Information concerning waste management and 
disposal, polluting enterprises and pollutant emission statistics is more difficult to 
access.486  The latter type of information mainly relates to enterprises that form the 
backbone of the economy.  
So far, economic development is still regarded as hard policy in China.  There is 
no doubt that maintaining high annual GDP growth has been one major factor in 
safeguarding the legitimacy of the party-state.487  Although there have been gradual 
changes in environmental policy in China, environmental protection nevertheless 
does not precede economic growth.488  A higher rate of economic growth is still the 
main indicator of local government performance assessment.  A research based on 
                                               
485 Carter 2001, 168-169. 
486 This is roughly in compliance with the report, Access to Environmental Information in China: Evaluation 
of Local Compliance, compiled by ARTICLE 19 and CLAPV, though the report did not include information 
disclosure request about pollutant emission statistics. See, ARTICLE 19 & CLAPV, 2010 report, 19-20. 
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283 Chinese cities has shown that spending on environmental amenities has a 
negative effect on government officials being promoted.
489
  
Under this situation, a pro-enterprises strategy becomes a natural choice for local 
governments when facing the conflict of business interests, environmental protection 
and public interest.  In China, environmental protection agencies are under a vertical 
management system (垂直管理).  In other words, each environmental protection 
agency is under the supervision of its upper-level environmental protection agency.  
However, environmental protection agencies are also under the administration of 
local governments and directors of environmental protection agencies are appointed 
by local governments.  Thus, a dilemma is faced by environmental protection 
agencies in strictly enforcing enterprises to curb environmental pollution while at 
the same time considering the interests of the local governments and their economic 
growth.  This has resulted in the unwillingness of local EPBs to disclose inspection 
statistics of local enterprises or to impose administrative penalties upon them, 
particularly with regard to enterprises that constitute a major part of local GDP 
growth.  The failure of Greenpeace in obtaining the information relating to the heavy 
metal enterprises from the Zhuzhou EPB could thus be partly due to the fact that the 
major economy of Zhuzhou city is metal industry.  In another case, villagers failed 
to obtain information about a sewage plant that belongs to the largest local textile 
corporation which is also the dominant business in the locality.
490
  The steel 
company Baosteel, about which Xu Taisheng requested the information disclosure, 
is the largest steel corporation in China.
491
    
One lawyer summarizes this as follows: 
环保局对于信息公开的态度很明确，要保护当地企业。把环境问
题曝露出来，主要曝露了两个问题，一他们以前工作没有做好，
二以后的 GDP 会收到影响。 
The attitude of local EPBs is very clear, to protect local enterprises.  If 
environmental problems get disclosed, two problems will be disclosed: 
                                               
489 Specifically, according to the working paper, “one standard deviation increase in average GDP scaled 
environmental improvement investment lowers the probability of promotion by 8.5 percentage points for 
secretaries and 6.3 percentage points for mayors.” See, Wu, Deng, & et al. 2013, 23. 
490 Case 5. 





first, they did not do a good job; second, the local GDP will be 
affected.492  
Concerning Friends of Nature’s information disclosure request, the reduction in 
the area of the Nature Reserve is mainly to pave the way for the construction of the 
Xiaonanhai Dam (小南海水电站), a USD3.8 billion project,493  and the largest 
project of Chongqing city during the 11th five-year plan.494  Research results already 
show that the dam will seriously affect the living environment of several rare and 
endemic fish; 495  nevertheless, it is the same as many other dam projects, local 
governments take all measures to promote them for poverty alleviation and 
economic development amid strong opposition from NGOs.496  
Information concerning incinerators is more complex.  In recent years, building 
more incinerators has been regarded as an effective means to solve the problem of 
rapidly growing house waste in China.  Until 2008 there were 86 incinerators in 
China, and for the year 2010, 41 new incinerators were planned for construction.497 
At the same time, mass incidents against incinerators were happening 
unprecedentedly all over China.498  In the summer of 2008, thousands of Beijing 
residents protested against the Gao’antun incinerator in Beijing; in November 2009, 
hundreds of residents went to the street, voicing their opposition against a planned 
waste incinerator in Panyu, Guangzhou;499 and in 2011, tens of thousands villagers 
blocked the road with barricades to oppose against the Huangtutang incinerator to 
operate near Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province.
500
  There is clearly distrust about the 
safety of living near incinerators among the public.  Does this explain why the EPBs 
in Jiangsu Province were not willing to disclose inspection statistics about 
                                               
492 Interview with lawyer 1, 6 May 2011. 
493  Case 20; New York Times, 29 December 2011. 
494  Qin Weihua, Liu lujun, Xu Wanglu et al. 2008.   
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496  Nujiang hydro power dam is the most typical example. See, Magee 2006; Mertha, 2008.  
497  Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan, 19 March 2010. 
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499  Yu Dawei 2012; See also, Guardian, 23 Nov 2009. 
500 In early 2011, when the incinerator started its trial operation, residents nearby smelt very strong odour in 
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villagers that there would be a temple to be built and 77% thus signed on a document of land expropriation 
that was later used to approve the construction of the incinerator. Villagers did feel the project suspicious 
during its construction but only started to protest when it started ignition for burning garbage and emitting 






incinerators?  Although it is difficult to answer such a question in this dissertation, 
Xie Yong and Green Beagle’s experiences do suggest that it is unlikely that 
inspection statistics of incinerators will be disclosed.  This is, nevertheless, not the 
only exception; in 2009 Yang Zi met a similar situation by failing twice in obtaining 
inspection statistics of Gao’antun Medical Waste Incinerator from the Beijing 
EPB.501  
Another perceptible conflict between government agencies and public access to 
environmental information is that disclosure might expose government fault.  It is 
not rare that EIA reports are defective but still get approved by EPBs.502  With 
regard to projects that need to have environmental impact assessments, a production 
chain has emerged that project constructors, environmental impact assessors and 
local government agencies are all involved in.  In June 2010, the MEP published its 
Notice on 2009 EIA Entities Spot Check; from 75 EIA entities, quality or 
management problems were found within 30.
503
  The approval of EIA reports is 
controlled by local governments instead of environmental protection agencies.  A 
director of a local environmental protection bureau has complained that as long as 
EPBs belong to the local government, with regard to both salary and officials’ 
positions, the independence of project approval cannot avoid being affected by the 
government.
 504
  It is not rare that some unqualified EIA reports were also approved 
by environmental protection agencies.  This probably explains why some EPBs are 
hesitating to disclose EIA reports–they do not want to “lift a rock to smash their own 
foot”.  
This is probably also one of the reasons why the Hai’an EPB did not want to 
disclose the inspection statistics of the Huji Incinerator.  In Nantong, enterprises that 
completed all operation procedures are filed with local monitoring agencies to be 
monitored.  However, it is not clear whether an enterprise that does not complete 
                                               
501  Case 16; Yang Zi v. Beijing EPB, Beijing Haidian District People’s Court Administrative Ruling, 
Haixingchuzi No.00093, 21 May 2010; Xinjingbao, 24 May 2010; After the case collection of this dissertation, 
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information disclosure upon request, Yuehuanyigong (2013) No. 9, 10 April 2013. 
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administrative procedures can be put into the system.  According to a lawyer, the 
Huji Incinerator probably started its operation without completing its assessment 
procedure, and thus was not included in the monitoring list. From this perspective, 
the key evidence of inspection statistics in Xie Yong’s civil litigation could not even 
exist.505  
Undoubtedly, open government information relates to the political environment in 
China.  Lagerkvist’s argument that the Internet in China is at the same time 
“unlocking and containing the public sphere” 506  also exists with access to 
government information.  As a stepping stone, access to government information 
can lead to more, and deeper, democratic participation in government affairs; 
nevertheless, some government officials still adhere to the out-dated view that there 
is no need for public access to government information on administrative 
management.507  As it is pointed out by Horsley, 
But they see it as a double-edged sword.  While loosening the reins on 
day-to-day governance and encouraging a more open style of 
governance with “supervision” by the people and the media, the Party 
still attempts to retain tight control over information flows and media 
reportage, issuing directives prohibiting or limiting reporting on 




Clearly, in China, open government information still faces the obstruction of a 
lack of democratic environment in public administration.  While transparency in 
governance is being promoted, it is also controlled and restricted, reflecting the 
paradox of introducing open government information into a non-democratic political 
system.509   
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Applying the approach of understanding the implementation of international 
environmental regimes by Neil Carter,
510
 the effectiveness of laws concerning open 
environmental information can be understood from two perspectives.  One is to 
assess whether the laws are changing the behaviours of their implementers; the other 
is to evaluate whether the objectives of the laws have been achieved.  It is true that 
government agencies have been changing from a secrecy-government to gradually 
regarding government information disclosure as their routine administration; this 
can be seen in the Zhuzhou EPB’s attitude development alongside with 
Greenpeace’s information disclosure request.  Although when it began nobody was 
really in charge of the issue of information disclosure, later the Zhuzhou EPB was in 
fact using legal rules to counteract the requests by Greenpeace.  Nevertheless, based 
on the case studies in this chapter, it is also clear that the purpose of obtaining 
information under the regulations is mostly obstructed due to effective 
counter-mobilization, also based on legal rhetoric, from the government’s side.  
Nevertheless, a paradox exists that citizens and organizations are still active in 
requesting that government agencies disclose environmental information, despite 
their failures in getting that information.  The following chapters will further discuss 
why and how information disclosure requesters have been endeavouring to use the 
mechanism, and how this makes the legal mobilization of environmental 
information disclosure go beyond its end aim of obtaining the information per se.   
                                               





4 INFORMATION DISCLOSURE REQUESTS: 
LEGAL MOBILIZATION BY CITIZENS AND 
ENTITIES 
In spite of the obstacles and impediments, Chinese citizens and organizations have 
been actively using the law to request for government information disclosure.  This 
study argues that with regard to information disclosure requests, it is not the ends 
but the means that matters.  In other words, while citizens and organizations invoke 
the law to access government information, a legal mobilization occurs in the 
social-legal sphere and results in social and political changes that go beyond 
information disclosure per se.   
This chapter mainly focuses on why and how the public invokes the law to 
request that government agencies disclose environmental information despite the 
existence of all kinds of obstacles.  It first explores the purposes, tactics and framing 
of the public’s invoking of the law to access government information through 
disclosure requests. Second, it briefly examines the effects their actions have 
brought out and how they have formed a new challenge that imposes pressure on 
governmental authorities.  Lastly, it summarizes the major findings and its 
theoretical implications.  
4.1 Invoking the Law to Access Environmental Information Upon 
Disclosure Requests 
According to Zemans, a legal mobilization happens when “a desire or want is 
translated into a demand as an assertion of one’s rights.”
511
  This legal mobilization 
can be individually initiated or a collective action.  In China, citizens and 
organizations requesting government information disclosures are exercising their 
right to access government information, thus constituting a new legal mobilization 
                                               





where legal rights of access to information have been translated into a demand upon 
the government to disclose information.   
Generally, environmental information disclosure requests can be divided into two 
categories: one is for public interest, the information disclosure requesters are not 
pollution victims, and the information they request does not concern themselves 
specifically, but the general public and the environment; the other is related to 
private interest, for instance when the family life or health of the requester is 
affected by environmental pollution.  Regardless of whether it is for public good or 
private interest, in all these cases, citizens and entities invoked legal norms, 
requiring government departments to act accordingly.  By doing so they have 
transformed themselves “from objects to wilful participants” in politics,
512
 whether 
purposefully or unintentionally, holding the government to its own words.  In other 
words, in the socio-legal sphere, it is clear that the law has been empowering the 
public to challenge government agencies and push government agencies to enforce 
the law and fulfil their obligations. 
4.1.1 Public-interest Oriented Environmental Information Disclosure  
A large majority of environmental information disclosure requests concern the 
public interest.  Out of the 28 cases, 10 individually-launched requests and 10 
entity-launched requests were for public interest, which accounts for about 71% of 
the total cases (Table 4-1); only eight were initiated for private interest, which 
equals 29% (Table 4-3 under section 4.1.2).  All survey-related requests (Table 4-2) 
aiming to monitor and push forward government implementation of the new law 
were public interest related.  
 
  
                                               
















Requests submitted by individuals 
1 Beijing netizen Yu 
Ping 
PM2.5 inspection  No 2011 
2 Ding Jinkun Qiandao lake water diversion project proposal 
etc. 
No 2012 
3 Hangzhou resident Qiandao lake water diversion project proposal No 2012 
6 Mao Da Result of the 2006-2008 National Survey on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants 
No 2011 
7 Mao Da 2006 report on Beijing  Domestic Waste 
Landfill Risk Evaluation 
No 2009 
8 Mao Da Plastic bags usage fee Yes 2009 
10 Sun Nong Used battery disposal information No 2008 
11 Tianjin blogger 
“Wandering Sky” 
Dahuangbao Wetland Nature Reserve plan 
maps 
No 2011 
15 Yan Yiming List of polluting enterprises Yes 2008 
18 Zhang Tao Pollution situation of Bohai oil field leaking Yes 2011 
The following requests were submitted by organizations 
19 All China 
Environmental 
Federation 
Haoyiduo Diary Co. daily inspection, EIA 
report and pollutants emission 
Yes 2011 
20 Friends of Nature Yangtse River upper reacheas fish 
preservation area readjustment 
No 2011 
21 Green Beagle Sujiatuo Incinerator EIA public participation 
section 
No 2011 
22 Green Beagle Hai'an Incinerator EIA and pollutant emitting 
data 
No 2011 
23 Green Beagle 2010 investigation result on PCBs-containing 
electrical equipment and waste electricity 
equipment in eight key provinces 
Yes 2012 
24 Green Beagle Emergency Plan for Heavy-polluted Day No 2012 
25 Greenpeace BASF pollutants emission No 2008 
26 Greenpeace Zhuzhou polluting enterprises No 2009 
27 Green Watershed Chromic slag pollution enterprises loan, 
regulations 
No 2012 
28 Tianxiagong (Justices 
for all) 
List of cities where water quality below 
requirement standard 
Yes 2012 

















1 Friends of Nature 
Shanghai members 
water-related environmental information partly 2008 




3 Greenpeace information of polluting enterprise partly 2009 
4 Southern Weekend list of enterprises received environmental 
penalty 
partly 2010 
5 ARTICLE 19 & 
CLAPV 
17 types of government information as 
listed in Art. 11 of OEI Measures 
partly 2010 
6 Southern Metropolis 
Daily journalist 
PM2.5 & Ozone inspection statistics partly 2011 
7 Wuhu Ecology Centre List of key enterprises that emit dioxin partly 2011-
2012 
8 Impact Law Firm eight types of information as listed in Art. 




The information requested for disclosure covered a wide range, from general 
environmental information of water and air quality to specific environmental 
information of the pollutant emissions of a particular incinerator, and from nature 
reserves to health-related environmental information. 
  The following categorization is based on the content of the information 
requested; it chooses the most direct and immediate content of the information as the 
categorizing basis if the request concerns two or more overlapping types of 
information.   
Among the 28 individual requests, most concern information about polluting 
enterprises.  Twenty requests relate to this category: to subdivide them, 10 relate to 
incinerators and waste management,
513
 and 10 requests relate to other types of 
polluting enterprises.
514
  The other requests include: general information of water or 
air quality,
515
 information of environmental protection work,
516
 information of 
projects and environmental plans,
517
 and information of nature preservation.
518
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515 Cases 1, 28. 
516 Cases 8, 24. 
517 Cases 2, 3. 





Chart 4-1 Types of information requested for disclosure 
 
 
It is clear that information requested for disclosure in individual cases mostly 
relates to environmental information about specific enterprises. Among the top 
ranking types of information requests concerning incinerators and waste 
management and other polluting enterprises, most also relate to environmental 
pollution incidents or pollution-caused health problems.  This shows that 
environmental problems that relate directly and closely to people’s daily lives are 
the most related to these requests.  
Among all the surveys, four concern lists of polluting enterprises,
519
 two concern 
various types of information that are listed under the OEI Regulations as mandatory 
disclosure information,
520
 and two concern general information of water or air 
quality.
521
  Compared to individual requests, survey-based requests concern 
information that covers broader scope or general environmental situation, instead of 
specific enterprises.  
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Chart 4-2 Information requested in surveys 
 
It should also be pointed out that among all eight surveys, half
522
 request the 
disclosure of information that is clearly stipulated under the OEI Measures as 
mandatory disclosure information.  In other words, these types of information 
should be disclosed on the government agencies’ own initiatives without any public 
disclosure requests.  This has shown the cautiousness and the strategic choices of the 
organizations in conducting their surveys.  Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3.1, 
even after public disclosure requests, a large majority of government agencies still 
refuse to disclose the information that belongs to the scope of mandatory 
disclosure.
523
  Thus, it is more likely that it could only be more difficult for the 
public to obtain information that does not belong to the scope of mandatory 
disclosure through disclosure requests.    
4.1.2 Environmental Information Disclosure Requests by Pollution Victims 
While the new legislation provides citizens and organizations with a new tool to 
request government agencies to disclosure for public interest, it also provides a new 
channel for pollution victims to obtain information to support their environmental 
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523 See, Chapter 3. 














claims or to be aware of their surrounding environmental risks.  In the eight 
documented environmental information disclosure requests for private interest, all 
requesters happen to be pollution victims as well.  
 











4 Huai'an residents Huaigang Special Steel Co EIA report No 2011 
5 Huang Jianxin Sewage plant EIA report false doc 2009 
9 Sun Bin Neighboring telecommunications base 
approval information 
Yes 2011 




13 Xu Taisheng Bao Steel Plant approval and inspection 
record etc. 
Yes 2008 
14 Xu Yu et al. Water quality inspection report relating to 
chemical plant pollution 
No 2010 
16 Yang Zi Gao'antun Incinerator annual inspection 
statistics 
No 2009 
17 Zhang Changjian etc. Houlong village dumping site approval info 
etc. 
No 2008 
Note: The case number corresponds with the case number documented by the author.  
This shows that all individual requests directly concern pollution enterprises, 
ranging from heavy industry such as steel plants
524





 and waste-treatment enterprises.
527
  Information of waste-treatment 
enterprises ranks the highest in private-interest related requests, partly reflecting the 
severity of environmental problems caused by China’s rapidly growing sector of 
incinerators and the waste-management industry.  
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4.2 The Agents of Legal Mobilization: Citizen Actors, Environmental 
Organizations, and Other Entities 
Among the 28 individual cases, 18 were submitted by individuals and 10 by 
organizations. It appears that both individuals and organizations are active in 
utilizing the new channels for their causes. While all eight requests concerning 
private interests were submitted by individuals, including both city residents and 
villagers, the situation concerning the 20 public-interest related requests is more 
complicated. 
Among the 20 requests for public interest, 10 were submitted by individuals and 
10 by entities. Among the 10 individual-submitted environmental information 
disclosure requests, four were submitted by lawyers,
528
 three by an environmental 
activist (also a scholar on environmental history),
529
 two by “netizens”, 
530
 and one 
by a resident of Hangzhou.
531
  Lawyers rank the highest in requesting information 
disclosure for the public good, reflecting their capacity to utilize the new legal 
channel and their concern for environmental protection.  
Among the entity-submitted cases, a large majority, nine out of 10, were by 
environmental organizations
532
 and only Case 28 relates to an organization
533
  whose 
main focus is not only environmental protection.  Among the eight surveys of 
environmental information disclosures, four were by environmental organizations,
534
 
two were media-related surveys,
535
 Survey 7 was by an international organization 
focusing on freedom of information and a legal aid centre, and Survey 8 is by a law 
firm.  Clearly, environmental organizations have been the most active in requesting 
government agencies disclose environmental information.  
                                               
528 Cases 2, 10, 15, 18. 
529 Cases  6, 7, 8. 
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blogger with account name as 奇异的恩典 (Amazing Grace) in most reports about his information disclosure 
request; Case 12 is initiated by a blogger who has a blog titled 流浪的天空 (Wandering Sky), through which 
the author located the corresponding case.    
531 Case 3. 
532 Cases 19-27. 
533 This organization is 天下公 (Justice for All). Established in 2011, Justice for All is a policy advocacy 
NGO based in Nanjing. Its main focuses include: issues of discrimination against people with disabilities, 
Hepatitis, and HIV/AIDS, food and medication safety standards etc. http://www.tianxiagong.org 
534 Surveys 1, 2, 3, 6. 





Moreover, it appears that the IPE, Friends of Nature,
536
 and Green Beagle
537
 have 
taken a leading and dedicated role in conducting environmental information 
disclosure requests since the coming into effect of the new legislation.  According to 
the collected statistics by the author, the members of Friends of Nature are among 
the first to request information disclosure.  IPE, a young Beijing based 
environmental organization focusing on environmental information disclosure, has 
conducted annual surveys on environmental information disclosures in 113 cities in 
China since 2008.  Green Beagle is involved in a total of four cases of information 
disclosure requests among the documented materials by the author. 
International organizations have also been active in environmental information 
disclosure requests, such as Greenpeace, ARTICLE 19 and Natural Resources 
Defence Council (NRDC). Greenpeace is one of the international ENGOs that first 
started to carry out environmental information disclosure work after the OEI 
Measures came into effect in China.
538
  It continued and resulted in the report about 
enterprise information disclosure in 2009.
539
  ARTICLE 19 is an international 
organization headquartered in London, focusing on “defending freedom of 
expression and information”;
540





 an environmental organization headquartered in New 
                                               
536 Friends of Nature (自然之友) is the earliest and one of the most influential ENGOs in China. It was 
established in 1994 with approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Since its creation it has been active in 
promoting environmental education, organizing green activities and conducting exchanges with foreign green 
NGOs. See Jiang Wandi 1996.
  
537 Based in Beijing, Green Beagle (达尔问自然求知社) was established in April 2009. This organization’s 
Chinese name 达尔问 is partly after Charles Darwin (达尔文); its English name is derived from the HMS 
Beagle, the sloop-of-war on which the great naturalist Darwin was on board. (Geall 2013, 15-16) Green 
Beagle’s work focuses on three aspects of environmental protection: city environmental quality testing and 
researching, China’s environmental situation investigation, and environmental protection education. Its main 
initiator is Feng Yongfeng (冯永锋), a journalist of one of the largest state media, Guangming Daily. Feng 
has long been regarded as one of the most influential environmental journalists in China.   
538 Greenpeace website, 30 June 2008. 
539 Greenpeace 2009, report.  
540 ARTICLE 19 was founded in 1987 in London, the UK. Its mission is to promote freedom of expression 
and freedom of information, protected by international human rights law, such as Articles 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.article19.org/index.php. 
541 Survey 5. 
542 NRDC was founded in 1970 by a group of law students and attorneys. It has offices at present in New 
York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Beijing. The mission of NRDC is to “safeguard 






York, jointly developed the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI)
543
 for 
environmental information disclosure assessment with IPE. 
Lastly, besides environmental organizations, domestic media and law firms have 
also become part of the community requesting environmental information 
disclosures, reflecting the diversity of actors that have been working with this newly 
emerging mechanism of open government information.  While the former has more 
capacity to report the results of their requests and arouse more public debate, the 
latter has professionals who are rich in legal knowledge and techniques in taking 
legal action.  Both of these factors play important roles in pushing legal mobilization 
forward in China.  
4.2.1 Purposes of Environmental Information Disclosure Requests 
As mentioned above, the general aim of information disclosure requests is either for 
environmental protection out of concern for public interest or for individual interests 
affected by environmental pollution.  Besides these general purposes, disclosure 
request actions also relate to other purposes.  The specific purposes of the 
information disclosure requests in the documented cases are rather multiple and 
diverse, and clearly they are not only about obtaining the information per se.  They 
are submitted to push government agencies to enforce the new legislation, to 
evaluate the implementation of the new regulations, to impose pressure upon local 
governments, to obtain information for public participation such as requests relating 
to environmental pollution accidents or environmental projects, to obtain evidence 
for environmental litigation, to arouse public environmental awareness, or simply 
for personal interests of loving nature.  Most of all, under most situations, these 
purposes are overlapping but do not exclude each other.  
                                               
543 The PITI Index is a standard to assess the level of disclosure of pollution information by city government 
and city environmental protection agencies through a review of eight metrics, including: records of enterprise 
violations (28 points), results of “enforcement campaigns” against polluting facilities (8 points), clean 
production audit information (8 points), enterprise environmental performance ratings (8 points), disposition 
of verified petitions and complaints (18 points), environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports and project 
completion approvals (8 points), discharge fee data (4 points), response to public information disclosure 
requests (18 points). Each criterion has certain points and the full points are 100. The evaluation establishes a 
quantitative score for each city.  The eighth item concerns environmental information disclosure upon public 
requests directly. (See, IPE & NRDC 2008, report, 10-11.) To understand the situation of the eighth item, 
NGO officials and voluteers submit disclosure requests to local EPBs directly for information disclosure, and 





Chinese organizations mostly tend to be cooperative with government agencies 
instead of directly challenging the authorities.
544
  This also appears clearly with 
regard to environmental information disclosure requests.  When a few Shanghai 
members of Friends of Nature first started to request information disclosures in 
China, they put their reasons as follows:  
之所以要申请环境信息公开，…… 就是因为《政府信息公开条例》





The reason why we want to request environmental information 
disclosures … is because the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures 
(for trial implementation) came into effect as of 1 May 2008, citizens 
have a duty and responsibility to coordinate with the government for 
the implementation of the new laws and to request environmental 
information disclosure according to law. Second, we believe that 
environmental information disclosure cannot solve all environmental 




Clearly, using the concept of citizens’ responsibilities and coordination, pushing 
government agencies to enforce their own policy constitutes one purpose of Friends 
of Nature’s information disclosure requests. Regardless of whether it is worded as 
“coordinate” or not, to request government agencies for information disclosure does 
constitute an action of citizenship, instead of being only passive subjects under the 
government.  
To push the government to fulfil its obligations of environmental information also 
appears as an implied purpose of the IPE in conducting its annual survey. Although 
it is stated that the PITI survey is to “systematically evaluate the … implementation 
for these regulations”,
546
 what IPE does indeed also pushes government agencies to 
fulfil their obligation to disclose information from all aspects. Since 2008 onward, 
                                               
544 Ho 2008b, 14; Ho 2001.   
545 Friends of Nature website, 22 April 2009. 





while summarizing the experiences and lessons of implementation, the reports made 
by IPE also give recommendations on how open environmental information can be 
improved. By doing this, clearly it has the purpose of pushing government agencies 
towards better performance. 
A statement made by the Impact Law Firm represents well the trend of pushing 







In order to understand the implementation situation of the OGI 
Regulations, the OEI Measures and the Notice on 2011 Key State-
Monitored Enterprises by the MEP; to push and help related 
government agencies to strengthen their information disclosure work 
and pollution sources monitoring; to know the achievements and 
weakness between the legislation and its practice, and make relevant 




Moreover, to use the official channel to make the government fulfil its obligation 
and be more accountable is not only the aim of NGOs, but also of individuals. Yan 
Yiming, a lawyer based in Shanghai, regarded as China’s “King of Torts” (诉讼之
王),548 is one of the earliest individuals to request an environmental information 
disclosure in China. In 2005, Yan began to pay attention to environmental problems 
caused by small-scale factories and mines in Shanxi Province. He found it difficult 
to bear the burden of proof since there was almost no way to analyse the polluted 
water. This made him confused and worried, until 2007, when the OGI Regulations 
and the OEI Measures were issued. He found that he could use the channel of 
environmental information disclosure. Noticing that the Huai River was highly 
polluted, and Henan and Anhui provinces, both located around the upper reaches of 
                                               
547 Impact Law Firm 2012, report, 5. 
548 Xu Linling 2009. It shall be pointed out that Yan in fact is not a lawyer doing only environmental lawsuits. 
His most famous rights defence cases are lawsuits relating to his representing small shareholders against 





the river, blamed each other for causing the pollution, Yan thought of requesting the 
disclosure of the related information. In May 2008, almost as soon as the regulations 
came into effect, Yan submitted his requests towards the Henan EPD and Anhui 
EPD, asking for the disclosure of key polluting enterprises.
549





家政治、经济、文化的稳定、健康发展。   
To request a government information disclosure is not my fundamental 
purpose.  My purpose is to awake the consciousness of citizen 
participation, and make more people participate in all aspects of 
social life, to push the government to improve its governing capacity, 
and ultimately realize a stable and developing national politics, 
economy and culture. 
550
 
Besides pushing the government to fulfil its obligation, the purposes of Yan 
Yiming’s requests clearly extend to other aspects: raising public awareness of social 
and political participation.  This also appears in Beijing citizen Yu Ping’s requests 
for the disclosure of PM2.5 related information.  
光骂没有用，得把现有能用的渠道和方法利用起来，督促政府做
些事情。 
It is useless to merely criticize the government, [one should] make use 




A second goal of requesting government environmental information is to create 
public pressure on local governments.  In 2011, Green Beagle, a Beijing based 
environmental organization, submitted several information disclosure requests with 
regard to the local incinerator in Hai’an, Jiangsu Province, aiming to impose 
pressure upon local government
552
 and to show support for Xie Yong’s case.
553
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We need to communicate with the government in a proper process. It 
does not matter what the result will be, we want to take a legal 
procedure.  When we choose to do so, we want to knock the door open 
and start a conversation; additionally, we want them to know, besides 
the complaints of local people, there is also the voice of outsiders that 
concern them.
554
   
To discover more about environmental pollution incidents constitutes the third 
purpose of several information disclosure requests.  Although this seems more 
related to the end result of obtaining the information, it shows that citizens and 
organizations do not want to stop at the stage of being informed but intend to know 
more through actively requesting related information.  In 2011, 5,000 tons of 
chromic slag was disposed of on a hillside and later it was found that the same 
enterprise also disposed of tens of thousands tons of chromic slag along the 
Nanjiang River in Yunnan Province.  This directly aroused the attention of Green 
Watershed, an environmental NGO that has long been interested in Green Credit, a 
policy that required banks to assess enterprises’ pollution situations when allocating 
loans. The NGO thus submitted information disclosure requests with regard to the 
banks’ regulations over the polluting enterprise. 
555
  
The information disclosure requests relating to PM2.5 disclosures, submitted by 
both Beijing netizen Yu Ping
556
 and the journalist of Southern Metropolis Daily,
557
 
are also typical examples of requests stemming from public concern and public 
debate.  They also reflect the purpose of furthering public participation in 
environmental issues.  Both requests relate to the heated discussions about PM2.5 on 
Internet forums and microblogs in late 2011.  The debate was originally caused by 
the disputed issue of air quality monitoring by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. In 
October 2011, the U.S. Embassy published on Twitter, via the account @BeijingAir, 
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the data of air quality with regard to PM2.5.  Twitter is blocked in China;
558
 Pan 
Shiyi, a real estate tycoon who has more than 10 million followers on Sina Weibo 
(新浪微博), a twitter-like Chinese microblog, reposted the Embassy’s tweet on 
Weibo.
559
  At that time, China did not monitor PM2.5.  Although according to the 
US Embassy’s statistics, the air quality in Beijing was “extremely dangerous”, the 
Beijing EPB stated that it was “slightly polluted”.  This sharp contrast angered 
netizens and aroused heated discussion and criticism towards the Beijing EPB.   
Citizen discussion did impose pressure upon the Chinese government.  While 
denouncing the foreign embassy’s publishing of air quality monitoring as 
interference in China’s internal affairs and against international conventions and 
Chinese laws,
560
 by December 2011, the MEP announced its plan with regard to 
PM2.5 inspection and information disclosure in China.
561
  And the central 
government passed revised air quality standards which included an index for PM2.5, 
aiming to gradually establish the monitoring system of PM2.5 in major cities in 
China.
562
  In 2013, the SC issued Air Pollution Prevention Actions Plan, and 74 
cities including Beijing started to have real time PM2.5 monitoring according to new 
air quality standard.  In February 2014, the MEP announced that another 87 cities 
will start to have PM2.5 real time monitoring.
563
  
To facilitate public participation in environmental decision-making is one of the 
purposes of obtaining environmental information about projects.  In 2011, the 
Beijing EPB published a notice concerning a new incinerator project that would be 
built in Sujiatuo, a town under the administration of the Haidian District in Beijing.  
Green Beagle conducted on-site investigations and found that many villagers in 
Sujiatuo did not know about the project.  Questioning the accuracy of the content 
with regard to public participation in the project’s EIA report, Green Beagle 
requested that the Beijing EPB disclose the chapter of public participation in the 
project’s EIA report.
564
  Yet it is not only environmental organizations that have 
shown their concern for environmental decision making, individuals have done 
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likewise.  In 2012, when the lawyer Ding Jinkun noticed that Hangzhou was going 
to construct a new project diverting water from Qiandao Lake to Hangzhou, he 
submitted his information disclosure requests to the Hangzhou Forest and Water 
Bureau (FWB).  He asked the Hangzhou FWB to disclose the project proposal and 
project investigative report and related records.
565
  Moreover, he also wrote in his 
blogs about the information disclosure request, as well as the impact on the 
surrounding nature of the new proposed water diversion plan.
566
  To request related 
information constitutes the first step in participating in environmental decision 
making.  Inevitably, an increasing concern over government environmental policies 
and environmental plans has been happening in China.  
The fourth purpose of information disclosure requests is to obtain evidence to 
support other legal claims.  For instance, in April 2011, Sun Bin, a resident in 
Changde, Hunan Province, requested that the Hunan EPD disclose its approval 
document for the establishment of a telecommunication base in his neighbouring 
apartment. His request constitutes part of his rights defending.  In May 2011, he 
sued the telecommunications company, the housing company and the owner of the 
apartment for installing the base without informing other residents, and thus making 
them living in an environment of potential radiation pollution.  Sun Bin asked for 
the removal of the base and also claimed for economic damages.
567
  The same 
purpose was behind Xie Yong’s environmental information disclosure request.  Xie 
Yong’s information disclosure requests relating to a local incinerator acted partly as 
a search for evidence to support his civil litigation against the local incinerator.
568
   
Xie explained his persistence in fighting for his sick child: 
我们的目的一是给小孩拿到赔偿，提供生活来源；再就是刺激社
会对环境污染的思考，对环境的关注。 
Our purpose is to get compensation for the child to support his living, 
and also to make the society aware of environmental pollution and 
have more concern over environmental protection. 
569
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The fifth purpose of obtaining environmental information is simply for personal 
interests, of loving nature or a general concern for environmental protection.  In 
2011, a blogger based in Tianjin requested for the disclosure of maps of the wetland 
preservation area in Tianjin, since he loves lakes and wants to know more about 
wetland protection.
570
  Mao Da, a scholar of environmental history, submitted three 
information disclosure requests
571
 over his concern of environmental protection.   
While citizens, organizations, and other entities have been actively utilizing the 
new legislation to request that government agencies disclose information, they have 
been imposing a demand upon government agencies; according to Zemans, active 
demand based on legal norms constitute actual legal mobilization,
572
 an actual legal 
mobilization thus happens.
573
  Inevitably, to obtain the information per se is not the 
single purpose of this legal mobilization.  Instead, various and multiple purposes, 
out of environmental concern, raising public awareness, pushing government 
agencies to enforce their own policies and laws, and imposing pressure upon 
government agencies, are behind the actions.  These purposes have clearly moved 
disclosure requests far beyond their original meaning of obtaining information.  
From another perspective, these purposes, probably even unknown to some 
requesters, have in fact turned them into, in Frances Zemans’ words, “active, 
assertive participatory citizenry that is central to a democratic society”.
574
  
Furthermore, these purposes have facilitated this group of assertive and participatory 
citizens to take various legal tactics.  
4.2.2 From Legal Tactics to the Forming of a Supporting Structure   
While the purposes of requesting environmental information disclosures are multiple, 
the tactics taken are strategic.  Moreover, during the processes, both individuals and 
entities have been increasingly gaining capacities in utilizing the law for their 
purposes.   
The process of an individual requesting an environmental information disclosure 
has constituted a process of the accumulation of citizen consciousness of legal 
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knowledge and legal tactics.  In China, when disputes rise, people tend to approach 
the government for settlement first through mediation or negotiations. The same 
happens with several cases in this study.  In most of the above individual-submitted 
requests, people sought other channels–for instance, negotiation with governments 
and enterprises, or petitioning
575
–before they ultimately took up the legal weapon of 
an information disclosure request.  
Sometimes, approaches taken before the legal channel are contentious. For 
instance, before the Houlong villagers used the channel of an information disclosure 
request,
576
 they blocked the road to the waste dump site under construction; villagers 
were beaten, and one got seriously injured.  In June 2008, when the OGI 
Regulations and the OEI Measures came into effect for one month, villagers 
requested that the local EPB disclose information concerning the dump site.  
Ironically, the local EPB only started to respond to the information disclosure 
request when villagers again blocked the road to the construction site.
577
  
The tactic of approaching government offices for solutions was also adopted by 
Xie Yong before he took the incinerator to court.
578
  Xie Yong contacted the 
government offices under Huji Town Government, Nantong City Government, and 
Jiangsu Provincial Government, trying to solve the issue through negotiation.  He 
also submitted his petition to the State Petition Agency.  Nevertheless, he did not get 
a solution from the government authorities at the early stage.
579
  Similar strategies 
were used by Huang Jianxin and residents in Hongqiao village, where villagers have 
been suffering from the air and noise pollution created by a sewage plant,
580
 and Xu 
Taisheng and his neighbouring residents fighting against pollution caused by Bao 
Steel in Baoshan district, Shanghai.
581
  
                                               
575 The petitioning system is also called 信访制度 (literally translation is “letters and visits”). Under this 
system, each government department shall have a letters and visits office that accept public’s complaits and 
solve their problems. The establishement of this system is for the central government to better control and 
supervise the local governments. But it becomes a mechanism that people use to ask for redress of their 
problems that cannot be solved locally or grievances caused by corrupted officials. When people fail to get 
their grievances redressed by local “letters and visits” offices, they sometimes take their compaints to Beijing 
and petition to the corresponding higher level government departments. Local government officials try to stop 
these people going to the higher level government departments by all means (截防), including putting 
petitioners into black jails. More about petitioning in China, see, Pils 2011. 
576 Case 17. 
577 Zhang Changjian 2009.   
578 For more detailed study of this case, please see section 3.2.2. 
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The same experiences were encountered by Yang Zi and residents affected by the 
Gao’antun incinerator.
582
  Before Yang Zi requested that the Beijing EPB disclose 
information about the incinerator, thousands of residents went on demonstrations 
right before the Beijing Olympics started in 2008, resulting in the detention of a few 
organizers.   
According to Xie Yong, by negotiating with local government, he wanted to give 
some “face” (面子) to, literally meaning not to embarrass the local government who 
regarded the incinerator as a model project.  This also shows that at the very 
beginning he had hope in, and was dependant on, the government to solve the 
problem for his family.  After failing to get a meaningful response from the local 
government, he then started to use the law as a weapon to request government 
information.  This clearly transformed him from being a passive subject seeking 
solutions granted by the government into an active citizen actor, using the law to 
safeguard his rights while at the same time challenging the local government.  
In today’s China, petitioning is likely to be restrained and even cracked down for 
the sake of “maintaining stability” (维稳), emphasized by the Chinese government, 
and sometimes even bringing danger to the petitioners; negotiation depends more on 
the government’s willingness for a settlement and is also likely to be of no avail if 
no external pressure from the media or public opinion is imposed.  Although a 
request for environmental information disclosure cannot really solve the problems 
directly, compared to petitioning and negotiating with government offices, it 
provides a new channel for citizens to demand their rights based on the law.  
Moreover, it practically enables citizens to seek more information to act as 
supporting evidence for their legal claims. 
The process of utilizing the channel of an information disclosure request has also 
constituted a process of learning and experience accumulating.  Some citizens have 
self-studied Chinese law in order to assert their legal claims and have changed 
themselves from environmental victims to quasi-legal experts.  Xu Taisheng is an 
ordinary Shanghai resident.  While getting involved into the rights defending for 
their residential area against pollution caused by Bao Steel Corporation, he was 
provided legal aid by CLAPV.  During his rights-defense process, he self-studied 
law and drafted legal complaints.  He also helped other pollution victims in 
Shanghai to communicate with Shanghai environmental protection agencies for 
solutions.  Some information disclosure requesters, for instance Yang Zi and Xie 
                                               





Yong, were invited by ENGOs to give presentations and share their experiences 
with other people in seminars and conferences.  It is clear that a growth of 
citizenship has been accompanying the development of environmental information 
disclosure requests. 
With regard to entities, it is also a process of experimenting, learning, practicing, 
experience-gaining and capacity building.  This can be seen with Friends of Nature’s 
requesting of environmental information disclosures.  When the OGI Regulations 
and the OEI Measures came into effect in May 2008, a few members of Friends of 
Nature in Shanghai thought it was a good opportunity to participate in 
environmental matters and proposed that they could use the new legislation to 
request that government agencies disclose environmental information.  However, 
some members expressed their opposition, fearing it might be a challenge to the 
authority and would affect the development of Friends of Nature.
583
  
Facing this situation, four members in Shanghai decided to launch a project 
“shangshanruoshui” (上善若水, a Chinese idiom, literally meaning “the highest 
virtue is like water”) in the name of individuals but not members of Friends of 
Nature, and to request that the Shanghai EPBs disclose water-related environmental 
information.
584
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We did not really have strategies for launching the project of 
information disclosure request.  However, without knowing how 
government agencies would react to it, in order not to cause them to 
hold [bad] opinion towards Friends of Nature, we decided to use the 
form of “performance art” and submit the requests as citizens.  
Since July 2008, we divided some members in Shanghai into four 
categories of shang, shan, ruo, shui, and started our requests towards 
city and district EPBs in Shanghai.  We also record our requests and 
results at  http://shanghaiwater.blogbus.com/. 
For us, [information disclosure request] breaks the mystery and fear of 
dealing with government agencies.  Although it is request according to 
law, at the very beginning, many felt worried and thought it was acting 
against the government and might cause retaliation; we hid the action 
under the cover of “performance art” and felt it was something sneaky; 
we also did not dare to publicize our identity of members of Friends of 
Nature.  Later we realized that it should not be like this.  There was no 
retaliation.  We can fulfil a citizen’s duty without hiding anything and 
declare loudly that we are members of the Friends of Nature. 585 
It is interesting to note that contrary to the initiators saying that no strategy was 
taken, the pioneer requesters of Friends of Nature applied “performance art” and 
formed themselves under the Chinese idiom “shangshan ruoshui”, consisting of 
four characters, representing four persons.  When it became clear that the legal 
action of requesting information disclosure was accepted by government agencies, 
they started to make known the identity of members of the environmental 
organization.   The process has shown a trajectory of requesting government 
agencies to disclose environmental information: from hesitating to taking legal 
action through performance art, to the final explicit and direct interaction with 
government agencies.  
Most of all, the experience of the members of Friends of Nature also shows that a 
transition has been happening: environmental information disclosure requests have 
                                               





changed citizens from being fearful to being confident in directly interacting with 
government agencies.  Today, Friends of Nature is one of the leading ENGOs in 
requesting that government agencies disclose environmental information in China.  
They have in-house lawyers specializing in providing legal consultation and 
professional work for information disclosure requests.  They have also extended 
their concern to environmental information directly relating to people’s living 
environment and natural protection.
586
  Moreover, failing to get the information 
requested, Friends of Nature has also applied for administrative reconsideration to 
China’s highest government administrative authority–the SC.
587
 
Clearly, from hesitating to submit information disclosure requests by some 
members to directly challenging the legality of the normative documents through 
administrative reconsideration before the highest executive power, the attitude of 
Friends of Nature with regard to environmental information disclosure has changed 
sharply, showing its increasing willingness, capacity and confidence to use the law 
to interact with the Chinese government.   
On the other hand, the interactions between environmental organizations and 
government agencies have made the latter change as well.  Moreover, the changes 
on the government side, from the other perspective, provide more opportunities for 
environmental organizations and citizens.    
When members of Friends of Nature first went to the Shanghai EPB with an 
information disclosure request, they were mistakenly regarded as “petitioners” (上访
人员);588 however, later they started to cooperate with each other. When they first 
went to the Jiading District EPB, nobody in the EPB knew about environmental 




                                               
586 Case 20. In fact, Friends of Nature also took part in the case of Xie Yong. The lawyer of Friends of Nature 
went to Hai’an for further on-site investigation about the Huji incinerator.  
587 Friends of Nature blog, 30 March 2011; In the administrative reconsideration, Friends of Nature requested 
the SC to withdraw the MoA’s reply to Friends of Nature refusing to disclose the information and order MoA 
to make new replies. It also asked the SC to review the legality of the normative documents issued by the 
General Office of the SC on 12 January 2010, Opinion on Doing a Good Job of Disclosing Government 
Information on Request. It particularly requested for the review of the opinion with regard to its explanation 
that  internal management information made or obtained by administrative agencies during their day-to-day 
work or in-process information under discussion, research or examination in general is not government 
information that should be disclosed as referred to in the Regulations. 






It is argued here that the attitude of government agencies plays an important role 
in encouraging more public requests for environmental information disclosures; a 
positive attitude by the government agencies towards public requests can make 
people feel that there is no need to fear challenging the government.  Nevertheless, it 
is more important to understand that this changing of attitude is in fact facilitated by 
the public, but not delivered automatically by the government agencies.  It is clear 
that the core argument in the approach to opportunity structures is that the 
opportunity, either in its constraints, possibilities or threats, matters in collective 
actions.
590
  However, it must also be emphasized that public action can cause the 
opportunity structure to change towards providing more possibilities.  Accordingly, 
the positive responsiveness of government agencies will thus encourage more 
citizens to take actions. This development could be gradual and slow; nonetheless, in 
the field of environmental information disclosure, a cycle of requesting and 
responding, more requesting and more responding has been happening in China.  
And more importantly, this cycle is evolving around utilizing legal rules and legal 
tactics, making it difficult for the government to directly reject this new type of 
public participation.  
In the cases documented by the author, information disclosure requesters, whether 
individuals or entities, almost always clearly make their requests based on law.  As 
was discussed in Chapter 3, when Xie Yong requested an information disclosure he 
always clearly cited his legal basis, based on the laws and regulations.
591
  Other 
individual requesters do likewise, from ordinary citizens to professional lawyers.  In 






根据《政府信息公开条例》第 13 条、第 20 条及相关规定，申请
人有权就上述申请公开事项向贵局申请获取，故申请人依法提出
申请，请求贵局依法以书面方式提供上述申请公开事项。 
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According to Article 23 of the Prevention and Control of Water 
Pollution Law, key polluting entities shall have water pollutant 
emission monitoring equipment that connects with the environmental 
protection government agency’s monitoring system.  As the agency in 
charge of environmental protection, your bureau is under the 
obligation to monitor the polluting situation of key polluting 
enterprises and take corresponding measures.  The requester asks for 
the disclosure of the inspection statistics and measures for pollution 
prevention and treatment. 
Based on Article 13, Article 20 and related rules of the Open 
Government Information Regulations, the requester has the right to 
request your agency to disclose the above items of information. I 
therefore submit my application to your agency to disclose the above 
information in written form.
 592
 
Although it is not required by law, clear legal basis has always been referred to by 
ENGOS–from Greenpeace and IPE, to Friends of Nature and Green Beagle–as well 
as other entities when submitting environmental information disclosure requests, to 
make their requests more authoritative.  
Since late 2011, Wuhu Ecology Centre in Wuhu City Anhui Province has 
requested provincial-level and municipality-level environmental protection agencies 
to disclose information about the enterprises that emit dioxin.  Volunteers at Wuhu 
Ecology Centre made their requests based on the OEI Measures as well as the 
Guidance Opinion on Strengthening the Work of Preventing Dioxin Pollution.  The 
guidance stated that: 
by the end of each year, all provincial level EPDs/EPBs shall disclose 
the names of dioxin emission key enterprises that shall undergo 
compulsory clean production inspection.
593
  
In 2012, the Beijing-based Impact Law Firm conducted a survey of 
environmental information disclosure by requesting that 80 city EPBs disclose eight 
types of information.  The requested information included pollutant emissions, lists 
of polluting enterprises, lists of polluting enterprises that had received an 
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593 MEP et al., Guidance Opinion on Strengthening the Work of Preventing Dioxin Pollution, 





administrative penalty, and enterprises that voluntarily disclosed their pollutant 
emissions.  The types of information were chosen out of the 17 types of information 
that is required to be disclosed voluntarily under Article 11 of the OEI Measures.
594
  
Not only national laws and regulations are used as the basis for environmental 
information disclosures, China’s international obligation was also questioned by 
Green Beagle.  In 2001, China signed the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPs). According to the treaty:  
Each Party shall report to the Conference of the Parties on the 
measures it has taken to implement the provisions of this Convention 
and on the effectiveness of such measures in meeting the objectives of 
the Convention. 
Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat: (a) Statistical data on its 
total quantities of production, import and export of each of the 




PCBs are mixtures of some chemical substances and belong to POPs.  In its 2010 
Annual Report on the State of Environment, the MEP stated that it completed an 
investigation with regard to PCBs-containing electrical equipment and wastes in 
eight key provinces.
596
  In 2012, Green Beagle requested that the MEP disclose this 
investigation report based on the Stockholm Treaty.
597
  
Aiming for multiple outcomes and by taking legal tactics, citizens, environmental 
organizations and other entities have been launching a legal mobilization of 
environmental information disclosure requests in China.  Although mainly this legal 
mobilization appears to be sporadic and contingent, it should nevertheless be 
regarded as completely separate and only related to the idea of individual action.  
Similar to the SULNAM activities narrated by Kate Zhou,
598
 cumulatively, these 
actions can indeed play a more powerful role.  Together, when more act in similar 
measure, they have been formed an individualized collective action
599
 of 
environmental information disclosure request in China.  Moreover, a supporting 
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network has also started to emerge, linking NGOs, lawyers, scholars, journalists and 
citizens through a common concern over environmental information disclosure.   
This professional supporting structure can be seen in several cases.  While 
cooperating with the international organization ARTICLE 19 in reporting 
environmental information disclosure in China, CLAPV, affiliated with the Chinese 
University of Political Science and Law, provided direct legal assistance for four of 
the seven individuals’ information disclosure requests that resulted in administrative 
lawsuits.
600
  Furthermore, while the Impact Law Firm was conducting its survey 
covering 80 information disclosure requests, its lawyers also acted as legal 
representatives for both Green Beagle
601
 and Friends of Nature
602
 in their 
information disclosure requests.  
An environmental community focusing on environmental information disclosure 
has also started to emerge.  As incinerators and waste management has become a 
controversial issue in China,
603
 both ENGOs and individuals have started to request 
information disclosure about this aspect, including Mao Da, as an environmental 
history scholar, Xie Yong and Yang Zi as ordinary citizens, Friends of Nature and 
Green Beagle, based in Beijing, and Wuhu Ecology Centre in Anhui Province.  
Moreover, by attending meetings and seminars, citizens, lawyers, professors and 
ENGOs have worked together in exchanging experiences as well as making their 
voice stronger and more widely heard.  
In April 2012, Friends of Nature organized a seminar in Beijing, particularly 
focusing on the three-year implementation of the OGI Measures.  The seminar 
attracted participants from all walks of life, from law professors, lawyers, NGO 
officials and environmental activists to journalists.  In the seminar, people 
exchanged their experiences of seeking environmental information through 
disclosure requests, and discussed the problems and obstacles they encountered.  In 
early 2012, the Impact Law Firm conducted a project, requesting EPBs to disclose 
information.  A report based on Impact Law Firm’s experience was also compiled 
and sent to interested parties, and a related seminar was held.  These activities 
generally helped more people to understand the OGI Measures, and thus become 
capable of using the law to also request government information disclosures 
themselves.  
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Another important source of support comes from the media.  First, there have 
been quite a few active journalists who have directly got themselves involved in 
environmental protection activities.
604
  The founders of two of the most active 
ENGOs in open environmental information, IPE and Green Beagle, are both 
journalists.
605
  It is also important to note that many Chinese journalists are pro 
environmental protection.
606
  This makes cases related to environmental protection 
more likely to be reported.
607
  Moreover, some journalists directly participated in the 
process of requesting government agencies to disclose environmental information.  
Wang Xing, a senior journalist of Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报), wrote 
his report on PM2.5 information disclosure based on his own experience of 
submitting the requests under his own name.
608
  Among the other surveys, one was 
also conducted by the Southern Weekend (南方周末),609 one leading open media in 
China. 
Lastly, it must be emphasized that the Internet has been playing an unprecedented 
role in shaping the supporting structure and forming a larger community that has 
been pushing forward environmental information disclosure.  While all owning 
official websites, and some also with blogs, almost all ENGOs use microblogs to 
exchange information with each other, and also to inform and educate a wider online 
audience.  As of 12 November 2012, Greenpeace had 85,366 followers on Sina 
weibo, Friends of Nature had 34,020 followers, Ma Jun, director of IPE, had 21,000 
followers, Feng Yongfeng, the founder of Green Beagle had 31,706 followers.  
Additionally, they also have individual accounts updated by other staff members 
who have hundreds to tens of thousands followers, for example the account of Li Bo, 
                                               
604 For study on media and civil society in China, see, Svensson 2012.   
605 Ma Jun, used to be a media journalist, he is now the director of IPE.  Feng Yongfeng, the founder of Green 
Beagle, still acts as a journalist for Guangming Daily.  
606 A very active environmental NGO, Green Earth Volunteers (绿家园), co-founded by journalist Wang 
Yongchen in 1996, organized monthly Green Journalists Salon (绿色记者沙龙) in Beijing. The salon is open 
to the public. It provides a platform for journalists and environmental activists to discuss environmental issues 
since 2007. The founder of Green Earth Volunteers, Wang Yongchen is a journalist of the China National 
Radio; she is chosen as one of the 32 Heroes of the Environment by Time in 2008. Wang is also one of the 
main actors involved in the campaign to oppose the building of 13 dams along the Nu River in China. See 
Time, 24 September 2008. 
607 This nevertheless doesnot mean that all environmental cases will be reported. Censorship exists with 
reporting about large-scale environmental demonstrations and protests. For instance, the tens of thousands 
villagers demonstrated against the incinerator in Huangtutang, Nantong, Jiangsu Province in spring 2011 in 
fact can not be found in official media. 
608 Survey 6. 





the director of Friends of Nature, has 38,204 followers.  In fact, one of the first 
information disclosure requests launched by Friends of Nature’s Shanghai members 
was initiated through the Internet.  When a few members of Friends of Nature 
wanted to try the new OGI mechanism in Shanghai, they first exchanged their 
thoughts via email discussions, and later also established a blog recording their 
requests, processes and the results of their information disclosure requests.
610
   
The Internet has also been utilized by individual requesters and lawyers. The four 
lawyers who submitted information disclosure requests for the public interest all 
have microblog accounts and three of them also have blogs.
611
  When netizen Yu 
Ping requested that the Beijing EPB disclose PM2.5 information, he updated his 
microblog
612
 and posted his requests in his blog.
613
  Yu Ping had 78,925 followers 
on the NetEase microblog (网易微博).614  His blog post titled “Beijing EPB Refused 
to Disclose PM2.5 Upon My Request, I submitted Administration Reconsideration 
to MEP” got 13 recommendations, seven reposts, 8,879 readings and 50 
comments.
615
  Moreover, he was also invited to one NetEase online discussion 
where netizens were invited to ask him questions with regard to information 
disclosure requests.  In total, 64 questions were posted and answered during the 
online interaction.  He received support from many of the participants for requesting 





I support you.  The public should be made aware of the environment 
they live in.  To disclose the data can help the public to take 
appropriate safety measures.  This is the duty of the EPB who shall not 
                                               
610 Survey 1; Interview with lawyer 2, 6 May 2011; See, also Friends of Nature’s water information project 
blog, http://shanghaiwater.blogbus.com/ 
611 This online research was completed by 12 November 2012. 
612 In news media about Yu Ping’s requests, he is mostly mentioned as 奇异的恩典 (Amazing Grace), which 
is the ID of his NetEase microblog (网易微博) account.  
613 Yu Ping blog, 9 December 2011. 
614 Data collected dated 24 October 2012.  





use research as an excuse and be irresponsible for the public. 
Everyone should have the right to monitor the EPB.
616
  
In another case where newly-weds sued the Hunan provincial-level EPD for not 
disclosing the information about the telecommunications base which was installed 
next door to them,
617
 their representative lawyer, Lei Zhifeng, an environmental 
protection volunteer particularly focusing on radiation pollution, posted the case, 
relevant laws and regulations, his administrative reconsideration application and 
government reply letters on his blog.
618
 
Guobin Yang argues that in a restrictive political environment, the Internet 
“enables voluntary environmental activity with minimal financial resources” and it 
“plays a crucial role in providing environmental groups a presence and creating 
public visibility”.
619
  Inevitably, the Internet has made environmental information 
disclosure requests not only visible, but also cost effective in raising public 
awareness and garnering public debate and support.  Moreover, the development of 
microblog has also enabled information that is likely to be censored by the official 
media finds an alternative to be dessiminated.
620
  It also overcomes the political 
constraints of strictly controlling collective activism, and helps to form a network 
that appears unorganized.  Furthermore, the development of Internet technology 
from forum and mailing list to blog and microblog have changed China’s green 
public sphere from being a “deliberative enclaves” that only include activists, 
intellectuals, students, and other like-minded urbanites
621
 to a platform for a broader 
audience.  
Although these legal tactics have not in reality made all government agencies 
disclose the information requested, as discussed in Chapter 3, they have imposed a 
pressure on government agencies to adjust their attitudes towards the public and 
respond with more legal reasoning.  
This situation is summarized well by Wang Qiuxia, a project officer of Green 
Beagle, as follows:  
                                               
616 NetEase online discussion dated 6 December 2011. 
617 Case 9. 
618 Lei Zhifeng blog, 25 May 2012.  
619 Yang 2003, 91.  
620  Government censorship applies to microblogs as well. However due to the sporadic and scattered 
information that can be shared and reshared on microblogs at a fast pace, comparatively it is difficult for the 
government to censor it as effectively as it does with the traditional media of newspapers, or official state 
media website. 










It is clear that more and more people have started to invoke the law to 
access government information, including some NGOs taking this as 
their routine job, either for the purpose of obtaining information, to 
assess government performance or to make proposals. While 
environmental awareness has been raised, the public knows that they 
have the right to request information disclosure, and to impose 
pressure upon the government and enterprises. [Government agencies] 
shall not simply ignore public requests as before; instead [they] should 
make an appropriate reply with regard to information disclosure 
requests according to the law.
622
 
4.3 Effect of Environmental Information Disclosure Requests  
According to Zemans, a dependence relationship exists between law enforcement 
and how citizens use the law; citizens although acting largely in their own interest, 
in an aggregation can strongly influence the implementation of public policy.
623
  
Although there is the happening of individualized collective activism with regard to 
environmental information disclosure requests in China that more and more people 
start to do it, it suggests that this aggregation has not been forming in China at 
present due to the fact that most people still have not got used to challenging 
government authorities.  Generally, Chinese citizens and environmental 
organizations are mostly reactive, rather than proactive, in taking action. In the 
words of a Chinese lawyer:  
心理障碍，挑战政府，和政府对着干… 这个申请是法定的权利，
并且还没看到谁去申请被抓起来的。这种担忧其实没有必要，但
                                               
622 Interview with NGO officer, 9 June 2012. 







[There is] a psychological barrier, that to request an information 
disclosure is to challenge the government and act against the 
government… This request is a legal right and we did not see anyone 
detained for an information disclosure request.  There is no need to 
worry about it.  However, it has been an old habit to think that to 
challenge the government is risky.  Many people do not really 
understand the law, thus this customary concept exists. 
624
 
Nevertheless, along with increasing utilization of the new channel to request that 
government agencies disclose information, visible changes have been happening in 
both the social and political system.  First, a legal channel has been established for 
citizens and entities to request information disclosure and more importantly, this 
channel has enabled Chinese citizens and entities to participate in environmental 
matters and “communicate with the government in a proper process”.
 625
  
Second, upon disclosure requests, government agencies have started to change 
their attitude towards the public and an interaction between the social-legal system 
and the political-legal structure occurs.  It appears that although the regulations were 
issued from top to bottom, their implementation is mostly from bottom up, and 
many government agencies have begun to be aware of environmental information 
disclosure when encountering public information disclosure requests. 
Thirdly, our cases have also shown that environmental information disclosure can 
also result in specific policy changes.  Undoubtedly, the pressure imposed by public 
opinion and environmental information disclosure requests has made the Chinese 
government start to monitor PM2.5 as one standard of air quality.  Thus, it can be 
predicted that if more requests for environmental information disclosures are made, 
more pressure will be imposed upon government agencies, and more changes will be 
created as a result.  
The lawyer Zhang Tao, who requested the Ministry of Ocean to disclose the 
information concerning a major incident of oil-leak in 2011, says:  
有的申请和建议可能短时间内起了作用，有的申请和建议可能暂
时没起作用，但不能因为暂时没起作用就否定先前所做的努力。
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 Some requests and suggestions may make a difference within a short 
time, others may not.  However, the effort shall not be negated because 
of this.  I believe that when injustice happens, as long as the public 
take appropriate means, appropriate techniques, and appropriate 
consideration, they will make difference.  This can be regarded as the 
scene of attacking a city gate in a historical drama. Attackers use a 
strong log to strike hard on the city gate, the gate remains still; 
however, with more strikes going on, though the gate is still not 
opened, physically it is already gradually changing.  You shall not say 
that this change does not make any difference to the ultimate conquest 




4.4 Concluding Remarks   
The events in the field of environmental information disclosure have shown that the 
changes in the legal system have shaped and disseminated a new concept of access 
to government information in Chinese society.  This has changed not only the 
individuals and entities in the social field, but has also affected the policy field of 
environmental administration and environmental decision making.  In spite of the 
fact that it is still not easy for the public to obtain environmental information 
through disclosure requests, legal mobilization in the field has nevertheless 
strengthened the public’s environmental awareness, made government agencies act 
more responsibly, and helped to nurture social and political change.  Moreover, 
during this process, empowered by law, the public has been gaining more capacities 
to interact with government agencies.  This has successfully made citizens’ requests 
                                               





for information disclosure beyond their end goal of obtaining the information per se; 
instead, the legal mobilization of environmental information disclosure requests 
turns the requesters into “both sites and agents of political change”.
627
  This has 
made the action of environmental information disclosure requesting more significant 
and thus deserves careful scrutiny and better understanding.  
Besides the interaction between the public and the government agencies, 
environmental information disclosure requesting has also lead to interactions 
between the public and the judicial system.  If citizens and organizations fail to get 
information disclosed through their requests, they can apply for administrative 
reconsideration to a competent higher-level government agency or they can bring an 
administrative lawsuit before the Chinese court.  Focusing on administrative 
litigation, the next chapter aims to find out why citizens and entities take cases to 
court and what changes such administrative litigation has brought to the legal system 
in China.   
 
                                               





5 ADDRESSING FAILURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE THROUGH 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS 
In the previous chapter, legal mobilization in open environmental information is 
generally reflected in the interactions between the public and government agencies.  
Despite the obstacles and impediments to obtaining information through disclosure 
requests, individuals and entities have been actively using the new channel of 
information disclosure for various purposes and with different tactics, based on law.  
This has been forcing government agencies to take open government information 
more seriously and has also raised more public consciousness on environmental 
issues.  
This chapter focuses on the narrowest sense of legal mobilization−“high-profile 
litigation efforts” for social change.
628
  Specifically, how has administrative 
litigation been developing in redressing failures of access to environmental 
information in China?  Instead of emphasizing the end result of winning or losing 
the case, I argue that it is the process of administrative litigation itself that matters.  
To put it another way, regardless of whether the plaintiff wins the case or not, the 
process of taking the legal action plays its role in creating changes in social, legal 
and political aspects.  The process of litigation has been forming a “reversed 
pressure” (倒逼), or a repercussion, on government agencies to take information 
disclosure seriously.  
This chapter first gives a general review of the administrative lawsuits concerning 
environmental information disclosures, the results of these lawsuits, and the 
composition of the plaintiffs.  Second, it discusses the actors, including plaintiffs 
and lawyers, their aims and tactics for taking the legal procedure of administrative 
litigation.  Third, it further analyses what changes administrative lawsuits have 
brought about. Lastly, it concludes that although visible progress has occurred along 
with the development of administrative litigation related to environmental 
                                               





information disclosure, the constraints of the legal system have impeded Chinese 
courts in being a strong pillar in pushing forward open environmental information 
through adjudicating administrative cases.     
5.1 An Overview of Environmental Information Disclosure Related 
Administrative Litigation  
Administrative litigation is not the only way to redress a failure of environmental 
information disclosure upon request.  Generally, there are three ways to redress 
failures of access to environmental information: to report to a higher-level 
administrative agency (举报 ), administrative reconsideration (行政复议 ) and 
administrative litigation ( 行政诉讼 ).  Specifically, legal persons and other 
organizations have the right to report or inform
629
 a superior administrative organ 
( 行政机关 ), supervisory organ ( 监察机关 ) or the competent government 
department (主管部门) if they consider an administrative agency fails to fulfil its 
obligation to disclose information according to law.  Citizens, legal persons and 
other organizations can also apply for administrative reconsideration before a 
competent administrative organ or bring an administrative lawsuit before a court if 
they believe that a specific administrative act committed by an administrative 
agency in carrying out government information disclosure work has infringed their 
legal rights and interests.
630
  Both reporting and administrative reconsideration are 
                                               






approaches within the administrative system;
631
 administrative litigation is within 
the judicial system.  
Chinese courts in administrative lawsuits are only concerned with the legality, but 
not the merits of reasonableness of the administrative actions being challenged by 
the plaintiffs.
632
  Nevertheless, through administrative litigation, the courts can 
exercise its authority of rectifying wrong doings of administrative agencies, and thus 
affecting the relationship between the public and the government as well.  As the 
last resort of redressing failures in accessing government information, administrative 
litigation plays an important role in safeguarding the realization of access to 
information. 
5.1.1 Result of the Lawsuits 
In the 28 cases collected by the author, 10 resulted in attempts to use administrative 
litigation.  Among them, seven were brought up by individuals and three by ENGOs.  
Four other lawsuits were initiated by the Impact Law Firm during its process of 
conducting a survey.  In total, 14 administrative lawsuits are documented and form 
the basis for the study in this chapter.  
 
  
                                               
631
 Reporting to superior government agencies and taking up administrative reconsiderations have also been 
used by both individuals and entities in the cases collected by the author, for instance, Yan Yiming reported to 
the MEP about his request to local EPDs for information disclosure of polluting enterprises.  (See, Ershiyi 
shiji jingji baodao, 4 November 2009) Impact Law Firm concludes in its report that administrative 
reconsideration plays an effective role in making government agencies to respond to information disclosure 
requests. In total 63 out of 80 government agencies responded to Impact’s environmental information 
disclosure requests, among them, 32 reacted after Impact Law Firm filed administrative reconsideration.  In 
total, Impact Law Firm filed 41 administrative reconsideration applications.  The Impact Law Firm concludes 
that administrative reconsideration is one effective remedy for environmental information disclosure failures, 
and it appears that higher-level authority’s supervision is one factor that administrative agencies consider the 
most important.  (Impact Law Firm 2012 Report, 2, 6, 13) Friends of Nature and Green Beagle also applied 
for administrative reconsideration to redress their failures in obtaining environmental information through 
disclosure requests. Both did not get any response from the respective government agency. This makes it thus 
difficult to say whether administrative reconsideration is always effective. In fact in 2012, when Green Beagle 
failed to get the PCBs-containing wastes information from the MEP, it was recommended by Friends of 
Nature that an administrative litigation instead of administrative reconsideration should be taken. Interview 
with NGO officer, 9 June 2012. 





Table 5-1 List of information disclosure administrative lawsuits 
Case 
No. 












Bao Steel Plant approval 





10 Sun Nong Zhuhai EPB Used battery disposal 
information 
2009 dismiss 
14 Xu Yu et 
al. 
Liaoning Chuyang 
City & Jianping 
County government 
agencies 
Water quality inspection 
report relating to 
chemical plant pollution 
2010 not accept 




26 Greenpeace Zhuzhou EPB Zhuzhou polluting 
enterprises 
2010 not accept 
9 Sun Bin Hunan EPD Neighbouring 
telecommunications base 
approval information 




12 Xie Yong Jiangsu EPD Hai'an Incinerator 
approval and inspection 
information 
2012 plaintiff win 
19 ACEF Xiuwen EPB Haoyiduo Diary Co. 
daily inspection, EIA 
report and pollutants 
emissions 
2012* plaintiff win 
23 Green 
Beagle 
MEP 2010 investigation result 
on PCBs-containing 
electrical equipment and 
waste electricity 









Anqing EPB eight types of 
information as listed in 
Art 11 of OEI Measures, 
i.e., pollutants emissions 



















Xinxiang EPB  Ditto 2012 not accept 
Note: Time is recorded as the court deciding time if the filing of the case and deciding are in different years. 





Among the 14 cases in which the information requesters used administrative 
litigation to rectify their failures in obtaining government information through 
requests, the results are roughly divided into five types: in five cases, 
reconciliation
633
 was sought and the plaintiffs withdrew the lawsuits; in three cases, 
the plaintiffs won the lawsuits; in another three, the filing of the lawsuit was not 
accepted; in two other cases, the filing was dismissed; in one case, a public hearing 
was organized and a settlement was reached between the parties.  
 
Chart 5-1 Divided results of the attempted administrative lawsuits 
 
5.1.2 The Plaintiffs  
The plaintiffs in the administrative lawsuits include individuals, organizations and a 
law firm.  Specifically, seven cases were brought by individuals including one by a 
lawyer and six by either city dwellers or villagers. Three cases were brought by 
environmental organizations, and four were filed by a law firm. 
                                               
633 Strictly speaking, mediation (调解) is not applicable to administrative lawsuits, except for administrative 
compensation cases. However, an alternative, reconciliation (和解) acts in similar way that the court acts as a 
go-between and facilitates the two parties for a settlement of the dispute until the plaintiff withdraws the 


















Most individual plaintiffs were direct victims of environmental pollution. Some 
had been persistently mobilizing the law to request government agencies to disclose 
environmental information for years, such as Huang Jianxin, Xie Yong and Xu 
Taisheng.  
Huang Jianxin is a resident of Hongqiao Village, Jinfeng County, Zhangjiagang 
City.  Huang’s house is located less than 60 meters away from Hexing Wastewater 
Treatment Plant.  The plant is in charge of waste-water treatment for Zhangjiagang 
Shazhou Textile Printing and Dyeing Import and Export Co., Ltd.  The textile 
company was expanded in 2009. Since then, Huang Jianxin and other villagers 
found that Hexing Wastewater Treatment Plant started to make a thundering noise 
and discharge foul smelling waste water and the village was filled with irritating 
chemical odours and smoke.
634
  
Worrying about the noise, waste water and waste gas affecting the villagers’ 
livelihood and their living environment, the villagers submitted an information 
request to the Zhangjiagang EPB, asking the EPB to disclose the Textile Company’s 
EIA Report.  In May 2009, the EPB replied that the project was approved by the 
Jiangsu EPD.  The Jiangsu EPD, after receiving Huang’s information request, 
replied in August that the project’s expansion EIA Report was first approved by the 
Suzhou City EPB, and their approval was based on the Suzhou EPB’s opinion.
635
  
Huang then submitted his request to the Suzhou EPB.  The Suzhou EPB replied that 
it was the Jiangsu EPD who approved the project expansion, and the Suzhou EPB 
did not have the information to disclose.
636
  Failing to obtain the information, Huang 
sued the Suzhou EPB in Suzhou Canglang District Court, claiming the Suzhou 




Similarly to Huang Jianxin, Xie Yong also failed repeatedly in obtaining 
information through disclosure requests.
638
 Although failing to obtain any 
information from several environmental protection agencies, he did not give up.  
With the help of CLAPV, Xie Yong brought his administrative lawsuit before the 
                                               
634 Zhongguo Jiangsu wang, 28 Dec 2009.  
635 Zhangjiagang is a county-level city under the jurisdiction of Suzhou city, which is under the jurisdiction of 
Jiangsu Province.  
636 Zhongguo Jiangsu wang, 28 December 2009.  
637 Ibid. Huang Jianxin v. Suzhou EPB, Suzhou City Canglang District People’s Court Administrative Ruling, 
(2009) cangxingchuzi No. 0094, 17 December 2009. 






Nanjing Intermediate Court and the filing was accepted.  In this lawsuit, Xie claimed 
that the Jiangsu EPD failed its obligation to disclose information upon request.  In 
August 2012, Xie Yong won his administrative litigation against the Jiangsu EPD.  
Xu Taisheng is a resident living in Baoshan District, Shanghai. Xu’s 
administrative litigation relates to his environmental information disclosure requests 
concerning Baosteel Group Corporation (宝钢 Baosteel), the largest state owned 
steel plant in China.
639
  Xu’s apartment is located in a residential block consisting of 
several apartment buildings within a distance of hundreds of metres from the No. 2 
steel mill, No. 3 hot rolling plant and a cold rolling plant of Baosteel.  Noise and air 
pollution caused by the plant prompted Xu Taisheng and other residents to try 
various approaches to negotiate with the plant, including sit-ins and petitions.  With 
the promulgation of the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures, Xu Taisheng felt 
that environmental information disclosure could be a new tactic for them.  In 
September 2008, four months after the new regulations came into effect, Xu 
requested that the Shanghai EPB disclose a total of 17 pieces of information about 
Bao Steel.  Fourteen of these requests resulted in the information being provided, 
and three did not.
640
  The three pieces of information that were not provided were 
the administrative reconsideration reply submitted by the Baoshan District EPB to 
the Shanghai EPB, the reply letter concerning the approval of Baosteel’s third phase 
engineering construction by SEPA, and an on-site Inspection Record of Baosteel.
641
  
In light of the non-disclosure of the three pieces of information, on 10 November 
2008 Xu sued the Shanghai EPB before Shanghai Huangpu District People’s Court.  
He brought up two claims: first, to revoke the three replies made by the Shanghai 
EPB, second, to order the Shanghai EPB to provide the information. 
All other individual plaintiffs, except the lawyer Sun Nong, were also pollution 
victims.  Sun Bin lives in an apartment which has a neighbouring apartment that 
hosts a telecommunications base, potentially creating radiation pollution.  Yang Zi 
lives in a residential complex that is affected by air pollution caused by a nearby 
incinerator.  Xu Yu and other villagers live in a village in which a chemical plant 
operates.  It appears that to obtain environmental information has been the first step 
and a common approach for citizens to fight against polluters.  
                                               
639 In 2012, Baosteel achieved steel output of 43.83 million tons and a total profit of RMB 10.4 billion, 
ranking the second among the world’s iron and steel enterprises. See, Baosteel Group Corporation official 
website, http://www.baosteel.com/group_en/contents/2880/39991.html 
640 Interview with pollution victims and information disclosure requester, 8 May 2011. 





The only exceptional plaintiff, who is not a pollution victim, is Sun Nong, a 
lawyer in Zhuhai.  Sun Nong’s environmental information disclosure request relates 
to the disposal of used batteries.  Thus, it is public-interest related.  The three 
administrative lawsuits brought up by environmental organizaitons and the four 
lawsuits by Impact Law Firm are also public-interest related.  Among all 14 cases, 
eight are public interest lawsuits.  This composition has shown that both grievances 
and public interest concerns can motivate individuals and entities to file lawsuits 
related to environmental information disclosure.   
5.1.3 Emerging Public Interest Litigation Lawyers and Law Firms 
Although it is argued by Zemans that legal mobilization study “focuses … on 
citizens rather than lawyers or judges”,
642
 it is undeniable that lawyers play critical 
roles in providing legal support to citizens.  Studying legal mobilization in various 
countries, Epp argued that lawyers play a crucial role in lawsuits, since they are 
capable of speaking for the plaintiffs in courts, contributing to the legal strategy and 
are also able to disseminate information effectively.
643
  The following discussion 
reveals that in China a group of professional lawyers with expertise and interest in 
environmental protection and environmental information disclosure have started to 
play active and crucial roles in providing support to environmental victims as well 
as environmental organizations.  
For the 14 cases discussed here, all were either brought by lawyers directly or by 
representative lawyers.  These lawyers are not only skilful in providing legal 
services; some are also enthusiastic about environmental protection and raising 
public awareness of environmental problems, such as Sun Nong and Lei Zhifeng.  In 
his information disclosure request letter, the lawyer Sun Nong addressed himself as 
a resident concerned with environmental protection (一个关注环保的市民). 644  
When he lost his lawsuit before the court in the first instance, he appealed.  In an 
interview with him, it was stated:     
无论二审结果如何，他都将动用自身的资源发动民间力量做好废
旧电池回收工作。 
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No matter what comes out after the appeal, he will use his resources to 




Clearly, the lawyer Sun Nong makes himself bear the dual role of being a lawyer 
as well as a citizen with deep concerns for environmental protection.  His 
persistence in taking up the litigation is clearly not only for the purpose of obtaining 
the information but also for a broader aim of environmental protection.     
Lei Zhifeng is not only a lawyer but also an environmental protection volunteer 
lawyer who concerns about electro-radiation pollution.  He writes in his blog about 
providing legal support to Sun Bin
646




Mr. Sun … decides to take up the legal weapon to safeguard his right. 
I am a volunteer of environmental protection who concerns about 
electro-radiation; I will continue to provide legal support to him. I 
hope more people will care about electro-radiation.
647
  
Environmental public interest lawyers have also started to get involved in 
environmental information disclosure.  For instance, Xia Jun, a lawyer from the 
Beijing Zhongzi Law Firm, has taken environmental lawsuits for more than ten 
years.
648
  He is also very active in promoting environmental information disclosure 
in China. Besides providing legal consultation to environmental organizations, such 
as Greenpeace when they sued the Zhuzhou EPB, he actively involves himself in 
participating open environmental information seminars, commenting on 
environmental lawsuits,
649
 and writing open letters to the MEP calling for public 
participation in environmental matters.
650
   
Moreover, a few law firms have started to make environmental information 
disclosure one of their focuses.  The most visible of these are the Impact Law Firm 
and CLAPV.  Naming itself “Impact”, the Impact Law Firm was established aiming 
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to take cases that would make an influential impact in pushing forward the rule of 
law in China.
651
  It provided legal support to Friends of Nature regarding their 
information disclosure about the Yangtse River upper-reach nature reserve 
readjustment and to Green Beagle in their administrative lawsuit against the MEP 
with regard to PCBs-containing equipment information disclosure.   In 2012, the 
Impact Law Firm conducted a nation-wide investigation, compiled a report based on 
its survey and shared its experiences with the public.  During the survey-related 
requests, Impact filed four administrative lawsuits: one was not accepted, two were 
withdrawn after the counter parties started to respond, and one case resulted in the 
plaintiff’s winning the lawsuit.
652
  
Established in 1998, CLAPV is the first, and in fact only, organization that 
focuses on providing free of charge legal services to pollution victims in China.  
Affiliated to the Chinese University of Political Science and Law, CLAPV has 
become a leading legal aid entity in China in taking up environmental cases. In 2005, 
CLAPV provided legal aid in Zhang Changjian et al. v. Rongping Chemical Plant, 
which resulted in the 1721 plaintiffs winning against the local chemical plant in 
Fujian Province.
653
  The case was regarded as one of the most influential lawsuits of 
2005.  Nowadays, lawyers from CLAPV have also become active in taking 
information disclosure lawsuits. Among the 14 administrative lawsuits, four were 
supported by CLAPV.
654
  Moreover, in December 2010, it was reorganized from a 
university-affiliated organization to an officially registered law firm and named 
itself Huanzhu Law Firm. “Huanzhu” (环助) in Chinese means “environmental 
support”; it has nine professional lawyers, six part-time lawyers, and a consulting 
group consisting of university professors and dozens of volunteers.
655
  Today, as a 
formal law firm, the Huanzhu Law Firm continues to provide pro bono services to 
environmental pollution victims and environmental organizations.  Professor Wang 
Canfa, the director of CLAPV and Huanzhu Law Firm speaks about information 
disclosure and the law firm: 
对于行政部门他们肯定好多时候是不愿意公开信息的 ……审批的
发了许可证的，好多是不该发的，比如批的垃圾焚烧场也许是不
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Government administrative agencies are mostly not willing to disclose 
information… some permits are granted but in fact should not be 
approved, for instance permits to some incinerators.  The higher level 
the agency is, the more it fears litigation.  Even if you fail, they feel the 
shame.  Under this situation, we shall take the maximum usage of the 
strategy of litigation.  If you cannot find lawyers, Huanzhu Law Firm 
is specially focusing on helping the common people file environmental 
lawsuits and the service is free of charge.  
We are not challenging the government. China is pushing forward a 
new mechanism.  When this cannot be done by the government on its 
own, it should still be pushed forward by the civil society.  For 
instance, the establishment of the environmental courts, public-interest 
litigation, to make rules favourable to pollution victims in the 
Environmental Law and the Water Pollution Prevention Law, were all 
initiated and pushed forward by the civil society and then accepted by 
the government after public consultation… The whole country is going 
towards rule of law, otherwise the open government information 
regulations would not come into effect… laws are to regulate 
government actions.  Rule of law government is in fact to impose 





do good deeds for the common people.  The law always supports 
government officials who work and serve the people.
656
  
Besides the support from lawyers, Chinese ENGOs are also starting to have 
in-house lawyers. Friends of Nature, the earliest environmental organization in 
China, have several in-house lawyers.  By doing this, it has become more 
professional in its legal capacity.  In-house lawyers also collaborate closely with 
external lawyers, as well as other environmental organizations.  In the case of Xie 
Yong, both Green Beagle and Friends of Nature got involved.  The lawyer from 
Friends of Nature went together with officials from Green Beagle to the village for 
onsite investigation and reporting.
657
  
5.2 Raising Public Consciousness of Environmental Protection and 
Imposing Pressure on Government Agencies  
Inevitably, a direct aim of the plaintiffs taking up administrative litigation is to 
redress their failures in obtaining environmental information through disclosure 
requests.  This applies to both private-grievance and public-interest related lawsuits.  
Nevertheless, there are also other reasons behind their filing the actions: namely to 
raise public awareness of environmental issues and put pressure on government 
agencies to administer according to the law.  It is clear that they have been using 




The lawyer Sun Nong is one of the first to take government agencies before the 
courts for failing to disclose environmental information.  In November 2008, he 
requested that the Zhuhai EPB disclose information concerning used battery disposal.  
Failing to hear from the EPB after the time limit,
659
 in February 2009 Sun sued the 
Zhuhai EPB before the Zhuhai Xiangzhou District People’s Court.
 660  
In a report, the 
journalist wrote about Sun: 
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Before bringing up the litigation, he expected that the possibility of 
winning the case was low; however, he wanted to take the action and 
to help the Zhuhai government to improve its administrative work, and 
at the same time to help strengthen the consciousness of residents for 
environmental protection.
661
   
Clearly, the lawyer Sun Nong was fully aware of the difficulties in suing 
government agencies in China and his main purpose did not really lie with winning 
the case, but in raising public awareness and creating public pressure on the 
government administration.  
The same opinion was expressed by the lawyer Lei Zhifeng, an environmentalist 
and representative lawyer of Sun Bin:  
其实不管这场官司是输是赢，我都想发出一个声音，辐射对人体
是一种可能致癌物，环保部门应该高度关注。 
It does not matter if this lawsuit will lose or win, I just want to let my 
voice be heard that radiation is a harmful substance that might cause 




On 5 March 2009, the lawyer Lei Zhifeng received the written reply with regard 







The written reply from the provincial EPD after entering the legal 
procedure of litigation at least proves the following facts: first, the 
tens of thousands of bases do not all go through the procedure of 
environmental impact assessment one by one, several thousands of 
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bases have one; second, regarding the Yuyuan base [in Sun’s 
neighbouring apartment], it has been operating for five years but did 
not get an approval inspection until now.  This was guessed by us 
before filing the case.  However, without using litigation to create 
reversed pressure, this written reply that makes the environmental 




The tactic of using administrative litigation as a strategy to “create reversed 
pressure” on government agencies to respond to information disclosure requests has 
been taken by Greenpeace as well.     
To test to what extent environmental information disclosure can be pushed 
forward in China, Greenpeace submitted a total of six information disclosure 
requests towards the Zhuzhou EPB in mid-December 2009.
664
  Failing to get the 
information requested from the Zhuzhou EPB, and in order to put some pressure 
upon the Zhuzhou EPB,
665
 Greenpeace sued the EPB before Zhuzhou Intermediate 
People’s Court on 12 April 2010.  While the acceptance of the case was still pending, 
the Zhuzhou EPB replied to Greenpeace by fax on 13 May 2010 and provided 
corresponding answers respectively concerning all six environmental information 
requests.
666
  Although the reply did not provide the information Greenpeace 
requested to be disclosed, it seems that the filing of administrative litigation at least 
imposed pressure upon the EPB to respond.  
In early 2012, Green Beagle requested that the MEP disclose its report about an 
investigation with regard to PCBs-containing electrical equipment and waste in eight 
key provinces.
667
  The MEP replied that the information could not be disclosed 
based on the SC Normative Document that it was in-process information. Green 
Beagle sued the MEP before Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court.  The lawyer 
Li Juan, from the Beijing-based Impact Law Firm, was their representative lawyer.  
With regard to the filing of the case, Li Juan explains that:  
                                               
663 Lei Zhifeng blog, 8 March 2012. 
664 Greenpeace, Information disclosure requests submitted to Zhuzhou EPB, 16 December 2009. 
665 Interview with NGO officer, 2 August 2010.  
666 Zhuzhou EPB, Reply concerning Greenpeace’s environmental information disclosure request, 13 May 
2010.  
667 Green Beagle has been paying continuous attention to PCBs-containing wastes for the past few years. This 
request is only part of their endeavour to push Chinese government to fulfil its international obligation under 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) China signed in 2001; please see, Chapter 







We are not challenging the MEP; we do not file the litigation to make 




In fact, Green Beagle did achieve its aim of getting the information disclosed 
through filing this administrative lawsuit.  After their filing of the case, Li Juan 
exchanged several telephone communications with the Intermediate Court and later 
the Intermediate Court arranged a reconciliation meeting between Green Beagle and 
the MEP.  The MEP explained that the investigation was an experimental 
investigation and the results were not suitable for disclosure.  Nevertheless, the MEP 
provided two tables of PCBs-related localities to Green Beagle.
669
  
Disregarding the result of winning or losing, with the persistence of plaintiffs and 
professional support, it is clear that in China administrative litigation plays a role of 








Under the situation that the government does not provide the 
information on its own initiative, lawsuit undoubtedly becomes the best 
channel for citizens to safeguard their right to information, to monitor 
and push government information disclosure.  With regard to the 
judicialization of government information disclosure, the most 
important function of the [OGI] Regulations is not the detailed list of 
“information to be disclosed” or “not to be disclosed”, but “the right 
to information” granted for the 1.3 billion citizens who can seek 
judicial relief, the obligation of all levels of governments to disclose 
information under judicial monitoring, and the power of the court to 
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Inevitably, Chinese courts cannot create “reversed pressure” upon government 
agencies without the public’s taking the cases to the courts.  In other words, it is the 
public activism in launching the litigation that has created the possibilities of judicial 
pressure upon the administrative agencies.  Moreover, administrative litigation has 
also helped creating new legal opportunities and thus gaining more ground for the 
public to take the issue of environmental disclosure to court in the future.   
5.3 The Shaping of the Legal Opportunity Structure 
On the one hand, the law provides opportunities for the public to take legal actions.  
On the other hand and most of all, citizen actions are “to an extent able to shape and 
create legal opportunities rather than always being shaped by them as structural 
accounts might imply”.
671  
Generally, the legal opportunity structure refers to “the 
degree of openness or accessibility of a legal system to the social and political goals 
and tactics of individuals and/or collective actors”.
672
  However, this degree of 
openness and accessibility is not always unchangeable.  It can be changed by new 
legislation or restructuring the legal system, for instance, establishing new 
specialised courts that focus on environmental protection
673  
to provide more legal 
opportunities for ENGOs.  It can also be changed through the external pressures of 
public opinion or litigation activism.  Though still limited in size and capacity, a 
community consisting of individuals, lawyers, and organizations with a common 
aim of making the maximum use of the new mechanism of open environmental 
information has been emerging in China.  With the continuous effort of all actors 
approaching the court through administrative litigation, changes have been 
happening with both procedural requirements and substantive issues about open 
environmental information administrative litigation. 
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5.3.1 Cracking of the Gate-keeper of the Filing Division 
In China, in order for a case to be accepted by a trial division of a court it needs to 
go through the gate-keeping procedure of being accepted and docked by the case 
filing division.  It is not rare that lawyers cannot get their administrative cases 
accepted at this stage due to the courts’ reluctance to accept cases against 
government entities, particularly in politically sensitive cases.
674
  This rejection of 
lawsuits directly deprives plaintiffs of their right to the procedural and substantive 
due process of law.
675
  
It is argued that the rejection of cases is due to the fact that local courts do not 
want to affect their relationship with the local governments.
676
  Although vertically 
under the leadership of higher-level courts, local courts depend upon the local 
government for staff appointments, salaries, and even welfare.
677
  In the words of 
one villager, “the court and the government are one family.”
678
  Environmental 
information is likely to concern local enterprises who are tax-payers and GDP 
contributors to the local government.  This existence of the mutually-dependent 
relationship among the courts, local government, and local enterprises, makes 
environmental information disclosure lawsuits also complicated and sensitive.
679
 
One environmental lawyer says: 
行政诉讼最难的，不用说能不能打赢，最难的是不能立案。 
The most difficult issue with regard to administrative litigation, not 
mentioning whether the plaintiff can win the case, lies in whether the 
case can be accepted. 
680
  
In Jianping County, Liaoning Province (辽宁省建平市), since a chemical plant 
started to operate, several incidents of students being poisoned occurred.  While 
villagers worried that it was due to the environmental pollution caused by the plant, 
the local government argued that it was because the students drank unfiltered water.  
Villagers thus wanted to know the truth and requested for the disclosure of the water 
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inspection report, but they failed.
681
  When the villagers sued the local government 
agencies before the Jianping People’s Court, the court did not accept the case.  In 
August 2010, noticing that the Supreme People’s Court had started to inspect 
non-acceptance of administrative lawsuits, Xu Yu and other villagers went to 
Beijing to report their case.  They were taken and sent back by local public security 
officials and punished with 10 days of administrative detention.
682
  They 
nevertheless did not give up and again tried to sue various government agencies for 
failing to provide them with the water quality report.  According to the Intermediate 
Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court on Case Filing, administrative lawsuits 
shall be decided for acceptance or rejection with a decision within seven days after 
the complaint was received.
683
  However, in practice it is not rare that Chinese courts 
refuse to accept lawsuits without providing written decisions. Xu Yu’s case was 
neither accepted nor rejected with a written decision.  When Xu Yu and the villagers 
inquired why the case could not be accepted, the Chief Judge of the Administrative 
Tribunal of Jianping County Court said: 
告公安局的官司，上级有精神，不让立。 
Litigation against the Public Security Bureau, the upper leaders 
instructed, cannot be accepted.
 684
 
When they inquired why their claim against the Public Health Bureau was also 
not accepted, the Chief Judge answered:  
这是院长决定的.  
This is decided by the president of the court. 
685
 
Regardless of the difficulties in getting actions accepted by the courts, individuals, 
environmental organizations, and law firms nevertheless do not give up; instead, 
different strategies are applied in order to pass the threshold of getting their cases 
accepted.  Multiple filing and being persistent are strategies that plaintiffs and their 
lawyers have often pursued.  Before Huang Jianxin’s lawsuit was accepted by the 
Suzhou Canglang district court, he took his litigation before several other courts in 
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In another well-known environmental information disclosure case, the plaintiff 
Xu Taisheng spent two and half years suing the local EPBs in Shanghai for their 
refusal to disclose inspection statistics concerning Bao Steel.  Xu received a total of 
12 judgments and decisions from local courts at different levels in Shanghai, none of 
which supported his claim; Xu finally got the information through the alternative 
approach of a public hearing.
687 
 
To use all possible approaches with sustained effort to create pressure is likely to 
help plaintiffs conquer resistance.  While acknowledging that “it is difficult to get a 
case filing accepted by the court” (起诉,存在立案难的问题), 688  Impact Law Firm 




（行政庭和立案庭相距大约 10 公里）。 最后立案。 
起诉青岛市环保局：2012 年 4 月 12 日，我们将起诉状等材料寄







For instance, when we sued the Shijiazhuang EPB, we got so much 
trouble.  Back and forth, we contacted the director of the filing 
division, the director of the administrative litigation division, the vice-
director of the court.  We also called the hotline of the city mayor and 
the monitoring telephone of the Political-Legal Committee of 
Shijiazhuang City.  We paid five to six return visits between the 
administrative litigation division and the filing division (the distance 
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between the two offices is 10km).  Finally we got the lawsuit accepted 
by the court. 
Suing Qingdao EPB: on 12 April 2012, we sent our filing documents to 
Qingdao Shinan District Court.  The documents were received on 13 
April 2013 at 15:29. Seven days later, we did not hear anything from 
the court. According to Article 32, item 3 of the Supreme People’s 
Court Judicial Interpretation on Several Issues of Implementing the 
Administrative Litigation Law of People's Republic of China, if a court 
does not accept a case within seven days and does not make a decision 
upon it either, the plaintiff can appeal to the court at the next higher 
level.  Thus we sent our appealing materials to Qingdao Intermediate 
People’s Court.  Soon after Qingdao Intermediate Court received our 
appealing documents, Shinan District Court informed us to pay the 
filing fee and the filing was accepted.
689
  
Instead of passively waiting for the result, plaintiffs often choose to actively 
communicate with the courts, if possible, after they file the actions.  For instance, 
after Green Beagle sued the MEP before the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court, 
their representative lawyer, Li Juan of Impact Law Firm, took the initiative and 
called to exchange communications with the court several times.  It is clear that on 
the plaintiffs’ part, individuals, organizations and their lawyers have been more and 
more active in taking positive actions to push the courts to act according to law and 
to accept the lawsuits.  This has further created opportunities for the courts to issue 
decisions to clarify both procedural and substantive issues with regard to open 
environmental information administrative litigation.  
5.3.2 Clarifying the Scope of Legal Standing   
Even if an action of filing a litigation is accepted, it does not mean that the case will 
go into the trial process to be adjudicated substantively whether the administrative 
agency has violated the law or not.  The lawsuit can still be dismissed (驳回起诉) 
by a court ruling for lacking in legal standing: that is, that the plaintiff does not have 
                                               





the right to sue the defendant. This can be related to either procedural issues or 
substantive factors.  
Among the six lawsuits filed before 2011, two were not accepted, and four were 
dismissed.  In 2012, among the eight cases filed (including the ACEF lawsuit filed 
in 2011 but decided in 2012), three resulted in the plaintiffs’ winning the lawsuits, 
four were withdrawn after the defendants reacted, and only one was not accepted.  It 
appears that more and more lawsuits are being launched and some are also bringing 
positive end results.  
In China, according to the Administrative Litigation Law (AL Law) and its 
Judicial Interpretation, administrative litigation can be brought by citizens, legal 
persons or other entities against specific administrative actions that have infringed 
their lawful rights and interests.
 690 
 Citizens, legal persons and other organizations 
can lodge “an administrative lawsuit if they believe that a specific administrative act 
committed by an administrative organ in carrying out government information 
disclosure work has infringed their lawful rights and interests”.
691
  Here, “specific 
administrative action”
692
 relates to the scope of acceptance, while “citizens, legal 
persons, or other organizations who think their rights and interests are infringed” 
relates to the issue of who has the legal standing.
693
  Moreover, to fulfil the legal 
standing in an administrative litigation, the plaintiff must also have “a causal 
relationship in law with the specific administrative act”.
694
  With regard to the legal 
standing of administrative litigation about environmental information disclosure, the 
most problematic factor is the requirement of “causal relationship in law”.  
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Between 2009 and 2010, a very strict interpretation of the “causal relationship in 
law” was applied in dismissing legal actions.  In 2009, in Sun Nong v. Zhuhai EPB, 
the action was dismissed based on the reasoning that there was a lack of causal 
















Sun Nong stated in his administrative litigation complaint and his 
statement in court:  the Zhuhai EPB should have disclosed the 
information of pollution prevention and management about solid 
wastes including used batteries, and toxic chemical wastes on its own 
initiative; however it did not disclose it, and also refused to reply 
[upon citizen request], constituting a failure of fulfilling its legal 
obligation.  Based on this, the reason for Sun Nong to sue is because 
he considered that Zhuhai EPB did not fulfill its government 
information disclsoure obligation, which did not belong to the scope of 
government information disclosure upon request according to Article 
13 of the OGI Regulations.  The government information requested for 
disclosure by the appellant Sun Nong does not meet the “special 
requirements of production, living, scientific research etc.” for the 
appellant Sun Nong.  This case belongs to public interest litigation.  
The non-disclosure of government information by Zhuhai EPB does 





current applicable Administrative Litigation Law and its judicial 
interpretations do not have rules regulating citizen filing public 
interest litigation.  Based on the above reasoning, our court considers 
that the appelant Sun Nong does not have a causal relationship based 
on law and he does not have a legal standing to be the plaintiff in this 
case, his claim is dimissed.
695
  
More problematically, in practice a causal relationship is not only interpreted as 
the special needs of livelihood, production or scientific research.  In Yang Zi v. 
Beijing EPB,
696
 the causal relationship was applied differently, but it still excluded 
the plaintiff for having no legal standing.  
Yang Zi’s lawsuit was related to an environmental information disclosure 
concerning the Gao’antun Incinerator in Beijing.  In recent years, China has been 
building more incinerators in order to solve the increasing problem of household and 
other waste; concurrently, the opposition voice against incinerators has also been 
increasing.
697
  In 2008 several large-scale mass incidents against incinerators 
occurred in Beijing around the time when Beijing Olympic Games was held. Some 
of the demonstrations were against the Gao’antun Incinerator, which at that time 
emitted an unbearable odour that made it difficult for residents to breathe, or even 
caused them to fall ill.
698
 
Against this background, on 9 November 2009, Yang Zi, a resident who lived 
near Gao’antun Incinerator in Beijing, submitted an information disclosure request 
to the Beijing EPB.  She asked the Beijing EPB to disclose two types of information: 
the legal basis that the Beijing EPB applied to issue a temporary permit for the 
Gao’antun incinerator to operate; and the inspection statistics provided for its permit 
renewal and the number of inspections since the incinerator first gained its 
temporary permit in March 2006.  The Beijing EPB did not provide the statistics to 
Yang.  On 7 January 2010, Yang submitted her information disclosure request for 
the second time.  The Beijing EPB still did not reply to her, as of 23 February.  Yang 
therefore sued the Beijing EPB before the Haidian District Court.
 699
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The Haidian District Court dismissed Yang’s lawsuit based on the requirement of 
causal relationship.  The ruling stated that, according to the Medical Waste 
Management Regulations, a medical waste incinerator should be located at a 
distance of more than 800 meters from residential areas, water resources, main 
traffic paths, factories, and enterprises.
700
  Since Yang lived about 2.5 kilometres 
away from the Gao’antun incinerator, the EPB’s reply did not have “specific impact” 
(具体影响) upon Yang’s rights and duties, and therefore there was no causal 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant’s act.
701
  Yang appealed, but lost 









Yang Zi acknowledged that she lives more than 2.5km away from 
Gao’antun Medical Incinerator, and this distance is far more than the 
requirement of 800 metres.  Moreover, Yang Zi did not prove that her 
right and obligation were affected.  Thus, whether the city EPB 
fulfilled its obligation of replying or how the city EPB replied does not 
have any actual impact upon Yang Zi.  The court of first instance 
judged that Yang Zi did not have the legal standing as the plaintiff to 
bring up the litigation and dismissed her lawsuit. This court should 
uphold it.  The appellant’s appeal lacks factual and legal basis, her 
appeal is not sustained by this court.
702
  
The main problem with the ruling is that the court applied laws regulating 
management of incinerators to the relationships between incinerators and residents 
who might be affected by the operation of incinerators.  From a reasonable person’s 
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point of view, anyone whose livelihood is affected by the incinerator should have 
the right to request information disclosure.
 703
  Although it is argued that if anyone 
with a right to information is affected by the administrative act, there shall be a 
causal relationship between the person and the administrative act,
704
 legal practice in 
this case has shown that local courts are still applying a very restrictive 
interpretation on the causal relationship between the administrative act of disclosing 
environmental information and the information disclosure requester, namely the 
plaintiff in administrative litigation.  This case clearly corresponds with Chen 
Yongxi’s argument that the Chinese court did not acknowledge citizens’ right to 
information as an independent legal right, but related it to their personal rights and 
property rights, and in China the right to information is still not regarded as a right 
to monitor the government and to promote public participation.
705
  
A comment on Yang’s case summarized the current situation concerning 
environmental information disclosure well:  
公民环境维权的最大困境，恰缘于政府执法的偏私以及司法矫正
的无力。 
the biggest obstacle to safeguarding citizens’ environmental rights is 
the biased implementation of laws by government agencies, and the 
failure of judiciary in rectifying the situation.
706
  
In 2010, Greenpeace sued the Zhuzhou EPB for its failure to disclose information 
as requested.  According to Xia Jun, the representative lawyer of Greenpeace, the 
court did not give any clear written reply for whether the filing was accepted or not; 
however, in phone communications between the lawyer and the judge, it was also 




This strict application of the legal standing posed a concern for lawyers and 
ENGOs about using administrative litigation.  In late April 2011, at the seminar of 
the three years of implementation of the OEI Measures, on Friends of Nature’s using 
administrative reconsideration instead of administrative litigation to redress the 
                                               
703 Email discussion with lawyer, 30 July 2010. 
704 Interview with NGO officer, 2 August 2010. See also, Jiang Bixin & Li Guangyu 2009, 14-15. 
705 Chen Yongxi 2011. 
706 Renmin wang, 23 May 2010.   
707  Xia Jun, comment, Friends of Nature Open Environmental Information Three Years Implementation 





non-disclosure of the information about Yangtse River upper-reach nature reserve 








When Friends of Nature consulted me about the information disclosure 
about the Yangtse River Upper Reaches Endemic Fish Nature Reserve 
readjustment, I thought the biggest risk is not losing the lawsuit.  If the 
court issues an administrative judgment and Friends of Nature loses 
the case, this is not the worst.  The worst result is if the court decides 
the same as it decides in Yang Zi’s lawsuit that there is no causal 
relationship and you do not have the legal standing in the 
administrative litigation.  This would not only affect this single case, 
but also the future lawsuits brought by environmental organizations.  
This would block the path of environmental organizations in 
monitoring the government to administer according to law. It would 
not be good indeed.
708
  
The comment of Xia Jun shows that until mid-2011, it was unclear whether 
environmental organizations would be granted access in bringing information 
disclosure administrative lawsuits.   It also shows that lawyers and organizations 
were very concerned about the potential negative effects of any formal legal action.   
Nevertheless, a few months later, on 12 December 2011, the first 
organization-initiated environmental information disclosure lawsuit was accepted by 
Qingzhen Environmental Court.  The lawsuit was regarded as a landmark for the 
formal launching of environmental information disclosure public interest litigation 
in China.
709
  The plaintiff in this case was the All China Environmental Federation 
(ACEF).  In China, organizations can be divided into two general categories: NGOs 
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and Government organized NGOs (GONGOs).
 710
  The latter ones refer to “the 
multitude of organizations that … created at various administrative levels by and in 
support of the [the Chinese Communist] Party and state”.
711
  ACEF is a GONGO, 
directly under the supervision of the MEP.  
In October 2011, ACEF sued a milk company for causing water pollution. In 
order to seek supporting evidence, it requested that the Xiuwen City EPB disclose 
related information concerning the milk company, but the request failed.
712
  Thus, 
ACEF sued the EPB before the court.
713
  In January 2012, the plaintiff ACEF won 
the case and the court ordered the defendant, the Xiuwen City EPB, to provide the 
requested information to the plaintiff.
714
   
Although this lawsuit is special in that the plaintiff is a GONGO, it creates a 
landmark case in China at least in two respects.  First, it confirms that it is too 
restrictive to state that AL Law does not apply to public interest litigation, as 
occurred in Sun Nong v. Zhuhai EPB.  Second, it sets up an example that besides 
individuals, other entities, including NGOs, can also bring environmental 
information administrative litigation before the court.  In fact, a few months after 
ACEF won its lawsuit, Green Beagle failed in obtaining the PCBs-containing 
equipment information.  Green Beagle consulted Friends of Nature for the follow-up 
to rectify their failures and was recommended to take administrative litigation 
instead of administrative reconsideration.
715
  This shows clearly that the judgment of 
ACEF v. Xiuwen EPB made environmental organizations shift from being cautious 
to confident in suing government agencies before the court.   
Following ACEF v. Xiuwen EPD, a positive change also occurred in Yu v. Anqing 
EPB.  Yu is an employee of the Impact Law Firm and her information disclosure 
belonged to the survey conducted by the Impact Law Firm.  In January 2012 Yu, a 
Beijing resident, requested that the Anqing EPB in Anhui Province disclose 
information concerning the monitoring of polluting enterprises in Anqing City, but 
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failed.  Yu sued the Anqing EPB before the Anqing Yingjiang District Court.  The 
court accepted the litigation and judged that 
依法公开政府环境信息是被告的职责所在。  
To disclose government environmental information is the obligation 
and responsibility of the defendant.
 716
   
It judged that Anqing EPB violated the law and should provide the information as 
requested within 10 days after the court judgment.
717
  
In Yu v. Anqing EPB, the Anqing Court did not discuss any other requirement 
concerning whether the plaintiff had a legal standing in the administrative lawsuit; 
nevertheless on the other hand, it shows that the court did not dispute for the legal 
standing of the Beijing resident Yu in the information disclosure request submitted 
to a city EPB in Anhui Province.     
It is difficult to say whether, compared to Sun Nong and Yang Zi, Yu as a Beijing 
resident has a closer causal relationship with the information disclosure from the 
Anqing EPB in Anhui Province: while Sun’s request relates to where residents 
dispose of used batteries, Yang lives in a residential area affected by the air 
pollution caused by the incinerator.  Nevertheless, this court judgment constitutes a 
change in open environmental information administrative litigation that allows both 
a broad legal standing for the plaintiff.   
5.3.3 Access to Information as a Legal Right  
Besides the broadening of the legal standing in administrative litigation, some 
lawsuits have also started to cause the courts give further interpretation to a few 
other issues with regard to environmental information disclosure.  
Both the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures do not stipulate clearly whether 
access to government information is a right to information.  It has been argued by 
scholars that lawful rights and lawful obligations can be either explicit or implicit in 
laws and regulations.
718
  The OGI Regulations do not explicitly stipulate the right to 
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information.  Nevertheless, it clearly states that its aim is “to guarantee citizens, 
legal persons and other organizations obtain government information according to 
law”.
719
  This is regarded as an implied access to government information as a 
lawful right.
720
  Compared to the OGI Regulations, the OEI Measures are more 
explicit, stating that the Measures are to “safeguard citizens, legal persons and other 
organizations’ rights and interests to obtain environmental information”.
721
  In other 
words, to obtain environmental information is the lawful right and interest of the 
concerned party under the OEI Measures.
722
  
Although the lawyer Sun Nong’s legal action was dismissed based on the lack of 
a causal relationship, the court’s decision confirmed that he had a legal right to 




The OGI Regulations explicitly stipulate that citizens have the right to 
obtain government information according to law. This refers to the 
right to information, which belonged to the scope of legal rights and 
interests of the citizens, legal persons and other organizations that 
shall be protected by the Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC.
723
  
This confirms the scholarly discourse that legal rights and interests that are 
alleged to be infringed by administrative actions clearly do not only refer to the 
rights of the person or of property–for instance personal freedom, or loss of 
property–but also include other lawful rights and interests.
724
  Accessing to 
environmental information as a legal right has also been endorsed in ACEF v. 
Xiuwen EPB, and Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPB. 
In ACEF v. Xiuwen EPB, the court affirmed that to obtain environmental 
information was an important right for citizens, legal persons, and other 
organizations, and it was an important approach for the public to participate in 
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environmental protection and monitor the implementation of environmental 




Our court considers that to obtain environmental information 
according to law is a very important right for citizens, legal persons 
and other organizations.  It is a very important means for the public to 
participate in environmental protection and to monitor the 
implementation of environmental laws. 
725
 
In Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPB, the court first confirmed clearly that administrative 
agencies “shall bear the legal obligation to disclose environmental information（有
公开相关信息的法定职责）”. 726   This is the same as in Yu v. Anqing EPB. 
Moreover, it also stated that  
原告谢勇依法要求获取相关环境保护信息的知情权益，应当得到
维护和支持。  
The plaintiff Xie Yong requested for the relevant environmental 
protection information according to law.  This is his right and interest 
to information and shall be safeguarded and supported. 
727
 
The three court judgments in 2012 have further confirmed that on the one hand, 
government agencies have the obligation to disclose environmental information, and 
on the other hand, the public has the legal right to access environmental information.  
5.3.4 From the Scope of Environmental Information Disclosure to the Means 
of Disclosure 
Court judgments have also helped to clarify other issues with regard to open 
environmental information, specifically, the scope of environmental information 
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disclosure, requirements for information disclosure requests submitting, government 
obligation in dealing with disclosure requests, and the means of disclosure.   
In ACEF v. Xiuwen EPB, the court stated that the principle for environmental 
information disclosure is to disclose as the principle, not to disclose as the exception, 







 To disclose environmental information shall be regarded as the 
principle and not to disclose as the exception.  The plaintiff ACEF 
submitted its written request by courier and also stated the name and 
contact of the requester, content of information, and the way the 
information be provided, in the request.  The content of the 
information requested for disclosure does not concern state secret, 
business secret and individual privacy, and it belongs to the scope of 




This understanding of the scope of information to be disclosed was also taken by 
the court in Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPB.  The court stated that  
被告在答复中认为上述信息为内部管理信息，其拒绝公开的理由
不符合《信息公开条例》第十四条的规定，缺乏法律依据。 
the reply by the defendant that the materials are internal management 
information and shall not be disclosed does not comply with Article 14 
of the OGI Regulations.
729 
 
This plays a same function as the judgment of ACEF v. Xiuwen EPB to further 
confirm that the exceptions of disclosure shall be based on Article 14 that only 
information concern state secret, business secret and individual privacy shall not be 
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disclosed. It thus excludes state security as one type of disclosure exception, but 
shall only be regarded as balancing element for discretion. 
In Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPD, the scope of information disclosure, particularly 
with regard to Article 17 of the OGI Regulations, has also been clarified.  Article 17 
of the OGI Regulations stipulates:  
Administrative agencies shall be responsible for disclosing 
government information that they have made. Administrative agencies 
that store government information obtained from citizens, legal 
persons or other organizations shall be responsible for disclosing it.  If 
laws or regulations have different provisions on the scope of 




In 2008, the Shanghai Huangpu District Court dismissed Shanghai resident Xu 
Taisheng’s claims based on Article 17 of the OGI Regulations and Article 14 of 
Shanghai Open Government Information Rules (上海市政府信息公开规定).731  
The major argument was that an administrative agency should disclose information 
made or compiled by itself.  If the information was compiled by other government 
administrative agencies, in Xu Taisheng’s case, SEPA and the Baoshan EPB in 
Shanghai respectively, it did not fall into the scope of the disclosure responsibility of 
the defendant, the Shanghai EPB.
732
  This judgment was later upheld by the second 
instance court of Shanghai No.2 Intermediate people’s Court.
733
  Although Xu later 
got the information after a hearing, the court’s interpretation of Article 17 limited 
the scope of information to be disclosed by government agencies to a large extent.  
A different court opinion was given more than three years later in August 2012 in 
Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPD.  The Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court stated that: 
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When an administrative permit is completed, documents submitted by 
applicants become materials of the administrative approval process, 
and shall be disclosed.  According to Article 2 of the OGI Regulations, 
information made or obtained during its administration belongs to the 
scope of information that shall be disclosed ... The Level A temporary 
permit, pre-evaluation opinion, project introduction, operation 
contract and inspection reports, are all related materials made and 
obtained by the defendant during its pre-assessment process.  The 
defendant bears the obligation to disclose them. 
734
  
This court judgment clarifies that government agencies are not only responsible 
to disclose information made by them but also responsible to disclose information 
that obtained during their administration.  This shows stark contrast to the 
obfuscated application made by the Shanghai Huangpu People’s Court and Shanghai 
No. 2 Intermediate people’s Court in dismissing Xu Taisheng’s claims that a 
government agency is only responsible for disclosing information made or compiled 
by the agency itself but not information obtained from other places.  
Besides the scope of information to be disclosed, requirements can be imposed 
upon the public for submitting information disclosure requests by government 
agencies have also been clarified though administrative litigation.  Basically, 
government agencies shall not ask requesters to present their identification 
certificates as long as they provide name and contact information. In ACEF v. 
Xiuwen EPB, the court stated that:  
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As to the plaintiff shall provide a certificate to prove its identification 
together with its submitting the government information disclosure 
[required by the defendant], our court considers that the plaintiff 
already filled its name, address, contact person and telephone number 
in request table with its entity stamp.  According to Article 20 of the 
OGI Regulations, government information disclosure request shall 
include (1) name and contact of the requester; (2) description of the 
information requested for disclosure; (3)  the method of disclosure.  
There is no requirement about the requester must provide 




This court judgment also clarifies that government agencies shall not reject 
unclear request but rather bear the obligation to ask the requester to give further 
clarification, and government agencies shall try its best to disclose the information 
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As to the defendant’s argument that Haoyiduo Company has three 
branches in Xiuwen county and the plaintiff did not clarify the 
information concerned which branch thus constituted unclear 
information disclosure request, our court considers, that according to 
Article 21 of the OGI Regulations, with regard to request that is 
unclear, the government agency shall notify the requester to amend 
and clarify with additional information.  In this case, the plaintiff 
already gave a clear request that it needed the information of 
Pollutants Emission Permit, the number of pollutants emission exits 
and their localities, the types and volume of pollutants emitted, the 
pollutant emission charge standard, the situation of environmental 
monitoring and inspection and environmental penalties, the EIA 
reports and its approval documents.  The plaintiff’s request is clear 
and substantive. As to [the fact that] there are a few branches of 
Haoyiduo Company does not affect the defendant’s disclosing the 
information.  The defendant shall disclose the information that is 
within its knowledge of the Haoyiduo Company. 
736
  
Furthermore, government agencies shall not only fulfil its obligation of disclosure 
but also fulfil it in the form requested by the public.  In Yu v. Anqing EPB, the court 





The defendant provided the plaintiff the requested environmental 
information by email instead of in written form, and the defendant 
delayed its reply without informing the plaintiff, the defendant also did 
not bear the burden of proof to explain its taking the legal procedure 
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to delay the reply and the reply was within the time limit, these actions 
constitute its failure of fulfilling its legal obligations.
737
   
In brief, no matter in lawsuits that the plaintiffs win or in the others they lose, it is 
clear that court rulings can nevertheless help to further clarify both substantive and 
procedural issues, thus providing more opportunities for the public to file 
environmental information disclosure litigation.  However, does this mean that, as it 
is stated in Yu v. Anqing EPB, there is a real turning point for the courts to 
“safeguard the legitimate right and interest of citizens and monitor administrative 
agencies to administer according to law (维护公民的合法权益，监督行政机关依
法行政)”?738  
5.3.5 A Turning Point? 
According to Vanhala: 
[t]he terms “test case” and “strategic litigation” generally refer to 
those cases in which an organization or individual entreats a court or 
tribunal to a) look at an issue for the first time or potentially 
reconsider an issue that has been decided in the past, b) decide an 
issue that will affect a significant number or class of people, and/or  
c) consider a particular perspective on an issue that has hitherto not 
been included in existing jurisprudence. 
739
 
“Test case” and “strategic litigation” have not been really used by the lawyers and 
citizens in China.  However, it seems like the concept of “impact litigation” (影响性
诉讼) used in China refers to the same types of lawsuits that aim to “establish model 
decisions for other plaintiffs, attorneys, and judges to follow”.
740
  In fact the English 
name of the Impact Law Firm derived from this.  Nonetheless, the administrative 
lawsuits analysed in this chapter, though might not really initiated purposely as “test 
cases”, have been functioning similarly in creating opportunities for the courts to 
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clarify unsolved or unclear issues about the OEI Measures, thus bearing the same 
function as strategic litigation.  
However, despite the noticeable development in court judgments, it is difficult to 
say whether they really constitute a turning point in the sense that there has been or 
will be a legal opportunity structure conducive to environmental information 
disclosure related administrative litigation.  First of all, since China adopts a civil 
law system and does not recognize judicial precedents as binding in later cases, 
landmark cases do not guarantee that all Chinese courts will act accordingly in the 
future.  
Second, it appears that the Chinese courts are still very cautious in accepting 
administrative lawsuits; and Chinese courts are likely to consult the defendant 





Before accepting administrative lawsuits, the court always 
communicates with the concerned parties [government agencies].  The 
court says that they take administrative litigation cautiously, and 
telling the defendant is to urge him to solve the problem. However, 
before taking the case to court, the plaintiff normally contacted the 
defendant for many times already.  If the problem could be solved, it 




Moreover, Chinese courts are also encouraged by the Supreme People’s Court to 
settle cases through mediation.
742
  Although strictly speaking, mediation is not 
applicable to the adjudication of administrative law cases, 
743
  a practice similar to 
mediation, reconciliation (和解 ) acts as an alternative that the court actively 
facilitate both parties to reach a settlement, under which the defendant changes its 
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administrative action and the plaintiff, withdraws the lawsuit.
744
  This happened with 
Sun Bin, Green Beagle, and the Impact Law Firm.  In the case of Xu Taisheng, the 
dispute was finally resolved by a hearing.  The problem was solved in a harmonious 
way and the court judgment was nevertheless not reversed.  This is because to state a 
government agency does something wrong in a court judgment is a big issue, and 
this kind of judgment is not easy to be made.
745
  There is no doubt that reconciliation 
or hearing can be more efficient or flexible than adjudication, it nevertheless 
decreases the possibility of more influential and binding court judgments to be 
issued.  
The impact of a lawsuit also depends on many other extra-legal factors, including 
the media.  With regard to the three winning cases in 2012, reports about the ACEF 
case were quite abundant; media reports concerning the latter two cases were limited 
and less influential.  As ACEF is a GONGO directly affiliated to the MEP, it 
attracted the most media attention with its information disclosure litigation.  A 
search of the subject “ACEF v. Xiuwen EPB” through Google
746
 resulted in more 
than 30 pages of related reports.
747
  From the accepting of the lawsuit to the 
judgment rendered, it appeared in most major Chinese media ranging from China 
Daily, People’s Net, Yahoo, Sina, local media in Guizhou Province where the trial 
happened, and the websites of ACEF and the trial court.  The case was also listed as 
one of the 10 most important public interest lawsuits of 2011 in China
748
 and hailed 
as a milestone in pushing forward environmental information disclosure in China.  




Experts point out that this case opens the door of using litigation to 
push forward open government information.  It constitutes a milestone 
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in promoting government administration according to law, 
safeguarding the rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and 
other social organizations to obtain environmental information, and 
facilitating public participation in environmental protection.
749
 
Yu v. Anqing EPB was part of the environmental information disclosure survey 
conducted by the Impact Law Firm, which is not only professional in legal 
knowledge but also active in promoting public interest litigation in China.  
Nevertheless, a search for “Yu v. Anqing EPB” through Google only results in one 
page with related articles, and a second page with a few related links.
750
  As for Xie 
Yong v. Jiangsu EPB, a search resulted in 17 pages with links relating to his 
information disclosure requests.
751
  However, they are mostly reports about his 
failure to obtain the environmental information from various government agencies. 
Only a few relate to his winning the lawsuit against the Jiangsu EPB, and generally 
these are reposts from the first report of CLAPV that provided legal aid to his 
litigation.
752
  Compared to the wide media coverage about open government 
information when the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures just came into effect, 
it seems that the recent winning cases, except the ACEF lawsuit, were probably not 
known to a wider audience.  
More controversially, in 2013, the amendment of the Environmental Protection 
Law (EP Law) has indicated that a broader participation of environmental 
organizations in environmental lawsuits is not encouraged yet.  The July 2013 
amended draft of the EP Law particularly stipulates that only ACEF and its local 
offices have the legal standing in filing public interest environmental litigation.
753
  
On the one hand, this seems a progress that public interest litigation is explicitly 
stipulated by the new EP Law.  However on the other hand, it also appears that the 
law tries to reserve public interest environmental litigation to the GONGO alone and 
thus excludes the participation of all other ENGOs.  In October 2013, the draft was 
amended again, stating “national social organizations registered with the Civil 
Affairs Office under the State Council, have conducted environmental protection 
activities continuously for more than five years, and with good reputation” can file 
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environmental public interest litigation.  Basically among the active organizations, 
only ACEF fits the requirements.
754
  Ho argued that the establishment of ACEF in 
2005 after the color revolution in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was a 
“clever move by the government to co-opt environmental civil groups”.
755
  The 2013 
EP Law amendment draft seems a confirmation.  Moreover, this draft also shows 
that a wider scope of legal standing is not really welcomed by the central authorities 
at present.  In 2013, ACEF filed in total seven environmental public interest lawsuits, 
and four were not accepted, three were dismissed by the first instance court. 
Basically; basically in 2013 no environmental public interest lawsuit was 
adjudicated in China.
756
  This is also sending out a mixed signal from the authorities 
about environmental public interest litigation that while the central government 
emphasizes environmental protection never so often, it is still very hesitant in fully 
opening the door for environmental public interest litigation.  Seeing no clear 
guesture from the central government, Chinese courts are also acting conservatively 
and unwilling to accept more environmental public interest litigation.   
5.4 Concluding Remarks   
Due to the limited number of cases brought to court, it is difficult to generalize the 
trend of judicial development with regard to open environmental information 
administrative litigation.  Nevertheless, the available lawsuits have shown that 
despite the dismissal of the cases using a restrictive interpretation of legal standing 
and unfavourable judgments towards plaintiffs with obfuscation of legal rules, the 
ACEF v. Qingzhen EPB, Yu v. Anqing EPB, and Xie Yong v. Jiangsu EPD 
judgments have shown visible progress in courts gradually accepting administrative 
lawsuits, implying the possibility of applying a broad application of the requirement 
of legal standing.  Secondly, the court judgments have also demonstrated that the 
failure to provide environmental information as requested can constitute a violation 
of the law by government agencies.  However, it might be too positive to say that 
these cases have indicated a real turning point in administrative litigation for 
rectifying failures to access government information.  A major problem with the 
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legal system is the current judicial system is still more restrictive than active in 
acting as an active supporting pillar in the process of mobilizing the law to access 
government information.  
Undoubtedly in China, lacking in judicial independence, it remains a formidable 
challenge for the Chinese courts to safeguard citizens’ rights and act not in favour of 
the powerful authorities.  It will take a considerable time for the court to be an 
effective monitor of government administration under an authoritarian regime.  The 
zero acceptance of environmental public interest litigation in 2013 has signalled the 
unwillingness of Chinese courts to make liberal moves while no clear guidance 
given by the central authority.  Moreover, the 2013 EP law amendment drafts have 
indicated that the central government is rather hesitant about giving more space for 
the civil society to participate in environmental protection.  
Nevertheless, a legal mobilization, though not on a large scale, has been 
happening in the field of environmental information disclosure along with the 
growing environmental and legal consciousness of ordinary citizens and 
professionals, such as lawyers and environmental organizations.  They have been 
actively forming the agents of change aiming to use the new regulations for the 
benefits of the public and the environment, and most of all, to push government 
agencies to fulfill their disclosure obligation. In a realist view that law is one form of 
politics,
757
 citizens have been taking the approach of judicialization to participate in 
the political process.  During this process, empowered by the law, taking 
government agencies before Chinese courts, citizens and lawyers have become 
active participatory actors and helped to shape legal opportunities. In a word, their 
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6 LEGAL PARADOX, CITIZEN MOBILIZATION 
AND POLITICAL PROCESS 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the workings of the law in the field of open 
environmental information, with a particular focus on environmental information 
disclosure upon request.  It takes an integrated approach of studying the role of law 
within its social and political context.  
Based on this study, it is clear that the formal establishment of China’s open 
government information mechanism has not led to an effective means of getting 
government information disclosed due to defects and problems in the legislation and 
obstacles in its implementation.  However, the invoking of the law by citizens and 
entities has formed a new legal mobilization that has contributed to the shaping of 
China’s open government information system.  During the process of legal 
mobilization, citizens and entities have changed themselves into the key drivers for 
pushing government agencies to fulfil their obligations of disclosure.  Moreover, the 
public, including citizens and entities active in the field of the society, have also 
created changes and made an impact in China’s legal and political field. 
6.1 The Legal Paradox 
While there are more and more laws and regulations promulgated, the debate about 
whether China has rule of law or not still dominates the academic discourses.  One 
of the major reasons behind this is that the legal system in China has never appeared 
as so paradoxical as now.  On the one hand, it seems that the Chinese government 
has been continuously taking measures to promote its aims of “constructing the 
country according to law” by promulgating abundant new legislation; on the other 
hand, the abridging of basic rights and the lax or obstructed implementation of laws 
has appeared still frequently.  In the field of environmental protection, while there 
are sufficient laws, regulations, and rules regulating almost all aspects of the 
environment, environmental pollution and ecological degradation have been 





There is no exception with regard to the mechanism of government information 
disclosure–it is also full of paradoxical situations.  First of all, it is paradoxical to 
introduce open government information mechanism into China’s non-democratic 
political system.
759
  While access to government information constitutes the first 
step of public participation in decision making, which can indeed lead to more 
demands for public participation in China’s political process.  A dilemma exists for 
the Chinese government in that while it opens the door for government information 
disclosure, it does not want to leave the door fully open, fearing that too much open 
government information might lead to more democratic demand.  This shows more 
clear with regard to people who demand government officials to disclose their 
assets.  Although it can be regarded as part of the government information disclosure 
mechanism and even complies with the central government’s anti-corruption policy, 
it is immediately repressed and people got detained if they go to street with banners 
of disclosing government officials’ assets.  Thus, the Chinese government tries to 
control and limit information disclosure at the same time.   
The second paradox relates to the establishment of the new open government 
information mechanism in China and the resistance of information disclosure by all 
levels of government agencies from the MEP to local EPBs, as shown by the 
findings in this study.  It appears that open government information has still 
remained more like government rhetoric than a government commitment.  
Moreover, the Chinese government agencies are also using various reasons from 
the laws, from business secret to state stability, to refuse information disclosure.  
Undoubtedly, while the political legitimacy of the Party-state is, to a large extent, 
still depends on economic growth, it seems not difficult to understand whether the 
government will use the law to protect environment or to protect business if there is 
conflict between these two.  At the same time, legal rhetoric can help government 
agencies to mask their political discretion and make their activities appear 
legitimate, and difficult to be challenged by the public.  Thus legal rhetoric becomes 
the tool of government politics.  
The issuance of normative documents, giving narrow interpretations of the OGI 
Regulations, has further added to the paradox of the implementation of the open 
government information law in China.  It reflected that the central government 
agencies, including the SC and the SEPA, have not really been encouraging more 
citizens and entities to access government information; instead they have been 
                                               





providing more flexibility for government agencies to refuse information disclosure 
and thus limit citizens’ rights to access government information.  The government 
has been conducive and containing in open government information at the same 
time.  The power of law has been mitigated through administrative power. 
The main paradoxical question this study aims to address, that despite the 
obstacles and impediments existing and the unpromising realization of 
environmental information disclosure upon request, citizens and entities have still 
been actively using the new legislation to request that related government agencies 
disclose information.  The findings of this dissertation have shown that it is the 
social and political change achieved or aimed to achieve by citizens and entities’ 
invoking the law to access environmental information that matters.  Their mobilizing 
the law to access environmental information in fact constitutes both an end and a 
means.  Even if they cannot achieve their aim of getting the information requested, 
they can nevertheless raise social awareness, strengthen the civil society through 
networking, and impose pressures upon government agencies to get to know their 
legal obligations and to act accordingly, and create legal opportunities.    
6.2 Citizen Activism, Legal Mobilization and Political Change 
In China, as citizens have been utilizing legal strategies in pushing government 
agencies to fulfil their obligations of disclosure, they are indeed demanding the 
realization of their right to information stipulated by the law;
 
it thus constitutes 
citizen activism in the form of legal mobilization.  
This legal mobilization has utilized the rules of law established by the authorities 
to assert their rights and demand government agencies act according to law.  It is a 
type of boundary spanning that it used the language of law, demanding for political 
changes.  It goes beyond the “rightful resistance” coined by O’Brien and Li
760
 to 
more explicit and direct “lawful demand”.   Actively making “the legitimacy of 
one’s claim … grounded in rules of law,”
761 
citizens and organizations have turned 
themselves from passive actors into agents of change.  Moreover, while more and 
more people take similar legal actions, in accumulation, they form an individualized 
collective activism that can and will help to make more changes. 
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In the social field, more and more citizens, including residents, lawyers and NGO 
workers have started to use the law not only to safeguard their own rights but also to 
raise environmental awareness among the public, enabling more citizens to use legal 
mobilization for their causes in the future.  
In the legal field, strategic litigation has been adopted, particularly by ENGOs 
and law firms, in order to create “reversed pressure” upon government agencies to 
react to information disclosure requests.  
This has helped to create chances in the legal opportunity structure.  It is clear 
that without citizens and organizations launching lawsuits, there would not be court 
judgments.  Taking various tactics to get their legal actions accepted by Chinese 
courts, citizens and organizations have also made it possible for the courts to clarify 
both procedural and substantive issues relating to environmental information 
disclosure administrative litigation.  
Court judgments have already started a change towards the broadening of the 
scope of legal standing in filing environmental information disclosure related 
administrative lawsuits as well as clarifying some legal issues, such as the scope of 
information that shall be disclosed.  This has clearly enhanced “the degree of 
openness or accessibility of a legal system to the social and political goals and 
tactics of individuals and/or collective actors”.
762
  Moreover, court judgments 
favourable to information disclosure requesters have indicated that the possibility 
exists for the public to win against government agencies who fail to disclose 
information upon request.  This can encourage more citizens and entities to sue 
against government agencies in the future. 
Accordingly, it further enhances the role of administrative litigation to create 
pressure upon government agencies, in the fear of being sued, to react to disclosure 
requests instead of neglecting them in the first instance.  
The findings in this dissertation have shown that although it seems that the 
Chinese courts are rather conservative in being strong supporters of open 
government information, they help in clarifying issues about the subject and pave 
the way for more administrative litigation in the future.  While restraints exist for 
legal reform of China–for instance having an independent court system still seems 
impossible in the near future–the Chinese courts have been making progress when 
rendering court judgments and can thus produce more legal opportunities for future 
litigation.   This study also agrees with the argument that legal opportunity shall be 
                                               





taken into consideration when studying legal mobilization.  It is clear that there is 
not really unchangeable legal opportunity structure.  Opportunities can nevertheless 
be created with the activism of citizens and organizations, as reflected in this study.   
In China, changes in the political field of government administration have been 
largely instigated by the citizen activism of directly interacting with government 
agencies about information disclosure.  The increase of public requests for 
environmental information disclosure, regardless of whether for private interests or 
for public interest, such as conducting information disclosure requests as surveys, 
has clearly made government agencies change from being unfamiliar with 
information disclosure to effectively aware of the laws and regulations about it.  
Although government agencies are still hesitating about disclosing environmental 
information, more and more of them have changed their attitude towards 
information disclosure requests from simply ignoring them to disclosing the 
information or using legal rhetoric to avoid disclosing information.  Based on the 
study, it is very clear that while the law lays down the foundation for open 
government information, it is citizen activism that has been pushing forward its 
implementation. 
Last but not least, a legal system is not merely about rules and structures, but a 
“set of interactions” and a social system.
763
  It is thus of significant importance to 
understand the interactions between the social and political fields through the media 
of law.  In this study, the legislation from the political field has laid down the 
foundations for the public to use it to request the government disclosure information.  
This further imposes recursive pressure on government agencies to change 
accordingly.  Thus, legal activism in the social sphere has clearly made impact in the 
political field.  Moreover, in reacting to the empowerment of citizens and entities by 
the new legislation of open government information, politico-legal adjustment 
occurs with the production of normative documents issued by the SC and the SEPA 
de facto limiting public access to government information.  This has shown that the 
Chinese government and government agencies have still been very concerned with 
the empowerment of the public by the OGI Regulations and the OEI Measures, in 
that they might demand more participation in political processes.  This again proves 
the dilemma of establishing an open government information mechanism in the 
non-democratic environment of China.   
                                               





Nevertheless, citizen action in the form of legal mobilization has been happening.  
Although the number of participants is still limited and legal actions are sporadic, a 
network of using the law to demand government agencies to disclose environmental 
information has emerged, and actively played its pivotal role in shaping China’s 
environmental information disclosure mechanism.  Apparently, ENGOs have also 
changed from promoting environmental education, bird watching and tree planting 
to being active agents and directly demanding government to act through requesting 
for information disclosure and filing administrative lawsuits.  The ENGOs are 
probably still “embedded” in a way that they avoid to make their actions bearing any 
political aims; however, even explicitly apolitical actions can make political changes 
too.  In the field of environmental information disclosure, citizens and organizations 
have already proved it.  
6.3 Concluding Remarks  
With regard to environmental information disclosure, public participation in the 
form of requests for environmental information disclosure, though still limited in 
size, has been developing from a token stage of being informed and consulted to a 
more meaningful one of exercising citizen power. An “actual legal mobilization 
occurs only when there is an active demand based on legal norms”;764 this study has 
shown that
 
citizens and organizations have been actively requesting government 
agencies to disclose environmental information, and more importantly, 
endeavouring to make government agencies disclose the information according to 
law.  An actual legal mobilization in requesting for environmental information 
disclosure has been happening in China. 
Legal actions in the field of environmental information disclosure mostly bear the 
characteristics of SULNAM coined by Kate Zhou that they are “spontaneous, 
unorganized, leaderless, non-ideological, and apolitical”, yet cumulatively they will 
help to revolutionize Chinese society.
765
  This study emphasizes that while more 
citizens act in similar measures, in accumulation, together they form an 
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 that plays more important roles during China’s 
legal and political transition.  
Moreover, this legal demanding of environmental information disclosure is 
nevertheless not alone and individualistic, if taking into consideration of the 
happening of legal mobilization in present China.  While actions in the form of 
politicization is repressed and limited, judicialization has become an alternative of 
political participation.  From rights-defence movement to public interest litigation, it 
is clear that the public has used legal language aiming for changes beyond 
redressing their grievances.  This study argues that in accumulation, legal actions in 
various fields can play a pivotal role during China’s transition.  However it shall 
also be pointed out that it depends on how the Chinese government will react to the 
happening of legal mobilization, or citizens’ using the law to demand their rights.  
In any case, with regard to the legal development in China, it is incomplete and 
narrow to only focus on the top-down process of legal reform initiated by the 
Chinese government.  By doing this, the role of citizens have been largely neglected.  
It is suggested here that the legal development in China shall be treated not a legal 
reform but in fact a legal change.
767
  First of all, it is doubtful whether there has been 
a real legal reform in China due to the fact legal reform and political reform are 
seriously lag behind China’s economic reform and remain almost dormant; 
secondly, legal change embodies a multi-directional perspectives in understanding 
the function of law and it includes both the top-down initiative of the shaping of the 
legal system as well as the bottom-up activism of the reshaping of China’s legal 
opportunity structure by citizens, lawyers and organizations.  
A shift of studying Chinese law from focusing on laws and rules established by 
the authorities to the roles of citizens and organizations can help us to better 
understand China’s legal and political change as well.  It is true that law is never 
separated from politics in China that the ruling party─CCP plays a role in 
determining today’s legal reform. Furthermore, the authority has also used law for 
its own purposes,
768
 and to counteract against citizen activism, for instance, the 
using of legal rules to refuse information disclosure; more seriously, the cracking 
down of Chinese civil society can also be done “in the name of law”, for instance, 
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the authority use the crime of “subverting state power”
769
 or “disrupting public 
order”
770
 to charge citizens for their expressing different opinions towards China’s 
political system and calling for rule of law and democratic reform.  However does 
this mean that law can only be used to serve the politics of the authorities?  If we see 
it from a different perspective, law clearly can also empower citizens to actively 
interact with the government, thus constituting political participation in the political 
process, as pointed out by this dissertation.  
Underscoring the roles and strategies of citizens and organizations invoking the 
law to request for environmental information disclosure, this study argues that the 
bottom-up individualized legal mobilization can play an alternative role of public 
participation in China’s political process.  However, due to the length of this study, 
there are many related questions still remain unanswered in this dissertation. For 
instance, how do citizens and organizations use the information they get through 
disclosure requests? Under which situations will the public be likely to get the 
information? How does the legal action of filing administrative reconsideration 
affect government information disclosure?  Furthermore, a comparative study with 
regard to other types of government information disclosure, for instance, disclosing 
government officials assets or government spending, and a wider scope of general 
government information disclosure will also help us to understand the wider picture 
of open government information in China.  Most of all, this study wishes that it will 
inspire more people to concern not only China’s legal development from the 
perspective of the establishment of the legal system by the authorities, but also how 
citizens and civil organizations have been mobilizing the law to create political 
changes.  In addition, studies about the relationship between legal mobilization and 
social movements in China are also of immediate and necessary importance against 
China’s current political environment that organized political activities are likely to 
be repressed and judicialization under many situations plays an alternative role of 
mobilization and political participation.    
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(Adopted by the State Council on January 17, 2007; Effective May 1, 2008) 
Chapter I General Principles 
Article 1 In order to ensure that citizens, legal persons and other organizations obtain 
government information in accordance with the law, enhance transparency of the work of 
government, promote administration in accordance with the law, and bring into full play the 
role of government information in serving the people’s production and livelihood and their 
economic and social activities, these Regulations are hereby formulated. 
Article 2 “Government information” referred to in these Regulations means information 
made or obtained by administrative organs in the course of exercising their responsibilities 
and recorded and stored in a given form. 
Article 3 The people’s governments at all levels should strengthen the organization and 
leadership of open government information work. 
The General Office of the State Council shall be the national department in charge of open 
government information work. It shall be responsible for promoting, guiding, coordinating 
and supervising open government information work throughout the whole country. 
The general offices of local people’s governments at the county level and above or other 
departments in charge of open government work designated by the local people’s 
governments at the county level and above shall be responsible for promoting, guiding, 
coordinating and supervising open government information work within their respective 
administrative areas. 
Article 4 
The people's government at all levels and the departments of the people’s governments at 
the county level and above should establish and perfect systems for open government 
information work for their respective administrative organs and designate an office 
(hereafter referred to as the “office for open government information work”) to be 
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responsible for the daily work of open government information for their respective 
administrative organs. 
The specific functions of the office for open government information work are: 
1) To undertake specific open government information matters for that administrative organ; 
2) To maintain and update government information disclosed by that administrative organ; 
3) To organize for that administrative organ the compilation of an open government 
information guide, open government information catalogue and annual reports on open 
government information work; 
4) To conduct examinations for secrecy of government information to be disclosed; And 
5) To carry out other responsibilities related to open government information stipulated by 
that administrative organ. 
Article 5 When disclosing government information, administrative organs should observe 
the principles of justice, fairness, and convenience to the people. 
Article 6 Administrative organs should disclose government information promptly and 
accurately. When administrative organs discover false or incomplete information that 
affects or might affect social stability and disturbs the social management order, they 
should release, within their scope of responsibility, accurate government information to 
clarify the situation. 
Article 7 Administrative organs should establish and perfect a coordination mechanism for 
releasing government information. When releasing government information that involves 
other administrative organs, an administrative organ should communicate and confirm with 
the administrative organs concerned to ensure the government information released is 
accurate and consistent. 
If the government information to be released by administrative organs needs to be approved 
in accordance with relevant state regulations, it may not be released without being approved. 
Article 8 The government information disclosed by administrative organs may not 
endanger state security, public security, economic security and social stability. 
Chapter II The Scope of Disclosure 
Article 9 Administrative organs should disclose on their own initiative government 
information that satisfies any one of the following basic criteria: 
1) Information that involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or other 
organizations; 
2) Information that needs to be extensively known or participated in by the general public; 
3) Information that shows the structure, function and working procedures of and other 
matters relating to the administrative organ; and 
4) Other information that should be disclosed on the administrative organ’s own initiative 





Article 10 People’s governments at the county level and above and their departments 
should determine the concrete content of the government information to be disclosed on 
their own initiative within their scope of responsibility in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 9 of these Regulations, and emphasize disclosure of the following government 
information: 
1) Administrative regulations, rules, and regulatory documents; 
2) Plans for national economic and social development, plans for specific projects, plans for 
regional development and related policies; 
3) Statistical information on national economic and social development; 
4) Reports on financial budgets and final accounts; 
5) Items subject to an administrative fee and the legal basis and standards therefor; 
6) Catalogues of the government’s centralized procurement projects, their standards and 
their implementation; 
7) Matters subject to administrative licensing and their legal bases, conditions, quantities, 
procedures and deadlines and catalogues of all the materials that need to be submitted when 
applying for the administrative licensing, and the handling thereof; 
8) Information on the approval and implementation of major construction projects; 
9) Policies and measures on such matters as poverty assistance, education, medical care, 
social security and job creation and their actual implementation; 
10) Emergency plans for, early warning information concerning, and counter measures 
against sudden public events; 
11) Information on the supervision and inspection of environmental protection, public 
health, safe production, food and drugs, and product quality. 
Article 11 The government information to be emphasized for disclosure by the people’s 
governments at the level of cities divided into districts and the county level people’s 
governments and their departments should also include the following contents: 
1) Important and major matters in urban and rural construction and management; 
2) Information on the construction of social and public interest institutions; 
3) Information on land requisition or land appropriation, household demolition and 
resettlement, and the distribution and use of compensation or subsidy funds relating thereto; 
and 
4) Information on the management, usage and distribution of social donations in funds and 
in kind for emergency and disaster relief, special care for families of martyrs and military 
service personnel, and assistance to poverty stricken and low income families. 
Article 12 People’s governments at the township (town) level should determine the 





within their scope of responsibility in accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of these 
Regulations, and emphasize disclosure of the following government information: 
1) Information on the implementation of rural work policies of the state; 
2) Information on fiscal income and expenses and the management and use of various 
specialized funds; 
3) Overall township (town) land use plans and information on the verification of land to be 
used by farmers for their primary residences; 
4) Information on land requisition or land appropriation, household demolition and 
resettlement, and the distribution and use of compensation or subsidy funds therefor; 
5) Information on township (town) credits and debts, fund raising and labor levies; 
6) Information on the distribution of social donations in funds and in kind for emergency 
and disaster relief, special care for families of martyrs and military service personnel, and 
assistance to poverty stricken and low income families; 
7) Information on contracting, leasing and auctioning of township and town collectively 
owned enterprises and other township and town economic entities; and  
8) Information on implementation of the family planning policy. 
Article 13 In addition to government information disclosed by administrative agencies on 
their own initiative provided for in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12, citizens, legal persons or other 
organizations may, based on the special needs of such matters as their own production, 
livelihood and scientific and technological research, also file requests to departments of the 
State Council, local people’s governments at all levels and departments under local 
people’s governments at the county level and above to obtain relevant government 
information. 
Article 14 Administrative agencies should establish and perfect mechanisms to examine for 
secrecy the government information to be released, and clarify the examination procedures 
and responsibilities. 
Prior to disclosing government information, administrative agencies should examine the 
government information to be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding State Secrets and other laws, regulations and 
relevant state provisions. 
When an administrative agency is unable to determine if certain government information 
may be disclosed, it should submit the matter for determination to relevant departments in 
charge or departments for safeguarding secrecy at the same level as the administrative 
agency. 
Administrative agencies may not disclose government information that involves state 
secrets, commercial secrets or individual privacy. However, government information 
involving commercial secrets or individual privacy may be disclosed by administrative 
agencies with the consent of the rightholder(s) or if administrative agencies believe that 





Chapter III Methods of and Procedures for Disclosure 
Article 15 Government information to be disclosed on administrative agencies’ own 
initiative should be disclosed by means of government gazettes, government websites, press 
conferences, as well as through newspapers and other publications, radio, television and 
other methods that make it convenient for the public to be informed. 
Article 16 The people’s governments at all levels should set up government information 
reading places in the state archives and public libraries and install appropriate facilities and 
equipment to make it convenient for citizens, legal persons and other organizations to 
obtain government information. 
Administrative agencies may set up, as needed, places and facilities such as public reading 
rooms, materials request stations, information bulletin boards, and electronic information 
screens to disclose government information. 
Administrative agencies should provide the state archives and public libraries with 
government information disclosed on their own initiative in a timely manner. 
Article 17 Administrative agencies shall be responsible for disclosing government 
information that they have made. Administrative agencies that store government 
information obtained from citizens, legal persons or other organizations shall be responsible 
for disclosing it. If laws or regulations have different provisions on the scope of 
authorization to disclose government information, those provisions shall be followed. 
Article 18 Government information to be disclosed on administrative agencies’ own 
initiative should be disclosed within 20 business days from the date the information is 
formed or changed. If laws or regulations have different provisions on the time period for 
disclosing government information, those provisions shall be followed. 
Article 19 Administrative agencies should compile and publish open government 
information guides and catalogues of open government information, and update them in a 
timely manner. 
Open government information guides should include such contents as the types of 
government information, the system of cataloguing, the methods for obtaining information, 
and the name, office address, office hours, contact telephone number, fax number and e-
mail address of the office for open government information work. 
Open government information catalogues should include such contents as an index, the 
name of the information, a summary of the information contents and the date of creation of 
the information. 
Article 20 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations should file requests with 
government agencies to obtain government information in accordance with Article 13 of 
these Regulations in written form (including digital and electronic forms). In the event that 
it is truly difficult for a requester to submit a request in written form, the requester may do 
so orally and the administrative agency accepting the request shall fill out the request for 
open government information on the requester’s behalf. 





1) The name of the individual or organization making the request and the method of contact; 
2) A description of the government information requested to be disclosed; and  
3) Requirements as to the format in which the requested government information is to be 
supplied. 
Article 21 Administrative agencies shall reply to requests for open government information 
respectively in accordance with the following circumstances: 
1) If the requested government information falls within the scope of disclosure, the 
requester should be informed of the methods and channels for obtaining that government 
information; 
2) If the requested government information does not fall into the scope of disclosure, the 
requester should be informed that such information cannot be disclosed, together with an 
explanation of the reasons; 
3) If, in accordance with the law, the requested government information should not be 
disclosed by that administrative agency or the requested government information does not 
exist, the requester should be informed of the situation and, if the agency that has the 
obligation to disclose that government information can be determined, the requester should 
be informed of the name of that administrative agency and the method to contact it; 
4) If the content of the requested government information is not clear, the requester should 
be notified to amend and supplement the request. 
Article 22 If the requested government information contains some contents that should not 
be disclosed but that can be handled through differentiation, the administrative agency 
should provide the requester with that information content that may be disclosed. 
Article 23 If an administrative agency believes that the requested government information 
involves commercial secrets or individual privacy the disclosure of which might infringe 
upon the lawful rights and interests of a third party, it should write to the third party to seek 
its opinion. If the third party does not agree to have the information disclosed, the 
information may not be disclosed. However, if the administrative agency believes that non-
disclosure might have a major influence on the public interest, it should disclose the 
information and notify the third party in writing of the content of the government 
information they have decided to disclose and the reasons therefor. 
Article 24 After receiving requests for open government information, administrative 
agencies should reply to the requests on-the-spot to the extent possible. 
If an on-the-spot reply is not possible, administrative agencies should provide a reply 
within 15 business days from receiving a request. If an extension of the time limit for 
replying to a request is needed, the agreement of the responsible person in charge of the 
office for open government information work should be obtained and the requester notified. 






If the requested government information involves the rights and interests of a third party, 
the time needed by administrative agencies to seek the opinion of the third party shall not 
be counted against the time limit provided in Paragraph 2 of this Article. 
Article 25 When citizens, legal persons or other organizations request administrative 
agencies to provide government information about themselves such as taxes and fee 
payments, social security and medical care information, they should show valid 
identification certificates or certifying documents. 
If citizens, legal persons or other organizations have evidence showing that the government 
information provided by an administrative agency concerning them is not recorded 
accurately, they have the right to request the administrative agency to correct the 
information. If the administrative agency does not have the authority to make the correction, 
the case should be transferred to the administrative agency that does have such authority, 
and the requester shall be so informed. 
Article 26 When providing government information on request, administrative agencies 
shall provide the information in the format requested by the requesters. If it is impossible to 
provide the information in the format requested by the requesters, administrative agencies 
may provide the information through making arrangements for the requesters to read the 
relevant documents, providing photocopies or using other appropriate methods. 
Article 27 When disclosing government information on request, administrative agencies 
may not collect any fees except they may collect cost-based fees for the cost of searching, 
photocopying, postage and the like. Administrative agencies may not provide government 
information as a compensated service through any organizations or individuals. 
The standards for fees collected by administrative agencies to cover such costs as for 
searching, photocopying and postage shall be made by the department of the State Council 
in charge of pricing in consultation with the department of the State Council in charge of 
financial affairs. 
Article 28 If a citizen requesting disclosure of government information truly has economic 
difficulties, the relevant fee may be reduced or exempted after an application for such 
reduction or exemption is submitted by the requester and verified and approved by the 
responsible person of the office for open government information work. 
If citizens requesting disclosure of government information have trouble reading or 
obstacles to hearing and seeing, administrative agencies should provide them with 
necessary assistance. 
Chapter VI Supervision and Safeguards 
Article 29 People’s governments at all levels should establish and perfect inspection, social 
appraisal and accountability systems for open government information work to carry out 
periodic inspection and appraisal of open government information work. 
Article 30 The departments in charge of open government information work and the 
supervision agencies shall be responsible for supervising and inspecting the implementation 





Article 31 Administrative agencies at all levels should publish their annual reports on open 
government information work before March 31 each year. 
Article 32 The annual report on open government information work should include the 
following contents: 
1) Information on disclosing government information on the administrative agency’s own 
initiative; 
2) Information on disclosing government information public upon request and of requests 
for government information that are denied; 
3) Information on fee collection and fee reductions and exemptions concerning open 
government information; 
4) Information on applications for administrative reconsideration and filing of 
administrative lawsuits in respect of open government information; 
5) The main problems existing in open government information work and the information 
on improvements thereof; and  
6) Other items that need to be reported. 
Article 33 If citizens, legal persons or other organizations believe an administrative agency 
has failed to fulfill, in accordance with the law, its obligations in respect of open 
government information, they may report it to the higher level administrative agency, the 
supervision agency or the department in charge of open government information. The 
agency that receives the report should investigate and handle it. 
If citizens, legal persons or other organizations believe a specific administrative action of 
an administrative agency in its open government information work has infringed their 
lawful rights and interests, they may, in accordance with the law, apply for administrative 
reconsideration or file an administrative lawsuit. 
Article 34 If an administrative agency fails to establish and perfect, in violation of the 
provisions of these Regulations, a secrecy examination mechanism for releasing 
government information, the supervision agency or the administrative agency at the next 
higher level shall order that administrative agency to correct the situation. If the 
circumstances are serious, administrative penalties shall be imposed in accordance with the 
law on the principal responsible person(s) of that administrative agency. 
Article 35 If an administrative organ violates the provisions of these Regulations and has 
engaged in any one of the following behaviors, the supervision organ or the administrative 
organ at the next higher level shall order that administrative organ to correct the situation. If 
the circumstances are serious, administrative penalties shall be imposed in accordance with 
the law on person(s) directly in charge of the administrative organ, as well as other persons 
who are directly responsible. If the behaviour constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility 
shall be pursued in accordance with the law: 





2) Failure to timely update the contents of government information that has been disclosed, 
the guide to open government information and the catalogue of open government 
information; 
3) Collecting fees in violation of provisions; 
4) Providing government information as a paid service through other organizations or 
individuals; 
5) Disclosing government information that should not be disclosed; and 
6) Other actions that violate the provisions of these Regulations. 
Chapter V Supplementary Regulations 
Article 36 These Regulations shall apply to open government information activities of 
organizations that are authorized by laws or regulations to exercise the functions of 
managing public affairs. 
Article 37 Disclosing information that is made or obtained in the course of providing public 
services by public enterprises and institutions that are closely related to the people’s 
interests such as education, medical care, family planning, water supply, electricity supply, 
gas supply, heating, environmental protection and public transportation shall be done with 
reference to these Regulations. The specific measures shall be formulated by competent 
departments or offices of the State Council. 










(Adopted by the State Environmental Protection Administration of China on February 8, 
2007; Effective May 1, 2008)  
Chapter I      General Provisions 
Article 1    In order to promote and standardize the disclosure of environmental information 
for the administrative departments in charge of environmental protection (hereinafter 
referred to as “environmental protection departments”) and enterprises, protect the rights 
and interests of citizens, legal persons, and other organizations to obtain environmental 
information, and promote public participation in environmental protection, in accordance 
with the “Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information,” 
the “Law of the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of Clean Production,” the 
“State Council Decision on Implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and 
Strengthening Environmental Protection,” and other relevant provisions, these Measures 
are hereby formulated. 
Article 2  “Environmental information,” as referred to in these Measures, includes 
government environmental information and enterprise environmental information. 
“Government environmental information” refers to information created or obtained by 
environmental protection departments in the course of carrying out their environmental 
protection responsibilities and recorded and stored in a definite form. 
“Enterprise environmental information” refers to information that an enterprise has 
recorded and stored in a definite form and which relates to the environmental impact 
generated by the operating activities of the enterprise or the environmental conduct of the 
enterprise. 
Article 3 The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) is responsible for 
promoting, guiding, coordinating, and supervising open environmental information work 
throughout the country. 
The environmental protection departments of the local people’s governments at the county 
level and above are responsible for organizing, coordinating, and supervising open 
environmental information work within their respective administrative areas. 
Article 4 Environmental protection departments shall abide by the principles of justice, 
fairness, convenience to the people, and objectivity, and disclose government 
environmental information promptly and accurately. 
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Enterprises shall, regardless of whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, disclose 
enterprise environmental information promptly and accurately. 
Article 5 Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations may file requests with 
environmental protection departments to obtain government environmental information. 
Article 6 Environmental protection departments shall establish and perfect the 
environmental information disclosure system. 
The General Office of SEPA shall be the office responsible for organizing SEPA’s open 
government environmental information work. Each of the functional offices shall complete 
open government environmental information work within their respective areas in 
accordance with the division of work responsibilities. 
Environmental protection departments of the local people's governments at the county level 
and above should designate the office responsible for organizing their open government 
environmental information work based on practical circumstances.  These offices are 
responsible for organizing and implementing their department's open government 
environmental information work. 
The specific duties of the office responsible for organizing the open government 
environmental information work of an environmental protection department are: 
(1)    To organize formulation of a set of regulations and work rules for the disclosure of the 
department's government environmental information; 
(2)    To organize coordination of the open government environmental information work of 
each of the functional offices within the department; 
(3)    To organize the safeguarding and updating of government environmental information 
disclosed by the department; 
(4)    To supervise and assess the open government environmental information work of 
each of the functional offices within the department; 
(5)    To organize compilation of the department's open government environmental 
information guide, open government environmental information catalogue, and annual 
report on open government environmental information work; 
(6)    To supervise and guide the open government environmental information work of 
lower level environmental protection departments; 
(7)    To supervise enterprise environmental information disclosure work in areas under the 
department's jurisdiction; 
(8)    To be responsible for investigating the secrecy of government environmental 
information prior to disclosure; 






Article 7 Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations shall not harm national interests, 
public interests, or the lawful rights and interests of other persons when using disclosed 
environmental information. 
Article 8 Environmental protection departments shall guarantee the personnel and funding 
for that department's environmental information disclosure work. 
Article 9 For government environmental information that requires approval in accordance 
with the relevant state provisions in order to be released by an environmental protection 
department, such information may not be released without approval. 
Article 10 Environmental protection departments, in disclosing government environmental 
information, must not endanger state security, public security, economic security, and 
social stability. 
Chapter II    Disclosure of Government Environmental Information 
Part I   The Scope of Disclosure 
Article 11 Environmental protection departments, within their scope of responsibility and 
jurisdiction, shall proactively disclose the following government environmental information 
to the public: 
(1)    Environmental protection laws, regulations, rules, standards, and other regulatory 
documents; 
(2)    Environmental protection plans; 
(3)    Environmental quality conditions; 
(4)    Environmental statistics and environmental investigation information; 
(5)    The emergency response plan, forecast, occurrence, management, and other 
information relating to sudden environmental incidents; 
(6)    Distribution and implementation of targets for total levels of major pollutant 
discharges, the distribution of pollutant discharge permits, and the results of urban 
environment comprehensive improvement quantitative assessments; 
(7)    Information on the classification, production quantity, disposal of and other 
conditions of solid waste for large- and medium-sized cities; 
(8)    The review of environmental impact assessment documentation for a construction 
project, the results of such review, the results of the environmental protection inspection of 
a construction project upon completion, and other items requiring environmental protection 
administrative permits and their legal bases, conditions, procedures, and results; 
(9)    The items, legal bases, standards, and procedures for fees levied on the discharge of 
pollutants, the amount of fees that the polluter shall pay for the pollutant discharge, the 
actual amount collected, and any reduction or delay; 
(10)    The items subject to environmental protection administrative fees, and the legal 





(11)    Verified and investigated petition letters and complaints by the public relating to 
environmental issues or enterprises that pollute the environment, and their outcome; 
(12)    Environmental administrative penalties, administrative reconsideration, 
administrative lawsuits, and the implementation of administrative compulsory measures; 
(13)    A list of the names of enterprises with serious pollution that have discharged 
pollutants exceeding national or local discharge standards, or whose total amount of 
pollutant discharge exceeds the total discharge control targets set by the local people's 
governments; 
(14)    A list of the names of enterprises responsible for major, large-scale environmental 
pollution accidents or incidents, and a list of the names of enterprises that refuse to carry 
out an environmental administrative penalty decision that has already taken effect; 
(15)    The inspection and approval results of environmental protection projects; 
(16)    The organizational structure, work responsibilities, contact information, and other 
information relating to environmental protection departments; 
(17)    Other environmental information required to be disclosed according to laws, 
regulations, rules, or provisions. 
Environmental protection departments shall compile their own open government 
environmental information catalogues based on the scope as set forth in this provision. 
Article 12 Environmental protection departments shall establish and perfect a mechanism to 
examine the secrecy of government environmental information to be released, and clarify 
the procedures and responsibilities for such examination. 
Prior to disclosing government environmental information, environmental protection 
departments shall carry out an examination in accordance with the “Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets” and other laws, regulations, and relevant 
state provisions. 
Environmental protection departments may not disclose government environmental 
information involving state secrets, commercial secrets, or individual privacy.  However, 
government environmental information involving commercial secrets or individual privacy 
may be disclosed if the rights holder consents or the environmental protection department 
believes that not disclosing such information could significantly impact the interests of the 
public. 
If the environmental protection department is unable to determine whether to disclose 
government environmental information, then it shall submit the matter for determination to 
the department in charge or the department for safeguarding secrecy at the same level as the 
environmental protection department, in accordance with laws, regulations, and relevant 
state provisions. 
Part II        Disclosure Methods and Procedures 
Article 13  Environmental protection departments shall publicize the government 





sites, government gazettes, press conferences, newspapers and other periodical publications, 
radio broadcasts, television, or any other method that facilitates public awareness. 
Article 14 Environmental protection departments shall disclose government environmental 
information that is to be proactively disclosed within 20 business days from the date such 
information arose or was modified. If other laws or regulations have different provisions 
regarding the time limit for disclosing government environmental information, those 
provisions shall be followed. 
Article 15 Environmental protection departments shall compile and publish open 
government environmental information guides and open government environmental 
information catalogues, and update them in a timely manner. 
Open government environmental information guides shall include the information 
classification, the compilation system, the method for obtaining the information, the name, 
office address, office hours, contact telephone number, facsimile number, and e-mail 
address of the office for open government environmental information work, and other 
related content. 
The open government environmental information catalogues shall include an index, name 
of the information, a summary of the information's content, the date of production, the date 
of disclosure, and other related content. 
Article 16  Citizens, legal persons, and other organizations who make a request to an 
environmental protection department to obtain government environmental information in 
accordance with Article 5 of these Measures shall do so in writing, either through a letter, 
facsimile, e-mail, or another written form; if it is truly difficult for the requester to make a 
request in writing, he or she may do so orally, and the environmental protection 
department's office for open government environmental work shall fill out a request for the 
disclosure of government environmental information on the requester's behalf. 
Requests for the disclosure of government environmental information shall include the 
following content: 
(1)    The name of the individual or organization making the request, and the method of 
contact; 
(2)    A detailed description of the government environmental information requested to be 
disclosed; and 
(3)    Requirements as to the format of the government environmental information 
requested to be disclosed. 
Article 17 Environmental protection departments shall reply to requests for government 
environmental information in accordance with the following: 
(1)    If the information requested to be disclosed falls within the scope of disclosure, the 






(2)    If the information requested to be disclosed does not fall within the scope of 
disclosure, the requester shall be notified that such government environmental information 
will not be disclosed and provided an explanation of the reason; 
(3)    If the law provides that disclosure is not within a department's responsibility or the 
government environmental information does not exist, the requester shall be notified; with 
regard to government environmental information whose disclosure agency can be 
confirmed, the requester shall be notified of the relevant administrative agency’s name and 
contact information; 
(4)    If the content for which the request is being made is unclear, the requester shall be 
notified to edit or supplement his or her request. 
Article 18  Environmental protection departments shall reply within 15 business days of 
receiving a request; if they are unable to reply within 15 business days, then with the 
consent of the person responsible from the office for open government environmental work, 
the deadline to reply may be extended with the requester notified in writing. The deadline 
to reply may not be extended by more than 15 business days. 
Chapter III     Disclosure of Enterprise Environmental Information 
Article 19  The state encourages enterprises to voluntarily disclose the following 
environmental information: 
(1)    The enterprise's environmental protection guiding principles, and annual 
environmental protection targets and results; 
(2)    The enterprise’s total annual consumption of natural resources;    
(3)    The enterprise’s investment in environmental protection and its development of 
environmental technology; 
(4)    The type, amount, toxicity, and destination of the enterprise’s discharged pollutants; 
(5)    The construction and operation of the enterprise's environmental protection facilities; 
(6)    The enterprise's handling and disposal of waste materials generated during the 
production process, and the recycling and comprehensive utilization of discarded products; 
(7)    A voluntary agreement with an environmental protection department to improve 
environmental conduct; 
(8)    A description of how the enterprise fulfills its social responsibility; 
(9)    Any other environmental information that the enterprise wishes to voluntarily disclose. 
Article 20 Enterprises included on the lists provided for under Part I, Article 11, Item 13 of 
these Measures shall disclose the following information: 
(1)     The enterprise's name, address, and legal representative; 
(2)     The names of major pollutants, their methods of discharge, the toxicity and amount of 
discharge, if they exceed standards, and the amount in excess; 





(4)     The emergency response plan for an environmental pollution accident. 
The enterprise may not invoke the protection of trade secrets as a pretext for refusing to 
disclose the aforementioned environmental information. 
Article 21 Enterprises required to disclose environmental information to the public in 
accordance with Article 20 of these Measures, shall, within 30 days after the environmental 
protection department publishes its list, publish the environmental information in the major 
media outlets where they are located, and file such environmental information disclosed to 
the public with the environmental protection department where they are located. 
Environmental protection departments have the authority to perform an audit of 
environmental information released by an enterprise. 
Article 22 Enterprises that voluntarily disclose environmental information in accordance 
with Article 19 of these Measures may disclose such environmental information to the 
public through the media, the Internet, or other means, or in the form of their annual 
environmental report. 
Article 23 With respect to enterprises that voluntarily disclose information regarding their 
environmental conduct, and who obey environmental protection laws and regulations in an 
exemplary fashion, environmental protection departments may give the following awards: 
(1)    Public recognition in local major media outlets; 
(2)    Priority position with respect to special funds for environmental protection projects in 
accordance with relevant state provisions; 
(3)    Priority recommendation for clean production demonstration projects or other 
demonstration projects that receive state subsidies in accordance with relevant state 
provisions; 
(4)     Other awards as provided by state provisions. 
Chapter IV     Supervision and Responsibilities 
Article 24 Environmental protection departments shall establish and perfect a system for 
assessment, public appraisal, and investigation of responsibility, and schedule periodic 
assessment and appraisal of open government environmental information work. 
Article 25 Environmental protection departments shall publish an annual report on their 
open government environmental information work before March 31 of each year. 
The annual report on open government environmental information work shall include the 
following information: 
(1)     The government environmental information proactively disclosed by the 
environmental protection department; 
(2)     Requested government environmental information that was either disclosed or not 
disclosed by the environmental protection department;   
(3)     Applications for administrative reconsideration or the filing of administrative 





(4)    Major issues that exist in open government environmental information work and 
improvements thereof; 
(5)    Other matters that must be reported. 
Article 26 If citizens, legal persons, and other organizations believe an environmental 
protection department has not fulfilled its obligation to disclose government environmental 
information according to law, they may report their concerns to a higher level 
environmental protection department. The higher level environmental protection 
department that receives such a report shall supervise and urge the lower level 
environmental protection department to fulfill its obligation to disclose government 
environmental information according to law. 
If citizens, legal persons, and other organizations believe that an environmental protection 
department's specific administrative conduct while carrying out open government 
environmental information work have violated their lawful rights and interests, they can 
apply for administrative reconsideration or file an administrative lawsuit according to law. 
Article 27  For environmental protection departments that violate provisions under these 
Measures, as in the case of any one of the circumstances below, the higher level 
environmental department shall order it to make corrections; if the circumstances are 
serious, managers with direct responsibility or other personnel with direct responsibility 
may be subject to administrative punishment according to the law: 
(1)     Failure to fulfill the obligation to disclose government environmental information 
according to law; 
(2)     Failure to update government environmental information content, the open 
government environmental information guide, and the open government environmental 
information catalogue in a timely manner; 
(3)     Collecting fees in violation of provisions during the government environmental 
information disclosure process; 
(4)     Utilizing other organizations and individuals to provide government environmental 
information as a fee-paying service;   
(5)    Disclosing government environmental information that should not be disclosed;   
(6)     Other conduct in violation of the provisions in these Measures. 
Article 28  In the case of serious pollution, enterprises that violate Article 20 of these 
Measures by discharging pollutants in excess of national or local discharge standards, or by 
discharging a total amount of pollutants in excess of the total discharge control targets set 
by the local people's government, and failing to disclose or failing to disclose in accordance 
with requirements the pollutant discharges, the local people's government environmental 
protection department at the county level or above shall, in accordance with requirements 
of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of Clean Production," 






Chapter V     Supplementary Provisions 

















Summary of information requested for disclosure Time 
Requests by individuals 
1 Beijing netizen  Beijing EPB PM2.5 inspection  2011 
2 Ding Jinkun Hangzhou Forest & Water 
Bureau 
Qiandao lake water diversion project proposal and 
report 
2012 
3 Hangzhou resident Hangzhou Forest & Water 
Bureau 
Qiandao lake water diversion project proposal 2012 
4 Huai'an residents Huai'an EPB Huaigang Special Steel Co EIA report 2011 
5 Huang Jianxin Zhangjiagang EPB, Suzhou 
EPB, Jiangsu EPD 
Sewage plant EIA report 2009 
6 Mao Da MEP Result of the 2006-2008 National Survey on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants 
2011 
7 Mao Da Beijing EPB, Beijing Land & 
Resources Bureau 
2006 Report on Beijing  Domestic Waste Landfill Risk 
Evaluation 
2009 
8 Mao Da Beijing Industry & Commerce 
Bureau 
Plastic bags usage fee 2009 
9 Sun Bin Hunan EPD Neighbouring telecommunications base approval 
information 
2011 
10 Sun Nong Zhuhai EPB Used battery disposal information 2008 
11 Tianjin blogger 
Wandering Sky 
Wuqing District Government, 
Wuqing Forestry Bureau 









12 Xie Yong Hai'an County EPB, Nantong 
City EPB, Jiangsu EPD 
Hai'an Incinerator approval and inspection information 2010 
13 Xu Taisheng Shanghai Pudong District EPB, 
Shanghai EPB 
Bao Steel Plant approval and inspection record etc. 2008 
14 Xu Yu et al. Liaoning Chuyang City & 
Jianping County government 
agencies 
Water quality inspection report relating to chemical 
plant pollution 
2010 
15 Yan Yiming Henan EPD, Anhui EPD List of polluting enterprises 2008 
16 Yang Zi Beijing EPB Gao'antun Incinerator annual inspection statistics 2009 
17 Zhang Changjian etc. Pingnan EPB Houlong village dumping site approval info etc. 2008 
18 Zhang Tao Ministry of Ocean Pollution situation of Bohai oil field leaking 2011 
Requests by organizations 
19 All China 
Environmental 
Federation 
Xiuwen EPB Haoyiduo Diary Co daily inspection, EIA report and 
pollutants emission 
2011 
20 Friends of Nature MEP, Ministry of Agriculture Yangtse River Upper Reaches Endemic Fish Nature 
Reserve area readjustment 
2011 
21 Green Beagle Beijing EPB Sujiatuo Incinerator EIA public participation section 2011 
22 Green Beagle Hai'an EPB, Nantong EPB, 
Jiangsu EPD 
Hai'an Incinerator EIA and pollutant emitting data 2011 
23 Green Beagle MEP 2010 investigation result on PCBs-containing 
electrical equipment and waste electricity equipment in 
eight key provinces 
2012 
24 Green Beagle Beijing EPB Emergency Plan for Heavy-polluted Day 2012 
25 Greenpeace Shanghai Environmental 
Protection and Hygine 
Administration Bureau 
BASF pollutants emission 2008 





27 Green Watershed Bank of China Kunming 
Branch, Yunnan EPD, Yunnan 
Banking Regulatory Bureau 
Chromic slag pollution enterprises loan, regulations 2011 
28 Tianxiagong (Justices 
for all) 
Ministry of Housing and 
Construction 
List of cities where water quality below requirement 
standard 
2012 







Summary of information requested for disclosure Survey 
time 




water-related environmental information 2008 
2 Institute of Public & 
Environmental 
Affairs 
113 EPBs in China list of enterprises received environmental penalty 2008-
2011 
3 Greenpeace 15 EPBs information of polluting enterprises 2009 
4 Southern Weekend 29 EPBs in China list of enterprises received environmental penalty 2010 
5 Article 19 & Centre 
for Legal Assistance 
to Pollution Victims 
8 EPBs in China 17 types of government information as listed in Art 11 
of OEI Measures 
2010 
6 Southern Metropolis 
Daily journalist 
MEP & 19 EPDs PM2.5 & Ozone inspection statistics 2011 
7 Wuhu Ecology Centre MEP, 4 EPBs, 26 EPDs in 
China 
List of key enterprises that emit dioxin 2011-
2012 
8 Impact Law Firm 80 EPBs in China 8 types of information as listed in Art 11 of OEI 
Measures, i.e., pollutants emission 
2012 
Notes:  
The cases are numbered by the author. They do not correspond to any official documents numbers, i.e., court judgments number, with regard to the requests. 
The time recorded for disclosure requests is according to the first time when the request was submitted. 
MEP, Ministry of Environmental Protection, 环保部; EPD, Environmental Protection Department at provincial level, including autonomous regions, EPD 环保
厅；EPB, Environmental Protection Bureau below provincial level, including city, county, and district EPBs, 环保局. EPB also refers to the EPBs at the 









8.4 Appendix IV Interviews  
17 June 2010, phone interview, lawyer and former ENGO volunteer, Beijing   
18 June 2010, interview with lawyer, Beijing   
20 June 2010, discussion with journalist and environmental activist, Beijing  
21 June 2010, interview with university environmental law professor, Beijing   
1 July 2010, EPB officials, Yantai, Shandong Province        
16 July 2010, phone interview with university law professor, Beijing  
16 July 2010, phone interview with ENGO officer      
20 July 2010, phone interview with environmental lawyer, Beijing   
22 July 2010, phone interview with administrative lawyer   
23 July 2010, phone interview with pollution victim in Beijing 
25 July 2010, interview with pollution victim and her lawyer, Beijing  
30 July 2010, email discussion with lawyer 
2 August 2010, interview with ENGO officer, Beijing   
3 August 2010, phone interview with ENGO director, Beijing    
4 August 2010, discussion with ENGO officers, Beijing    
6 May 2011, interview with lawyer 1, Shanghai   
6 May 2011, interview with lawyer 2, Shanghai     
7 May 2011, interview with former ENGO volunteer, Shanghai   
8 May 2011, interview with pollution victim, Shanghai  
9 May 2011, interview with pollution victims, Zhangjiagang, Jiangsu Province  
10 May 2011, interview with pollution victim, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province   
23 May 2011, interview with lawyer of pollution victim, Beijing  





29 May 2011, interview with ENGO officer, Beijing  
30 May 2011, interview with lawyer, Beijing   
31 May 2011, interview with ENGO Officer and lawyer, Beijing   
3 June 2011, interview with environmental law professor   
3 June 2011, phone interview with administrative law professor 
9 June 2012, interview with ENGO officer, Beijing   
14 June 2012, discussion with lawyers, Anqing, Anhui Province  
15 June 2012, interview with ENGO officer, Wuhu, Anhui Province 
23 June 2012, interview with pollution victim, Shanghai  







8.5 Appendix V A Short List of Major Laws, Regulations, & Rules 
Concerning Open Environmental Information 
Laws and regulations 
1989, The Environmental Protection Law of the PRC (中华人民共和国环境保护法 EP 
Law).  
2000, The Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution Law (大气污染防治法 
PCAP Law).  
2002, The Environmental Impact Assessment law of the PRC (环境影响评价法 EIA 
Law).  
2006, The Interim Measures on Public Participation in Environmental Impact 
Assessment (环境影响评价公众参与暂行办法 PPEIA Measures).  
2008, The Prevention and Control of Water Pollution Law (水污染防治法 PCWP Law).                  
2008, The Circular Economy Promotion Law (中华人民共和国循环经济促进法 CEP 
Law). 
2009, The Plan Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (规划环境影响评价条
例 PEIA Regulations). 
2007, The Open Government Information Regulations (政府信息公开条例 OGI 
Regulations).  
2007, The Interim Measures for Open Environmental Information (环境信息公开暂行






8.6 Appendix VI Wang Xing’s 32 PM2.5 Information Disclosure 
Requests Towards MEP, EPDs, & Municipality EPBs 
Table A: Information disclosure requests submitted successfully 
 
  
Requestee Request date  Reply date Result 
MEP 7 Dec 2011 25 Dec 2011 Research data cannot disclose 
Shanghai EPB 9 Dec 2011 25 Dec 2011 PM2.5 data provided  
Beijing EPB 17 Dec 2011 10 Jan 2012 Already disclosed historical research 
data on website  
Tianjin EPB 7 Dec 2011 25 Dec 2011 Research data, not disclose 
Chongqing EPB 8 Dec 2011 12 Dec 2011 Start to monitor since 2005, data can be 
disclosed till new standards established 
Guangdong EPD 16 Dec 2011 4 Jan 2012 Research data, not belong to the 
category of information to be disclosed 
Jiangsu EPD 8 Dec 2011 19 Dec 2011 Monitor since 2010, will disclose 
according to MEP requirement 
Henan EPD 8 Dec 2011 28 Dec 2011 Did not monitor, start by 2012 in 
Zhengzhou city 




8 Dec 2011 16 Dec 2011 Did not monitor, start by 2012 in Xi’an 
city 
Xinjiang EPD 8 Dec 2011 23 Dec 2011 Did not monitor, cannot provide 
information 
Zhejiang EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply It shows “in process” on website 
Liaoning EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply Provided reference number; but cannot 
check for information disclosure result 
Jilin EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply Same as above 
Yunnan EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply Same as above 
Qinghai EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply Same as above 
Inner Mongolia 
EPD 
8 Dec 2011 No reply Same as above 
Fujian EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply Same as above 
Gansu EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply No reference number provided 
Ningxia EPD 8 Dec 2011 No reply No reference number provided 
Shanxi EPD 
山西 











The above two tables are compiled mostly according to the original table (in Chinese) 
compiled by Wang Xing, with additional information added based on the report.  The 
compilation and report of Wang Xing, see, Nanfang dushibao 11 January 2012. 
Requestee Attempted request 
date  
Reason for failure in submitting the request online 
Heihongjiang EPD 8 Dec 2011 Requires registration, waiting for confirmation 
Guizhou EPD 8 Dec 2011 Requires registration 
Shangdong EPD 8 Dec 2011 Cannot open the request form 
Guangxi EPD 8 Dec 2011 Cannot open digital forms (can open now) 
Jiangxi EPD 8 Dec 2011 Cannot submit request successfully 
Hubei EPD 8 Dec 2011 Email submit, requires copy of ID 
Anhui EPD 8 Dec 2011 Error, cannot submit 
Sichuang EPD 8 Dec 2011 No online request 
Hainan EPD 8 Dec 2011 No online request 
Tibet EPD 8 Dec 2011 No official EPD website 





8.7 Appendix VII Replies Regarding Wuhu Ecology Centre 32 Dioxin 
Information Disclosure Requests 
Table A: Information disclosure requests with replies addressing the information 
Requestee Request date Reply date Reply summary 
Hunan EPD 14 Feb 2012 12 Mar 2012 MEP did not approve, cannot provide list. 
Jiangsu EPD 20 Dec 2011 31 Dec 2011 Requested information does not exist. 
Shanghai 
EPD 
14 Feb 2012 6 Mar 2012 Information requested does not belong to government 
information that shall be disclosed according to OGI 
Regulations. 
Yunnan EPD 14 Feb 2012 8 Mar 2012 We did not monitor it, cannot provide accurate 
information 
Anhui EPD 20 Dec 2011 13 Jan 2012 We asked Chemical Division, Department of 
Pollution Prevention of MEP, the information related 
to key research project, cannot be disclosed. 
Beijing EPB 20 Dec 2011 11 Jan 2012 State secret, cannot disclose. 
Fujian EPD 20 Dec 2011  (Not recorded) The information requested for disclose does not exist.  
Guangdong 
EPD 
20 Dec 2011 16 Jan 2012 Information is already available on the website.  
With links provided.  
Guizhou 
EPD 
14 Feb 2012 21 Mar 2012 Provided list of enterprises that emit dioxin.  
Tianjin EPB 20 Dec 2011 4 Jan 2012 We cannot monitor dioxin. We plan to carry out 
investigation and then decide the list of enterprises 
emit dioxin to be disclosed.  
MEP 14 Feb 2012 2 Mar 2012 Information requested does not exist. We have not got 
the 2011 dioxin emission information. 
Jiangxi EPD 22 Feb 2012 14 Mar 2012 The issue is in process, no result is available yet. 
Shanxi  EPD 
(陕西) 
22 Feb 2012 10 April 2012 Disclosed three dioxin emission enterprises of 2010. 
Information re. 2011 will be available by June. 
Xinjiang 
EPD 
27 Feb 2012 22 Mar 2012 Due to Xinjiang as frontier and minority area, it is 
complicated society, to disclose the information might 
affect social stability of Xinjiang. 
Guangxi 
EPD 
27 Feb 2012 12 April 2012 The data is being collected. But it belongs to data in 
process and cannot be disclosed. 
Hainan EPD 27 Feb 2012 20 Mar 2012 Dioxin emission enterprises list belongs to MEP key 
research project. According to the SC opinion and art 
9(4) of Hainan OGI methods, information under 
investigation, discussion and process, cannot be 






Henan EPD 28 Mar 2012 11 April 2012 Information does not belong to the information to be 
disclosed. Art 2 of State Council Opinion 2010 
“internal management information made or obtained 
by administrative organs during their day-to-day work 
or in-process information1 under discussion, research 
or examination in general is not government 




20 Dec 2011 18 April 2012 Information does not exist. 
Ningxia 
EPD 
10 April 2012 20 April 2012 We did not categorize key enterprises that emit 
dioxin. Information cannot be provided. 
Chongqing 
EPB 
22 Fe 2012 16 
April 2012 
28 April 2012 Due to the special characters of dioxin, according to 
relevant regulations, in order to avoid causing panic 
and safeguard social stability, we cannot provide the 
list of enterprises emit dioxin.   
Hebei EPD 28 Mar 2012 4 May 2012 The list is not disclosed. 
Sichuan 
EPD 
27 Feb 2012  
25 April 2012 
17 May 2012 Did not know the enterprises emit dioxin in the 
province and cannot provide accurate data. 
Shandong 
EPD 
27 Feb 2012 6 June 2012 Does not have the complete list, and cannot provide 






Table B: Information disclosure requests without official reply addressing the 
information 
 








22 Feb 2012 
10 April 2012 
 Submitted request in written form and with ID 
according to requirement, but no reply.  
Gansu EPD 22 Feb 2012  Nobody answers contact phone.  
Qinghai 
EPD 
28 March 2012  Contacted EPD with phone, was replied cannot 
provide the list. Then no reply.  
Hubei EPD 28 March 2012  Phoned twice, replied request information was not 
complete, asked for ID 
Jilin EPD 28 March 2012  Emailed, EPD said information requested for 




28 March 2012  Could not open the information disclosure page 
online.  Later was informed a proof of “scientific 
research” was needed to request.  
Liaoning 
EPD 
22 Feb 2012  Cannot find responsible person 
Tibet EPD   No contact information 
 
Note: Compiled by the author based on materials provided by Wuhu Ecology Centre in 
June 2012.  
